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The focus of this research is uncanny reading effects in the shorter fiction of the Australian 
author, Christina Stead (1902-1983). I define the uncanny as an awareness of uncertainty over 
how to categorise something. As a reading effect, this is the experiencing of ambiguity in 
relation to a hard-to-place aspect of a narrative. I argue that Stead’s writing often depicts 
characters, situations, and atmospheres that resist categorisation, and that the form of the 
writing is, in addition, often difficult to classify. This thesis is an enquiry specifically into the 
different and innovative ways in which this ambiguity occurs in Stead’s writing, and more 
generally into the ways in which ambiguity in a narrative can be uncanny. My argument offers 
a new interpretation of Stead’s fiction, centrally of The Salzburg Tales, in the light of 
theorisations of the uncanny. Implicit in the argument is the memorable, striking quality of 
uncanny effects which, I argue, are a large part of the power of Stead’s fictional production. 
Stead’s works challenge and provoke: this thesis articulates this in terms of the uncanny. 
 
The introduction highlights patterns in the critical literature on Stead: critics repeatedly note 
that Stead’s work is hard to categorise, and that it is characterised by strangeness. I suggest 
that theories of the uncanny are helpful in theorising the hard-to-categorise and the strange. I 
discuss different interpretations of the uncanny, and how they relate to literature, including an 
exploration of ideas found in Sigmund Freud’s essay, “The ‘Uncanny’” (1919). In the first two 
chapters of the thesis I discuss uncanny effects in Stead’s work with reference to Freud’s 
theories of the return of the repressed, the return of the surmounted, and the death drive. I find 
that Freud’s ideas of the uncanny, while crucial to an understanding of subsequent 
developments in theorising the uncanny (especially in literary, visual arts, and cultural 
critique), cannot illuminate the main source of uncanny effects in Stead’s work. These, I find, 
are produced by ambiguity of category.  
 
From the third chapter onward, my thesis develops ideas to do with ambiguity of category, and 
how it produces uncanny effects, in relation to Stead’s writing. Through an analysis in chapter 
three of storytelling characters in several Stead stories, I explore how story can be a medium 
for the hard-to-categorise, and how this produces uncanny effects. In the two chapters that 
follow, I make further links between uncanny effects and the hard-to-categorise. Drawing on 
the writings of the structural anthropologist, Mary Douglas, I argue that the hard-to-categorise 
– that which falls between categories, or occupies simultaneously several usually discrete 
categories – is perceived as formless: furthermore, that the formless can be linked to what is 
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taboo. In a discussion centred on the title story in Stead’s novella collection, The Puzzleheaded 
Girl, I indicate how the evocation of formlessness is a persistent and powerful aspect of 
Stead’s work, as is her fearless evocation of the taboo. I find that the formless and the taboo 
are closely associated with uncanny effects deriving from ambiguity of category in Stead’s 
writing.  
 
In the last two chapters I focus on distinct features of Stead stories which generate an 
ambiguity of category – aspects of language (imagery) and form (elision) in the case of “The 
Captain’s House”; content in the case of “The Rightangled Creek,” in its treatment of nature. 
In discussing imagery, I adapt Roland Barthes’s understanding of the blind field, to argue that 
a striking detail in a work can elicit a trail of association in the subject: this brings to light the 
hard-to-place, which is felt as uncanny. 
 
My thesis is an exploration of powerful and key aspects of Stead’s writing. My findings are 
arrived at through analyses of works that have not received much, or any, critical attention. My 
conclusions about the uncanny and its central relation to ambiguity of category, and the links 
with formlessness and taboo, have implications for the study of Stead’s work, and for 
theorising the uncanny in literature more generally.  
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This thesis, in analysing uncanny reading effects in some of Christina Stead’s short stories 
and novellas, breaks new ground in Stead criticism in two ways. First, it explores a number of 
complex and powerful stories, many of which have been rarely, if ever, critiqued. Second, I 
find that Stead’s works are uncanny when they depict or suggest in their content, or embody 
in their form, what is difficult to categorise. Theories of the uncanny are suited to analysing 
that which is difficult to categorise. To date, however, Stead’s fiction has been only briefly 
and infrequently discussed in relation to theories of the uncanny.1 
          These opening statements immediately raise larger questions. What is the uncanny? 
What are its effects and why are these effects worth exploring? What light do theories of the 
uncanny shed on Stead’s work? 
          The critical literature on Stead frequently uses such terms as “strange,” “unsettling,” 
“curious,” or “odd” when attempting to characterise her fiction. This strangeness is often 
linked to another recurring theme in Stead criticism, that the writing is hard to categorise. This 
pattern of critical response can be traced to the first work of criticism published on Stead, M. 
Barnard Eldershaw’s 1938 essay, “Christina Stead.” In this essay, Marjorie Barnard and 
Florence Eldershaw, writing as the author M. Barnard Eldershaw, deal in part with Stead’s 
first published book, The Salzburg Tales (1934), a collection of short stories which contains 
many of the works discussed in this thesis. Stead’s writing is hard to categorise, wrote 
Barnard Eldershaw, since “the author passes from reality to illusion and mixes the actual with 
the fictitious” (30). In addition, the writing is strange, because “[t]he idiom of the books is 
individual and not conventional. At heart we are all strangers one to another, but this 
strangeness is very largely masked by the acceptance of a common vocabulary and common 
formulae. In Christina Stead, one feels that this strangeness is partly unmasked” (27). A third 
recurring theme in Stead criticism is that her writing brings to light hidden aspects of familiar 
                                                          
1 Two critical articles explicitly read for the uncanny in Stead’s work. These are Brigid 
Rooney’s “Strange Familiars” on Cotters’ England, and Manfred Mackenzie’s “Seven Poor 
Men of Sydney.” Both articles address novels. Stead published eleven novels, a collection of 
short stories, and a collection of novellas in her lifetime. Two further works of fiction, a 
novel, and Ocean of Story, which anthologises uncollected short works, were published in the 
first few years following her death, as were two volumes of her letters. A third volume of 




things, and this is also already evident in Barnard Eldershaw’s essay, which suggests that 
“[f]amiliar scenes are shown, but from a new angle, revealing curious proportions” (35).  
          These observations are refracted throughout Stead criticism. On the point of what is 
normally hidden in the familiar coming to light, Ann Blake writes of “the vertiginous pleasure 
of reading Christina Stead; to see a fresh and sometimes terrible reality cracking through the 
superficial accounts of our lives” (“A Reconsideration” 16); Elizabeth Perkins observes that 
Stead allows “characters to show themselves unmasked” (14); while Denise Brown states that 
“[t]he surface reality of Stead’s characters is frequently disturbed by undercurrents” (206). On 
strangeness, Jennifer Gribble writes that “[t]here is a dismaying strangeness about Stead’s 
genius” (“The Beauties” 324), and Kate Macomber Stern states that “[i]n Stead’s fiction the 
world is described as endlessly original and various, and it consistently surprises us and seems 
strange” (6). On the point of the works defying classification, Terry Sturm writes that 
“Christina Stead has always seemed a writer whose work does not fit comfortably into 
received categories” (89); Susan Sheridan states that Stead’s fiction “refuses neat 
accommodation into any of the usual regional, generic or stylistic categories of modern 
fiction” (Introduction xii); and Stephen Cowden notes that “her work challenges the dominant 
labels used by institutions to pigeon-hole writers; her work doesn’t sit particularly 
comfortably as ‘socialist literature,’ ‘Australian literature’ or ‘women’s literature’” (63). 
Margaret Harris also draws attention to a difficulty in classifying Stead’s work in the opening 
chapter of her edited collection of critical essays, The Magic Phrase (2000), which brings 
together some critical responses to Stead’s work. One point Harris makes about The Man Who 
Loved Children, typifies critical responses to Stead’s books: “critics could not decide how to 
read [this] novel” (11). I suggest that one central reason why Stead’s writing is perceived as 
strange is that it is hard to categorise. 
          Theories of the uncanny attempt to articulate the strangeness associated with the hard-
to-categorise. The first writing to deal with the psychology of the uncanny, Ernst Jentsch’s 
essay, “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906), theorises just this kind of uncanny effect.2 
Jentsch identifies “psychical uncertainty” as the cause of uncanny effects, an uncertainty 
arising from a subject’s inability to categorise something (9). For instance, in the context of 
                                                          
2 Jentsch’s essay appeared in English for the first time in an issue of Angelaki in 1995, 
although passages from it are cited by Sigmund Freud in his essay, “The ‘Uncanny,’” which 




literature, he notes that “one of the most reliable artistic devices for the producing of uncanny 
effects easily is to leave the reader in uncertainty as to whether he has a human person or 
rather an automaton before him in the case of a particular character” (13). By automaton, 
Jentsch implies a figure such as Olympia in “The Sandman,” a story by the German Romantic 
writer, E. T. A. Hoffmann. Olympia is a life-like doll which can move and make sounds, a 
simulacrum which can potentially pass as a human. To extrapolate from Jentsch, other 
instances of an inability to categorise, which may lead to an uncanny effect, would include the 
confusion of self with other (as in a mirror image, or a double), or of past with present 
(including the sense of déjà vu). These kinds of confusions threaten the dissolution of the 
categories by which the world is conventionally ordered. That Jentsch’s central idea remains 
of interest in studies of the uncanny is shown in three recent books on the uncanny. Paulina 
Palmer’s The Queer Uncanny (2012) and Petra Eckhard’s Chronotopes of the Uncanny 
(2011) begin with examples of the ambiguity of categories as causing uncanny effects, while 
Jo Collins and John Jervis, editors of the collection of essays, Uncanny Modernity: Cultural 
Theories, Modern Anxieties (2008), call Jentsch’s essay a “classic paper” (8), and reproduce it 
in their book. 
          Jentsch’s theory of the uncanny is able to accommodate Sigmund Freud’s conclusions 
on what constitutes the uncanny, as given in his essay, “The ‘Uncanny’” (1919). Freud begins 
his essay by attempting to rebut Jentsch’s central thesis – that the uncanny is inextricably 
bound up with uncertainty – only to increasingly give ground on this point. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the most significant point in Freud’s theory of the uncanny is that there is no 
one class of uncanny effects. The uncanny is heterogeneous. My interpretation of Freud’s 
essay stems, in part, from his offering four definitions of the uncanny in the course of the 
essay. Early on, Freud cites a definition of the uncanny given by the German philosopher, 
Friedrich Schelling: “‘everything is unheimlich [conventionally translated as “uncanny” but 
literally “unhomely”] that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light’” 
(345). Schelling’s definition is sometimes taken as Freud’s own, or conflated with his 
thinking on the uncanny. The first of Freud’s original definitions of the uncanny, given near 
the start of his essay, is that “the uncanny is that class of the frightening which leads back to 
what is known of old and long familiar” (340). The essay then traces the division of what is 
“old and long familiar” into two classes, so that Freud’s final definition in the essay of the 
uncanny becomes: “an uncanny experience [which] occurs either when infantile complexes 
which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive 
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beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed” (372, emphasis 
added).  
          Here are two classes of the uncanny, which Freud is at pains to differentiate: the 
repressed uncanny, and the surmounted uncanny. They are different things, although this is 
not often emphasised in the large volume of secondary literature on Freud’s essay. I highlight 
the distinction, as it illuminates different orders of uncanny effect, which arise from different 
sources. 
          The surmounted uncanny is felt upon the return of discarded beliefs. It would be felt, 
for example, by a person who does not normally believe in ghosts being confronted by what 
appears to be a ghost. Such a scenario is depicted in Stead’s “The Rightangled Creek,” in The 
Puzzleheaded Girl, a story in which contemporary, urban characters move into a country 
house which seems haunted. Something similar happens, too, in “The Death of Svend,” a 
story in The Salzburg Tales, when the narrator is confronted by an unusual-looking old 
woman: “‘[i]t is Death,’ I thought, very certain. A moment afterwards, I thought, ‘She must 
know she looks deathly, poor woman; I will look away.’ I did so, with an effort” (134).  
          The repressed uncanny is the return to consciousness of the repressed, for instance, 
evidence of incestuous feelings or experiences. I argue in the fifth chapter that one of Stead’s 
stories in The Salzburg Tales, “The Little Old Lady,” is uncanny because it depicts such a 
return. In this story, a man takes his lover and his mother to watch an opera; the mother talks 
throughout the performance, telling the younger woman how much the man loves his mother, 
and she him.  
          The return of both repressed and surmounted material is labelled “regression” by Freud. 
The idea of the repressed is familiar enough from Freud’s ubiquitously circulated theory of 
repression, relating centrally to sexuality. What constitutes the surmounted, however, is not so 
well-known. Two key passages on the surmounted uncanny in “The ‘Uncanny’” detail what it 
is. Writing in regard to the possibility of the supernatural, the magical, and the animistic, 
Freud states:  
We – or our primitive forefathers – once believed that these possibilities 
were realities, and were convinced that they actually happened. Nowadays 
we no longer believe in them, we have surmounted these modes of thought; 
but we do not feel quite sure of our new beliefs, and the old ones still exist 
with us ready to seize upon any confirmation. As soon as something 
actually happens in our lives which seems to confirm the old, discarded 
beliefs we get a feeling of the uncanny.  (370-71) 
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According to Freud, a writer can recreate this effect by: 
in a sense betraying us [the reader] to the superstitiousness which we have 
ostensibly surmounted; he deceives us by promising to give us the sober 
truth and then after all overstepping it. We react to his inventions as we 
would have reacted to real experiences; by the time we have seen through 
his trick it is already too late.  (374)3 
This passage maintains that uncanny effects arising from the surmounted can only derive from 
fiction that purports to be giving “the sober truth,” that is, realist fiction.  
          In his essay, Freud also alludes to two further classes – two more sources – of the 
uncanny, something not explicit in any of his given definitions. These additional classes are 
effects to do with the death drive, and uncanny effects specific to storytelling. Discussion of  
the death drive is broken off after a paragraph or so in the middle of the essay (360-61), while 
the uncanny effects specific to literature (the “literary uncanny”) are given in several pages 
near the end (372-76). My theoretical starting point in the first chapter focuses on ideas to do 
with the repressed uncanny, and in the second the surmounted and the death drive; the 
uncanniness specific to story or narrative is the subject of my third chapter, although Freud’s 
thinking on the literary uncanny is not central to the argument there. 
          What the four classes of Freud’s uncanny share is the central insight of his essay: that 
uncanny effects are elicited at the return of something which was once familiar, yet has now 
become strange. Freud begins his essay by pointing out that the word heimlich (commonly 
translated as “homely” or “familiar”) can merge in meaning with its antonym, unheimlich, so 
that in some contexts, heimlich also means unheimlich (344).4 For Freud, the uncanny consists 
                                                          
3 How can common or familiar reality be defined, especially in the context of reading fiction,  
which involves the suspension of disbelief? Elements of my working definition of “familiar 
reality” are implicit in Freud’s observation about the narrative technique used to elicit 
uncanny effects from the surmounted, found in the passage above: the terms “sober,” “truth,” 
“ostensibly,” and “real experiences” show Freud shoring up what comprises a familiar reality. 
His implicit definition of familiar reality also has a temporal aspect – things must be timely 
and not be “too late”; a spatial aspect – things are not to be “overstepped”; and also an ethical 
dimension in that it is not to be betrayed. Familiar reality is contrasted with 
“superstitiousness,” “inventions,” or a “trick,” and it has understood material conditions. 
 
4 Freud cites numerous dictionary entries for “heimlich” and “unheimlich” near the beginning 
of his essay. To give somewhat more contemporary definitions of the terms, according to 
Cassell’s German and English Dictionary, unheimlich means “uncanny, sinister; 
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in the coincidence of two apparently contradictory sets of ideas, the strange and the familiar, 
apparent in the word heimlich. Yet this, ultimately, is a case of ambiguity of categories, of an 
inability to place or classify something.5 
          Aside from noting that Freud identifies four classes of uncanny effects and gives at 
least as many definitions of the term, it is also worth highlighting some general observations 
made in the course of his essay. Freud associates uncanny effects with childhood fears to do 
with silence, solitude, and darkness (369-70, 376). He enumerates other links between the 
uncanny and childhood, such as the formation of the castration complex (354), and the 
common belief in children of the omnipotence of thoughts: that they only have to wish for 
something, for instance, to make it come true (363). He also links the uncanny to the figure of 
the double (356-58), and to coincidence and repetition (358-60).  
          Freud’s theory struggles to limit the uncanny. He argues, for instance, that the uncanny 
manifests in the return of the surmounted, the repressed, and in the surfacing of the death 
drive. These processes, however, are pervasive in his models of mental life. Jentsch’s notion 
of the uncanny, as that which cannot be categorised, is more precise than Freud’s. In this 
thesis, I use it to selectively draw upon Freud’s theories of the surmounted, repressed, and the 
death drive in their relation to the uncanny. I argue that the surmounted, the repressed, and the 
death drive are only uncanny when they cannot be categorised. 
          It is hard to over-estimate the influence of Freud’s essay on subsequent writing on the 
uncanny. Michael Saler writes in 2008 that Freud “can no longer have the last word” on the 
uncanny (198). Given that he died over seventy years ago, it might be uncanny if he did, but 
such remarks underscore how pervasively influential Freud’s essay has been.6 Julia Kristeva 
articulates one reason for the ongoing relevance of Freud’s thinking on the topic: “a first step 
was taken [by Freud in “The ‘Uncanny’”] that removed the uncanny strangeness from the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
uncomfortable, uneasy; gloomy, dismal, weird,” while heimlich means “secret, concealed; 
stealthy, underhand, furtive, secretive, close; private, secluded; comfortable, snug.” 
5 Schelling’s definition of the uncanny, too, ultimately involves an ambiguity of categories. In 
his definition, the category of the hidden coincides with the category of the revealed. 
 
6 In another testament to the persisting centrality of Freud’s essay, nine of the ten collected 
essays in Collins and Jervis’s Uncanny Modernity discuss Freud’s work in their first few 




outside, where fright had anchored it, to locate it inside” (Strangers 183). Engagement with 
Freud’s uncanny is engagement with most of what has since been written on the topic.  
          At various points in this thesis I draw on more recent writers on the uncanny, including 
Tzvetan Todorov, Jacques Derrida, and Julia Kristeva, to extend or elaborate ideas to do with 
literature and the uncanny. Yet, it is extending or elaborating that seems to be what these 
writers have in common in their writing on the uncanny, for while the applications may 
change, the central ideas concerning the uncanny, as suggested in the essays by Jentsch and 
Freud, have not. Few theorists of the uncanny have gone beyond Freud or Jentsch’s main 
propositions, and it is because of this that I spend time restating and discussing them. The 
continuing relevance of Jentsch and Freud to thinking on the uncanny becomes clear in 
Nicholas Royle’s definition of the uncanny at the beginning of his 2003 book, The Uncanny. 
Over the course of almost two pages, Royle summarises the current thinking on the topic. In 
this comprehensive summary, there is little that does not draw on ideas on the uncanny in the 
two essays by Freud and Jentsch. To cite Royle’s second and third sentences: “[t]he uncanny 
is ghostly. It is concerned with the strange, weird and mysterious, with a flickering sense (but 
not conviction) of something supernatural” (1). This alludes to Freud’s idea of the surmounted 
uncanny. Royle continues: “[t]he uncanny involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular 
regarding the reality of who one is and what is being experienced” (1). This recalls Jentsch, 
and the summary continues in this way.7 While Royle gives much space to Derrida’s writings 
in The Uncanny, he states near the beginning of his 340-page book that “[i]n many respects 
the present study seeks to provide little more than a reading of Freud’s short text” (6). 
          The uncanny might also be understood in relation to what the Russian Formalists 
theorise as ostraneniye, or defamiliarisation. Viktor Shklovsky writes that “[t]he technique of 
art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and 
length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be 
prolonged” (12). This is in order to promote a “renewed and sharpened attention to reality” 
(Bennett 26). If this is so, then the production of uncanny effects might be considered a 
specific function of the techniques of art theorised as defamiliarisation. In both cases the ends 
– making unfamiliar what hitherto had seemed familiar – appear much the same. Both rely on 
                                                          
7 In Royle’s summation of thinking on the uncanny, those ideas that cannot be traced to 
Jentsch or Freud derive from Derrida. Derrida’s writings, including Dissemination (1981) and 




eliciting a sense of strangeness to change perception in a reader. The means by which this is 
achieved, however, differ. The Russian Formalist theorists focus on the coupling of things 
considered unlike. Conventionally unlike things are paired to create surprising links which 
make the subject perceive the world afresh. Uncanny effects, however, derive from the 
apparently alike, not unlike. As Stephen Frosh writes, “[t]he uncanny . . .  is not absolutely 
other: rather it has a familiar quality . . . the small and unexpected difference that is the 
almost-the-same brings to light . . . enough to open up a crack in identity” (16-17). This 
“crack” is to do with an undermining of categories: “[t]he uncanny suggests the existence of 
something odd that we have not noticed before, something that undermines the unattended-to 
foundations on which we stand” (15). Frosh continues:  “[w]hereas the absolutely alien is a 
clear threat, the almost-the-same is deceptive. It reassures us that it is a friend but then turns 
out to be on its own mission” (16). The means by which strangeness is elicited, then, is 
different in the uncanny to those techniques of defamiliarisation identified by the Russian 
Formalists. In the case of the uncanny, things assumed to be the same prove to be different, 
and their difference is often not immediately apparent. (This also helps to distinguish the 
uncanny from Kristeva’s “abject,” Kristeva’s abject being clearly other.) 
          The ends, or effects of the uncanny and defamiliarisation, too, are only roughly the 
same. Ideas of defamiliarisation highlight the ways in which the world is made to appear 
afresh and particular again. The uncanny does this as well, but the result includes an 
additional element. It includes a sense of apprehension, in the sense of having a heightened 
awareness of something as yet unknown. The nature of this apprehension points to what I 
consider to be the origin of the uncanny. The uncanny thing or sensation is that which cannot 
be placed, or categorised. That which cannot be placed might be something new and 
wonderful; it could also be potentially threatening. Either way, it requires close attention. 
Things that cannot be placed can include the “transitional,” the term used by anthropological 
theorists for people and things which are between recognisable states: “transition is neither 
one state nor the next, it is undefinable,” writes the structural anthropologist, Mary Douglas 
(Purity 96). In the course of this thesis I also link the uncanny to the formless and the taboo – 
but as with the transitional, I consider these things uncanny only when they are ambiguous in 
category. 
          Royle’s study, The Uncanny, and the collection of essays edited by Collins and Jervis, 
Uncanny Modernity, are important books for understanding how thinking on the uncanny has 
developed in recent years. Other recent books on the uncanny, such as those by Eckhard and 
Palmer, offer thematic readings of various novels, employing theories of the uncanny. 
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Kenneth Gelder and Jane Jacobs’s Uncanny Australia (1998) develops a reading of the genre 
of the colonial ghost story in terms of the uncanny, but only as part of a single chapter. Other 
contributions to theory of the uncanny, and its relation to literature, occur in works which use 
the terms “fantasy” or “fantastic” instead of “uncanny.” These include Rosemary Jackson’s 
Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion (1981). I discuss Jackson’s ideas on fantasy, in 
particular in relation to character, in the fourth chapter of this thesis.  
          Another book that is frequently alluded to in discussions of the uncanny is Todorov’s 
The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, first published in French in 1970, 
and translated into English in 1973. Todorov attempts to provide a definition of the uncanny 
as a genre. He does this by exploring its relation to other genres, such as the fantastic. He 
concludes that the fantastic incites uncertainty in the subject about what is real, and remains 
always irrational; the uncanny, however, seems fantastic, but ultimately can be explained 
rationally (25-26, 46). Eckhard, who provides a long discussion of Todorov’s theory (32-40), 
notes that “Todorov’s fantastic bears a striking similarity to Jentsch’s uncanny” (35). Tom 
Gunning, in his essay “Uncanny Reflections,” also identifies the uncanny with the ongoing 
uncertainty that Todorov associates with the fantastic. Gunning writes: “I think it can be 
demonstrated that the genre of the Fantastic [as understood by Todorov] is closer to the 
uncanny as understood by Freud and Jentsch” (“Uncanny” 71). Gunning notes that in 
Todorov’s book, “l’étrange” is translated as “uncanny,” and he considers that it might be 
better translated as “strange” (71). Todorov nevertheless makes many observations pertinent 
to reading effects associated with the uncanny, which I refer to at times in this thesis. I have 
not found it helpful to think of the uncanny in terms of genre, but more as a free-floating 
effect which can inhabit any literary genre, or any artistic production. 
          For other commonly used terms, I use these definitions: “realism” is “the accurate 
depiction in any literary work of the everyday life of a place or period” (Murfin and Ray 
328),8 while the “marvellous” is a genre that assumes a reality where everyday laws of 
                                                          
8 The term realism, however, is helpful only to an extent in regard to Stead’s work. This is 
because, as Terry Sturm writes, Stead “insists … on the non-manipulative nature of her 
approach to fiction , the absence of programmatic interactions”; Sturm claims that this 
approach is at odds with the standpoint of “socialist realism that shares with bourgeois realism 
the assumption that fiction ‘illustrates’ pre-formed theories or explorations of behaviour, thus 
depriving it of any radical exploratory possibilities. … A critical terminology derived from 
the older categories of bourgeois realism, naturalism and socialist realism does not, then, 




materiality can be exceeded. I use “genre” as John Kinsella defines it: “[g]enre is category – 
category of recognition. . . . It is about a set of rules that dictate the probable flow of narrative, 
of the conditions of encounter with character and setting. The reader expects certain patterns 
to be created, engaged with” (57). “Category” is a term much contested in philosophy, as the 
voluminous secondary literature on Aristotle’s book on categories attests. The Oxford English 
Dictionary Online defines “category” as “[a] term (meaning literally ‘predication’ or 
‘assertion’) given to certain general classes of terms, things, or notions; the use being very 
different with different authors.” 
 
 
Had Stead ever read Freud’s essay, “The ‘Uncanny’”? Stead’s knowledge of Freud was 
almost certainly deeper than is suggested by her dismissive remarks about psychoanalysis and 
its key founder, made in interviews and inserted into her fiction. Already apparent in The 
Salzburg Tales, her first-published work, is a pattern of the disparaging of psychoanalysis. 
The first English translation of Freud’s essay appeared in 1925. It seems unlikely that Stead 
could have read it before then, as she did not learn German at school (Wetherell 433). It is 
possible she heard about the essay in psychology lectures she attended. Stead studied 
psychology as part of her training at Sydney Teachers’ College in 1920 (Rowley 47). Soon 
after, in 1922, she worked as a research assistant for a psychologist, and attended lectures on 
Freud (50); in 1924 she was employed as a Junior Lecturer in Psychology (54). From the late 
1920s, Stead was living with a German-speaking bibliophile, William Blake, who may have 
read the essay in German. I can find no reference to “The ‘Uncanny’” in Stead’s letters, 
fiction, or interviews. She presumably absorbed an appreciation of uncanny effects, and how 
to write them, from other authors. Freud draws on some of these same authors. Both were 
clearly taken, for instance, with Hoffmann’s “The Sandman,”9 and I draw attention to some of 
the debts owed by Stead to Hoffmann in the second chapter.  
 
 
A series of close readings of some of Stead’s shorter fiction, that is, her stories and novellas, 
is at the heart of this thesis. I have not excluded discussion of Stead’s novels, but limit this to 
                                                          





the amplification of my arguments about the shorter fiction. I focus on Stead’s shorter works 
as they are complex, accomplished, and powerful, and have tended to be neglected in Stead 
criticism. Discussing a number of stories also allows me to demonstrate that different kinds of 
uncanny effects emerge in different ways in various Stead narratives.10 
          Stead’s shorter work is found in three volumes, widely separated in publication dates: 
the collection of short stories, The Salzburg Tales (1934); the collection of four novellas, The 
Puzzleheaded Girl (1967); and the posthumously published anthology of short stories, essays, 
and other short pieces, Ocean of Story (1985).11 I discuss works from each of these three 
books.  
          In The Salzburg Tales I focus on “The Triskelion,” “The Mirror,” “The Death of 
Svend,” “The Marionettist,” and “Gaspard,” and give brief readings of “A Russian Heart,” 
“The Little Old Lady,” “Day of Wrath,” and “The Centenarist’s Tales (VII).” These stories 
are not entirely distinct, as The Salzburg Tales is structured according to the models of 
Boccaccio’s Decameron and Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales: a series of tales is told by a number 
of narrators to an audience collected together by circumstance, and responses between tales 
are included. In Stead’s case, the storytellers are gathered for the Salzburg Festival, some 
years after the First World War (Stead attended the Salzburg Festival in 1930). Stead’s 
storytellers are a disparate group, and they pass the time between festival performances by 
telling each other tales. The Salzburg Tales begins with a description of these assembled 
storytellers, or “personages,” as Stead calls them. Thirty-two named tales follow, narrated by 
thirty of those assembled. The stories are told over seven days, and the narrative divided into 
seven parts: at the end of each day, the personage of the Centenarist, nominated by the others 
as a master of ceremonies, tells his own tales, comprised of strings of anecdotes, jokes, and 
                                                          
10 A link may exist between shorter works and the production of uncanny effects. The most 
frequently identified exponents of the uncanny, E. T. A. Hoffmann and Edgar Allan Poe, are 
best known for works shorter than novel length. It may be that the ambiguity of 
categorisation, which I argue elicits the uncanny, is harder to sustain over the course of a long 
work. In Stead’s novels, uncanny effects are usually either intermittent or concentrated in 
relatively discrete episodes.  
 
11 A late short story, “The Palace with Several Sides,” appeared separately in 1987 in 
Southerly.  It was one of Stead’s stories unpublished at the time of her death, and omitted 
from Ocean of Story. R. G. Geering, who chose the pieces that comprise Ocean of Story, 
provided no reason for the omission when he oversaw the later publication of “The Palace 




traditional stories. The audience usually comments upon each tale after it has ended, and often 
an anecdote, or part of one, is told in the lead-up to a tale, or as a spin-off. This makes the 
exact number of narratives related in The Salzburg Tales hard to tally, which is in keeping 
with a question asked in several ways in the book: Does narrative ever end?12 
            From Ocean of Story I read “The Captain’s House,” “I Live in You,” and “My Friend, 
Lafe Tilly.” Later chapters address two novellas in The Puzzleheaded Girl: the title story, and 
“The Rightangled Creek.” The stories I have chosen are those that I consider most 
demonstrably produce uncanny effects. 
           Compared to Stead’s novels, relatively little criticism has been published on any of 
these volumes. As mentioned, Barnard Eldershaw addresses The Salzburg Tales as part of the 
first example of Stead criticism. In the sixty-five years between the publication of Barnard 
Eldershaw’s article, and Michael Ackland’s in 2003, it appears that only one other addresses 
The Salzburg Tales. This is Lorna Tracy’s “The Virtue of Story” (1982), in which she makes 
a claim for Stead’s originality in the short story form. Ackland extends Tracy’s argument to 
take issue with Diana Brydon’s statement, made in a passing overview of The Salzburg Tales 
in her book on Stead, that the work is “accomplished but conventional” (53). Ackland 
demonstrates how Stead works with her influences, especially E. T. A. Hoffmann, and in 
particular his story, “The Sandman.” The Salzburg Tales, argues Ackland, refashions 
European storytelling traditions. However, a difference between Stead and Hoffmann, 
according to Ackland, is that Stead’s work lacks the uncanny element so pronounced in 
Hoffmann: “[t]here was no point . . . in trying to return to the uncanny realm of Hoffmann” 
(63).  The reason for this is that, between the times of Hoffmann and Stead, “intellectually 
there had been a massive shift. Devilish forces, witches and fairies still people the popular 
imagination in the Romantic’s [Hoffmann’s] time. . . . By the 1930s , the former theatre of  
                                                          
12 While the resemblance in the structure of The Salzburg Tales to the Decameron and the 
Canterbury Tales is often noted, two authors important to Stead also use the technique of a 
gathered circle of narrators swapping tales and then commenting on the tales among 
themselves; Balzac does this in Autre étude de femme, for example, and E. T. A. Hoffmann in 
The Serapion Brethren. In an introduction to a collection of Hoffmann tales, J. M. Cohen 
writes: “The Serapion Brethren [a society of which Hoffmann was part] lend their name to a 
collection of some of his tales, the last to be published in Hoffmann’s life-time. These, 
although written for no such framework, are put into the mouths of six friends of contrasted 
characters who are made to tell them and to comment on them in short conversational 
interludes interspersed among the narratives” (12-13). Apart from the number of narrators, 




inherited deities was . . . hollow; its otherworldly cast was re-envisaged definitively in terms 
of natural or psychic forces” (63).  
          In making this argument, Ackland suggests that Stead’s stories lack an uncanny 
element. I argue, however, that uncanny effects do not only derive from shifting intellectual 
worldviews. In Freud’s terms, this would apply only to uncanny effects produced by the 
surmounted uncanny. Even according to Freud, as indicated above, uncanny effects can derive 
from other sources, and I argue that they derive from ambiguity of category. While a story 
such as “The Marionettist” owes a debt to Hoffmann’s writing, as Ackland shows, I argue, in 
chapters two and three, that its uncanny effects are produced in ways different from 
Hoffmann’s. 
          Since Ackland’s article, Brigid Rooney has analysed “Day of Wrath” as part of her 
chapter, “Time’s Abyss,” in Scenes of Reading: Is Australian Literature a World Literature? 
(2013). Rooney argues that the story, which tells of a ferry sinking in Sydney Harbour, 
portrays Sydney Harbour as a site of the uncanny, as it is the scene of a series of inversions:  
the abyss of the harbour is only “apparently tamed and domesticated,” and the enclosed 
waterway “effects an uncanny inversion of the usual scene of shipwreck,” that is, the ocean 
(106). Rooney focuses on place and gender in her reading. My discussion of the story, in 
chapters four and six, explores uncanny effects deriving from states of transition depicted in 
the story, and the story’s imagery. 
          Apart from these works, some references to The Salzburg Tales appear in anthologies 
of Australian literary criticism and the monographs on Stead. H. M. Green, in A History of 
Australian Literature (1961), writes: “[t]hese tales have an extraordinary range of scene, 
subject, character and manner: comedies, tragedies, fairy-tales, fantasies, extravaganzas; they 
are idealistic, ludicrous, cynical, adventurous and exciting, pathetic sometimes, but there is 
something of all these kinds and qualities in almost every one of them.” This emphasises 
again the difficulties of categorising Stead’s work, as does the observation that follows: “[a]ll 
the tales are fantasies, though most are realistic in their own way” (1172). The first 
monograph on Stead, R. G. Geering’s Christina Stead in 1969, contains a similarly 
appreciative summation of The Salzburg Tales. Writing in his expanded 1979 edition of the 
book, Geering is also struck by the diversity of modes employed in The Salzburg Tales. 
According to him, Stead appropriates traditional modes: “[t]he kind of book she has . . . 
chosen to write makes possible the artistic exploitation of different modes” (54). Joan Lidoff, 
in her 1982 study, notices polarities in Stead’s writing that she considers unresolved at the 
time of The Salzburg Tales: in this book, Stead’s “voice of romantic and psychologically 
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probing fantasy wars with her coolly controlled satiric realism” (109). Some of Lidoff’s 
comments on Stead’s fiction in general are relevant to The Salzburg Tales. Lidoff stresses a 
hybrid quality as being characteristic: “Stead has always had this access to fantasy’s 
extremities and insists on the importance of fantasy to quotidian existence; she refuses to 
draw an absolute line between the two” (110). Lidoff is also insistent on Stead’s commitment 
to unveil what is normally hidden, noting her “profound attention to the particularity and 
complexity of the inner regions of the primitive imagination” (110).  
          Brydon gives a few pages to The Salzburg Tales in her book, Christina Stead. She 
argues that the collection is imitative and repeats patriarchal conventions: “The Salzburg 
Tales swallows European traditions whole . . . here [Stead] is content to imitate – to 
demonstrate her often dazzling skill as a ventriloquist, allowing the tradition’s old voices to 
speak through her” (44). In this rather uncanny description, the author as storyteller is a 
medium, an idea which I explore further in the third chapter of this thesis. Brydon suggests 
that one of the stories in The Salzburg Tales, “The Little Old Lady,” is unshaped reportage: 
“[t]he teller’s [the story’s narrator’s] passion for eavesdropping, that makes of him a 
‘connoisseur of what people say in the dark’ . . . is clearly also Stead’s. But the connoisseur 
must be more than just a tape recorder” (45). Brydon is not the only critic to make this kind of 
observation in regard to Stead’s writing. Randall Jarrell, for instance, states that Stead’s 
writing “can rattle along indefinitely” (27). I discuss “The Little Old Lady” in my fifth 
chapter. 
          Gribble’s Christina Stead (1994) pays more attention to Stead’s narrative techniques 
than most of the preceding books. As with Barnard Eldershaw, Geering, and Lidoff, she 
emphasises the varied forms in The Salzburg Tales, noting that the stories show the “narrative 
indeterminacies most clearly seen in dream and folk-tale” (29). She writes that “the fairy-tale 
mode . . . has an indeterminacy in which Stead delights” (26). For example, the horrors of 
“The Triskelion” are told “in a disarmingly anecdotal manner. . . . There is a teasing play of 
incongruity and congruence between this traditional narrative game and the domestic horror it 
unfolds” (28). Gribble briefly yet suggestively explores Stead’s use in The Salzburg Tales of 
elision, allusion, imagery, and dreams. According to her, the repressed is always surfacing in 
Stead’s characters in what resembles an uncanny, compulsive, Freudian process. Stead 
records “the unquenchable flow of compulsive narrators” (28). Gribble also notes the 




          In summary, of the thirteen books of criticism on Stead, or which address her work in 
part, only three discuss The Salzburg Tales in any detail (the books entitled Christina Stead 
by Geering, Lidoff, and Gribble). The two other books which provide overviews of her work 
– also entitled Christina Stead – either omit (Sheridan) or give cursory treatment (Brydon) to 
the book. In The Magic Phrase one essay deals in part with The Salzburg Tales (this is 
Barnard Eldershaw’s piece). The remaining seven books on Stead’s fiction (by Clancy, 
Gardiner, Stern, Yelin, Blake, Pender, and Petersen) give readings that focus almost 
exclusively on Stead’s novels, mentioning The Salzburg Tales in passing, if at all. This 
appears to be the sum total of the critical writing on The Salzburg Tales, although the 
introductions to various editions provide an overview of changing critical ideas in relation to 
the book.  
          In 1967 Stead published a collection of four novellas, The Puzzleheaded Girl, which 
included “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” “The Dianas,” “The Rightangled Creek,” and “Girl from 
the Beach.” Four critical articles discuss stories from this collection. Ian Reid is interested in 
the formal aspects of the novellas, while Judith Kegan Gardiner offers a feminist 
interpretation of the “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” as does Dorothy Jones of “The Rightangled 
Creek.” Michael Wilding, in “Christina Stead’s The Puzzleheaded Girl,” reads Marxist-
materialist themes in the stories. The novella collection is descriptively dealt with in several 
of the monographs on Stead, while Teresa Petersen, in The Enigmatic Christina Stead (2003), 
gives a biographical-psychoanalytic reading of “The Puzzleheaded Girl.” Petersen’s 
interpretation is in the tradition of Freudian criticism in id-psychology, in which the author 
and the author’s characters are, in essence, psychoanalysed by the critic. For Petersen, the 
protagonists of the novella are projections of Stead and her husband, William Blake. 
          Ocean of Story has received the least critical attention of any of Stead’s works, with 
Ann Blake the only critic to write on it. In her article, “Christina Stead’s Ocean of Story” 
(1986), she provides an overview of the book, noting the use of the double in the story, “A 
Harmless Affair.” In a 1993 article and in her book, Christina Stead’s Politics of Place, Blake 
writes on four of Stead’s late short stories, collected in Ocean of Story, as part of her enquiry 
into Stead’s materialist analysis of post-war English society. One of the stories in Ocean of 
Story, “A Night in the Indian Ocean,” has been discussed by Fiona Morrison in her article, 
“The Elided Middle,” primarily to expand an analysis of Stead’s novel, For Love Alone. 
Morrison refers to the ideas of the early twentieth-century anthropologist, Arnold van 
Gennep, whose work informs Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger (1966), a work I draw upon 
in the middle and last chapters of this thesis.  
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           Critical approaches to Stead’s work have frequently included biographical-
psychoanalytical, Marxist, feminist, and post-colonial methodologies. This thesis has a 
different emphasis. Its centre lies in investigating formal questions to do with aesthetics, 
through close readings of Stead stories. I recognise the pervasiveness of a concern with 
politics, including sexual politics, in Stead’s writing, and aesthetics, as Terry Eagleton, among 
others, has argued at length, is culturally constructed and political. The production of uncanny 
effects, for example, is an effect sometimes tied to changing worldviews, an idea I explore 
more closely in my second chapter. Stead was able to criticise the left of politics, even as a 
writer of the left, by leaving a great deal implicit in her work, an elision that often coincides 
with uncanny reading effects (Stead’s late novel, Cotters’ England, sustains this throughout). 
In turn, the right of politics is satirised in the story, “The Captain’s House,” in Ocean of Story, 
with a critique that also coincides with uncanny effects (I discuss “The Captain’s House” in 
chapter six below). My main concern in this thesis, however, is to suggest first how and why a 
range of Stead’s works are experienced as uncanny. 
           How I understand “aesthetics” is shown by what I do in this thesis: I analyse a 
particular reading effect, that of the uncanny, and explore how it is produced by processes in 
the reader in conjunction with the content, structure, or language of a story. This, in part, is a 
response to an observation made by Harris: 
There are . . . many formal questions, to do with narrative in the broadest 
sense, and with particular questions of language and narrative technique, 
that cry out for more sustained answers than they have had to date [in Stead 
criticism]. Stead’s prose is instantly recognisable, and infinitely chameleon. 
But I don’t think we’ve found satisfactory ways of talking about some of her 
characteristic ways of writing. . . . We need more strenuous examination of 
her use of various genres, and the intricacies of her narrative technique.  (“A 
Note” 164) 
Harris wrote this in 1993, but it still largely holds.13 Susan Sheridan notes something similar: 
“we tend to ignore the prodigious variety of the narrative experiments [Stead] set herself” 
(Christina 17). Every Stead novel has a unique form. Her shorter fictions are singular in form, 
                                                          
13 In relation to Stead’s shorter fiction, two critics in particular do address some of its formal 
qualities: Jennifer Gribble in discussing The Salzburg Tales in her book, Christina Stead, and 
Ian Reid in “Form and Expectation,” an article concerned with Stead’s use of form in “The 
Puzzleheaded Girl” and “The Rightangled Creek.” 
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too, and often technically complex. Stead frequently used shorter narratives to develop, or try 
her hand, at various narrative techniques.  
 
 
This thesis has seven chapters. The first two chapters read uncanny effects in Stead’s writing 
in relation to Freud’s theory of the uncanny. As indicated above, I adopt Freud’s thinking on 
the uncanny only in part, and not uncritically. I seek to clarify my conception of the uncanny 
by exploring ideas about the uncanny in relation to Freud’s essay. In the first chapter, I 
identify at what points uncanny effects emerge in Stead’s “The Triskelion,” a key story in The 
Salzburg Tales, and investigate how they might be illuminated by Freud’s thinking on the 
uncanny. I conclude that many of the narrative’s uncanny effects can be read as corresponding 
with Freud’s repressed uncanny, while ideas to do with his surmounted uncanny are of 
relatively minor importance to the narrative. This is surprising, as the story has supernatural 
content in a narrative that initially establishes a familiar reality, which, according to Freud, is 
just the kind of narrative that elicits uncanny effects from the surmounted. I explore why the 
apparition of the triskelion in Stead’s story produces little or no uncanny effect. This involves 
an investigation of the relationship between uncanny reading effects, the supernatural, and the 
role of genre, in this case the genres of realism and the marvellous. Distinguishing between 
the repressed and surmounted uncanny in “The Triskelion” allows for a more precise 
discussion of what causes uncanny effects in the narrative, and how they are produced. The 
distinction also allows me to suggest that uncanny effects deriving from the repressed 
uncanny can be elicited in any narrative genre, including marvellous narratives. Other 
uncanny effects in “The Triskelion,” however, cannot be explained in the terms given in 
Freud’s theory of the uncanny. I discuss some of these instances in terms of Jentsch’s theory 
of the uncanny. The chapter raises more questions than it attempts to answer, questions that 
indicate lines of development for the chapters which follow.  
          My second chapter begins by focusing on an issue raised in chapter one: the conditions 
under which the evocation of the supernatural in a narrative elicits uncanny effects. In order to 
do this, I contrast two stories in The Salzburg Tales, “The Mirror” and “The Death of Svend.” 
Each story introduces a supernatural element into an initially realist narrative, but to different 
effect. “The Mirror,” after a realistic beginning, depicts clairvoyance in a mirror, while “The 
Death of Svend,” also after a realistic beginning, climaxes with a personification of Death. In 
the latter story, I argue that the appearance of the supernatural is felt as uncanny, while the 
clairvoyance in the former story is not. I explore why this might be the case, and find that 
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some beliefs are more surmounted than others: the less surmounted they are, the easier it is to 
make them return in the reader. Ideas to do with death, for example, are not well surmounted, 
and can still be made to return with relative ease. When they return, they can be felt as 
uncanny. The remainder of the chapter is an exploration of the relation between death and the 
uncanny in several Stead stories, particularly “Gaspard” in The Salzburg Tales. This 
discussion draws on ideas articulated in Freud’s theory of the death drive. The death drive can 
be defined as an “organism’s wish to return to a . . . stable state” (Wright 129); with the drive, 
“an element internal to the organism itself takes death as its end, and life is only a means to 
that end” (Faulkner 157). According to Freud, the death drive is felt as uncanny when the 
normally hidden drive comes to light. In my reading of “Gaspard,” I argue that the coming to 
light of the normally hidden drive is not sufficient in itself to create uncanny effects, but that 
it is the difficulty in categorising what has come to light that produces uncanny effects. I 
explore how something resembling the death drive is invoked in “Gaspard” by distortions of 
time in the form of haunting and foreboding, the motif of the double, and repetition.  
          The discussion of death and its connections with the uncanny is expanded in the third 
chapter, specifically in relation to narrative’s ability to speak of death and other hidden, 
marginalised, and forbidden topics. This chapter centres on analyses of portraits of storytellers 
in Stead’s short stories. I focus particularly on the storyteller figures depicted in two stories in 
The Salzburg Tales, “The Marionettist,” and “The Mirror,” and two in Ocean of Story, “My 
Friend, Lafe Tilly,” and “I Live in You.” The storytellers in these narratives are uncanny 
figures, I argue, due to their stories telling of things that resist easy categorisation – which 
include the forbidden, forgotten, and the inconvenient yet apparent (such as death). When 
narrative tells of the hard-to-place, it is not only the story, but the storyteller, and the act of 
storytelling, which become potentially uncanny. 
          The fourth chapter takes the step of linking the categorically ambiguous to the idea of 
the formless, as theorised in the writings of Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger. The 
formless, according to Douglas, is that which resists categorisation. I argue that in Stead’s 
novella, “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” the story’s protagonist, Honor, defies categorisation. She 
can be regarded as formless. At times she seems to be conventionally human, but at other 
times is more like a spirit or an animal. This movement between categories means Honor 
becomes uncanny. This kind of characterisation makes ambiguous, too, how the novella is to 
be read, as the characterisation moves at times toward the marvellous, while at other times it 
is realistic. The ambiguous genre of the narrative, and the ambiguous characterisation of the 
protagonist, means these things verge on the formless: that is, they do no not fall into any one 
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category, or they simultaneously occupy more than one category. I end the chapter by 
pursuing connections between formlessness and states of transition suggested by Douglas: 
states of transition are periods when a subject moves between categories. This, I argue, makes 
transition, or what might also be termed metamorphosis, potentially uncanny. I discuss a 
number of Stead stories in which characters are depicted in states of transition, sometimes to 
uncanny effect.  
          In chapter five I pursue the links between the uncanny and formlessness to include their 
relation to taboo. Douglas shows how taboos are imposed on formless things. Addressing the 
taboo, or the suggestion of a transgression of a taboo, is a persistent feature of Stead’s fiction. 
I note how characters in Stead stories cross boundaries and broach taboos, becoming uncanny 
as they do so. These characters include the storyteller figures analysed in chapter three, and 
Honor in chapter four. One of the widely acknowledged qualities of the taboo is that it is 
contagious: to transgress the taboo is to become taboo, and to be in contact with the taboo is 
to be infected by it. In this chapter I suggest that when story broaches taboo subjects, the 
contagion of the taboo could extend to the story and the storyteller, and even to the listener or 
reader.14  
          The last two chapters distil my lines of argument concerning uncanny effects, in order 
better to explore the uncanny effects deriving from particular aspects of some Stead works.          
Chapter six investigates two specific narrative techniques which evoke uncanny effects: the 
first elision, and the second striking imagery. I argue that each technique sets off a trail of 
association in the reader. The nature of these associations is that they are difficult to 
categorise, and uncanny effects ensue. In order to articulate this I adopt the concept of the 
blind field in the visual arts, as developed in particular in works by Roland Barthes, and 
adapted by the art theorist and critic, Margaret Iversen. The blind field is an element of a work 
that is suggested, rather than made explicit. This suggested element is an uncanny presence, a 
presence sensed by its absence. I argue that Stead’s works exhibit the literary equivalent of a 
blind field, and two ways this occurs is by elision and imagery. These ideas help identify and 
articulate the source and nature of uncanny effects in Stead’s “The Captain’s House.”  
                                                          
14 When I link the uncanny to taboo, I do not claim that all that is taboo is uncanny. Rather, I 
show that the taboo becomes uncanny when it moves out of its proscribed place: so that when 
a storyteller tells of what is not to be spoken of, the taboo moves from the category of the 




          The seventh and last chapter again draws on the preceding arguments, in order to 
analyse Stead’s novella, “The Rightangled Creek,” a story that tells of a haunted house set 
amid an animistic nature. I investigate how this content evokes uncanny effects. I find that the 
rural setting of the novella is depicted as a place where urban characters experience an 
uncanny dissolution of categories and the return of the repressed and surmounted. Dualities 
such as inner and outer, psychic and physical, and animal and human cannot hold under the 
pressure of the natural surroundings, and various fears and superseded, or surmounted, beliefs 
return to the characters. This dissolving of categories is associated with formlessness through 
imagery, depictions of sensory confusion, and the rendering of a teeming profusion in nature. 
           In summarising my findings in the conclusion, I indicate how the methodology 
developed in this thesis might be extended to future analyses of Stead works, and literature 
more generally. My thesis is an attempt to theorise just one of the features of Stead’s writing 
that makes it striking and memorable. Stead’s fiction can sustain and encourage a multitude of 
interpretations, or re-interpretations, an elusive quality which in itself verges on the uncanny – 
as does something oddly irreducible in the writing. As Rooney notes, writing of a Stead novel: 
“I have been reading For Love Alone . . . for about three decades now. In all that time, and 
after so many re-readings, it has lost neither its strangeness nor its familiarity, and its power to 





“The Triskelion”  
 
I begin with “The Triskelion” as the story is in many ways exemplary of those found in The 
Salzburg Tales. It is also exemplary of several uncanny effects explored in this thesis. In “The 
Triskelion,” uncanny effects derive not only from the story’s content, but its form. In regard 
to form, “The Triskelion” is told by three narrators. The first part is narrated by the personage 
of the Doctress, while the second part is a remembered narration by a friend of the Doctress, 
Kate de Lens Ormonde. Kate’s story is incorporated into the Doctress’s, who recounts it 
without interruption, so that Kate in effect becomes a second narrator. The third part of the 
story is told by the personage of the Lawyer, who adds to what the Doctress tells. These 
narrators are different in style and voice, reflecting various worldviews. The Doctress has a 
scientific voice. “A doctor can’t be mystic,” she says before commencing her narrative (211). 
Kate, by contrast, is inclined to stress the supernatural and the marvellous. The plain-speaking 
Lawyer returns the story to the Doctress’s realist voice. The first and third narrators thus make 
realist contributions, but sandwiched in between is the middle narrator’s marvellous narrative. 
          This provides contrast of narrative voice within the confines of a single narrative. It also 
undermines any easy categorisation of the narrative as a particular genre. “The Triskelion” 
reveals more complexities the further its form and reading effects are investigated. For 
example, the gravity and scope of the story’s themes challenge the usual proportions of the 
short story form, and the reader’s reception of the material. In the space of twenty pages, “The 
Triskelion” addresses suicide, incest, patricide, infanticide, rape, and child abuse. Yet these 
things are not even the story’s primary concern. I read the story as, at its heart, a meditation 
on the nature of narrative. Other writers, however, have focussed in particular on its treatment 
of the breaking of the incest taboo. As with form, the thematic centre of this story eludes easy 
categorisation.  
          This chapter explores instances in “The Triskelion” in which uncanny effects arise, and 
interprets these effects along two lines of enquiry: in relation to ambiguity of category, and in 
relation to Sigmund Freud’s theory of the uncanny, in particular his theory of the repressed 
uncanny. 
          The complexities of “The Triskelion” have been sometimes noted yet left largely 
unexplored by Stead critics. Readings of the story are usually limited to a paragraph or a few 
sentences in the books on Stead. A brief consideration of how some critics have characterised 
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the story – and it is the story most often singled out in The Salzburg Tales – suggests that it 
has been met with both interest and dismay. Diana Brydon writes:  
the teller and audience of ‘The Triskelion,’ a blood-curdling tale of sexual 
abuse within the family, utterly miss the point of the story – the corrupt 
ways in which the law and the business world conspire together to protect 
the oppressor from the consequences of his crimes. . . . they tend to blame 
the victim . . . and express titillation rather than horror at the story’s 
revelations of corruption.  (46) 
Brydon suggests that the story is presented and received as titillation. This raises questions to 
do with genre and reader expectation, or audience expectation, since “The Triskelion” is 
presented as an oral tale told to a small group of people. She also suggests a mismatch 
between the story’s content and the narrative voice (“the teller . . . [misses] the point of the 
story”). Brydon’s reading of “The Triskelion” informs her more general view of The Salzburg 
Tales: “Stead’s refusal to comment in these instances [of blaming the victim] . . . must be 
taken as at least a kind of endorsement [of the crimes committed]” (46). This brings into 
consideration the relationship, especially the distance, between the author and the work. Joan 
Lidoff discusses “The Triskelion” in six sentences, in which she assumes a link to Freud’s 
writings. The story, according to Lidoff, “is overtly about an incestuous triangle and is 
permeated with imagery of sexual self-disgust. This tale takes its title from an ancient three-
legged symbol which Freud takes as an image of male genitalia. . . . The tale is a murder 
mystery” (119).1 Here again, issues of genre are raised. “The Triskelion” is a “murder 
mystery,” with references to myth through Freud. Lidoff goes on to draw attention to Stead’s 
use of imagery to highlight the story’s themes. In general, she characterises “The Triskelion” 
as a story about sex and death. Jennifer Gribble treats “The Triskelion” to the longest analysis 
by any critic, giving it nearly a page in a short book that gives an overview of most of Stead’s 
works. She includes this observation: “[o]stensibly a ‘case study’ of the sexually voracious 
Arnold . . . it is a nightmare projection of incestuous relationship, told in a disarmingly 
anecdotal manner by a series of narrators who build on the opening sequence. There is a 
teasing play of incongruity and congruence between this traditional narrative game and the 
                                                          
1 I cannot find any reference to the triskelion in Freud’s writings. Lidoff refers to Freud’s 
short piece, “Family Romances,” which does not mention a triskelion. A triskelion might 




domestic horror it unfolds” (28). Again issues of genre and voice are raised, the “anecdotal 
manner” contrasting with the story’s content, and an awareness given to the author of a 
“narrative game.” Gribble explores these technical issues, in particular how an effective 
relationship between content and form is achieved. On the issue of voice, she points to the 
purportedly scientific nature of the part of the narrative dealing with the character Arnold, 
presented by the story’s first narrator as a “case history” (211), a phrase with medical 
overtones. Gribble also uses the phrase “domestic horror” in relation to the story, suggesting a 
depiction of the homely harbouring something abhorrent.  
         Hints of “domestic horror” are found from the start of “The Triskelion.” The personage 
of the Doctress begins the story by telling of the young adult Arnold, born blind, and long 
institutionalised in the place where the Doctress works. The Doctress has taken an interest in 
Arnold. When Arnold’s “aunt” and grandmother come to collect him from the institution in 
order to begin caring for him themselves, Arnold gives the Doctress a small parting gift: “[h]e 
pressed into my hand something which I thought was a shilling. . . . I called: ‘Arnold, what is 
this? You have given me your ‘three-legs!’” (213). The “three-legs” is described as a “round 
gold medal which Arnold had found one day, long ago, making sand castles on the beach: it 
bore as device, three legs radiating from a small circle” (213). After Arnold has left with his 
family, the Matron overseeing their departure remarks to the Doctress: “‘[w]ell, that’s the 
closest family that ever I met: I never got a word out of them about Arnold’s parents, or 
anything else. . . . I suppose there was something wrong with the old lady’s son, that the 
grandson’s so queer. . . . there’s a skeleton in the cupboard’” (214). Two years later, the 
Doctress visits Arnold at his grandmother’s house, and finds him in a “depressed, dull way” 
(215). She learns that he has married, but is separated from his wife. The Doctress then visits 
the estranged wife, in order to plead on Arnold’s behalf. The young woman intimates to the 
Doctress that she left Arnold due to his insatiable sexual appetite, and emphasises that she has 
no intention of ever going back to him.  
          The Doctress next tells of meeting an old friend, Kate de Lens Ormonde, who 
recognises the three-legged medallion given by Arnold to the Doctress, which the Doctress is 
wearing. Kate begins to weep at the sight of it, saying, “‘[p]ardon my crying over it! I’ve had 
the habit since childhood of crying in the presence of the supernatural’” (217). At this point 
the Doctress’s narration of Arnold’s story ends, and the “blood-curdling” second part of the 
“The Triskelion” begins, as Kate launches into her tale of seeing a “real” triskelion when she 
was a child. As mentioned, the Doctress embeds Kate’s tale in her narrative. The Doctress’s 
voice thus becomes recessed in the narrative. She recedes from being narrator to being 
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simultaneously narrator and narratee. Kate effectively becomes the second narrator of “The 
Triskelion,” and while her story is being repeated, the Doctress’s narrative voice is forgotten.  
          Kate recounts a holiday as a twelve-year-old with her family at the Entrance, a popular 
holiday destination on the central coast of New South Wales. They stay at a boarding-house 
with a number of other families. One evening, playing alone on the beach, Kate sees 
something detach itself from the headland (“the Skillion,” a real place) and trundle down the 
beach: “‘at first I thought a buggy, and next it was like a giant turning hand-springs by the 
sea; then I saw a wheel with three spokes’” (218-19). This is the triskelion. When Kate tells 
the boarding-house proprietor, Rhoda, what she has seen, Rhoda relates that every time the 
triskelion is seen something terrible happens. A short time later, Mr and Mrs Jenkins and their 
eleven-year-old daughter, Sylvia, arrive at the boarding-house. Over the next few days this 
family offends the other guests with inappropriate behaviour. Deemed particularly offensive 
is Mr Jenkins’ offering of sweets to other people’s children; the family members keeping too 
much to themselves inside their room; and Sylvia’s perceived insolence and over-familiarity 
with men. One day, while Kate is lying alone in the sand dunes, Mr Jenkins appears and 
offers her a shilling. She senses something is amiss and runs away. Some mornings later a 
child from the boarding-house is found murdered. The boarding-house staff notice that the 
Jenkins family have not come out of their room. They force open the door. Mrs Jenkins is led 
out in a daze, Mr Jenkins is found dead, and Sylvia is missing. A few days later, Sylvia is 
discovered living in a nearby hotel under a false name. The girl reveals that she has been in an 
incestuous relationship with her father, and that she murdered him out of jealousy upon his 
seducing another child. Sylvia is committed to an asylum, and gives birth to a son some 
months later. Here the Doctress finishes recounting Kate’s story, and concludes, “‘[t]hat  
boy . . . was unquestionably Arnold, the boy of the triskelion’” (229). With the return of the 
Doctress’s narrative voice, the reader finally learns that the blind Arnold of the first part of the 
narrative is the child of the incestuous union between Mr Jenkins and his daughter, Sylvia.  
          The story then proceeds to a supplement, or coda, provided by one of its listeners, the 
personage of the Lawyer, who becomes the third narrator of “The Triskelion.” He tells of 
coming across the same Sylvia and her mother by coincidence, in Vienna, only the year 
before. The mother caused a scandal in certain circles by marrying Sylvia’s fiancé. Sylvia had 
then killed herself. “‘The vice certainly flowered in that family in all its forms!’” concludes 
the Lawyer. “‘What a three-legged history!’” says the Doctress, who has just learnt that what 
she thought was the end of her story is not the end of the story, “‘I begin to think it will never 
stop’” (230).  
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          “The Triskelion,” then, is a narrative told by three narrators telling of events from three 
different places and times. The events that comprise the story take place in different decades, 
on continents on opposite sides of the world: the events are intimately connected, yet the 
connections lie unrealised for years at a time. Two of the story’s narrators have never met, 
and the Doctress and the Lawyer, from different countries, have only recently met at the 
Salzburg Festival. This suggests something global, general, impersonal, and timeless about 
the chain-like narrative. 
          A synopsis cannot convey the unsettling feelings that arise while reading “The 
Triskelion,” an effect that continues to grow upon reflecting on the work. However, the plot 
summary can indicate some areas of potential correspondence between theories of the 
uncanny and the narrative. These include Arnold being “queer” (meaning strange rather than 
homosexual), the theme of incest, the appearance of the supernatural triskelion, the coming to 
light of threatening, unsanctioned sexuality associated with the Jenkins family, and the 
repetitions and coincidences that link the different parts of the narrative. The synopsis also 
indicates that the supernatural element of the narrative is limited to the triskelion’s appearance 
in the story’s middle part. The framing narratives of the Doctress and the Lawyer have no 
supernatural elements.  
          Freud’s division of uncanny effects as arising from the surmounted or the repressed is 
potentially helpful in reading “The Triskelion.” Freud’s theory of the repressed uncanny, for 
instance, goes some way to illuminating the uncanny effects in the opening scene of “The 
Triskelion,” although it falls short of explaining them all. In the opening scene, Arnold is 
depicted waiting to be taken home by his female relatives from the institution where he has 
been living. When “Aunt Sylvia” (this is Arnold’s mother, although Arnold and the hospital 
staff do not know this) and Mrs Jeffries (this is Sylvia’s mother, Mrs Jenkins) arrive,2 Arnold 
approaches them: 
He sniffed and said with his thick articulation: “You have got a nice scent 
to-day, Aunt Sylvia.” 
   “It is only lavender,” said the young woman indifferently. 
   “Smell mine,” said the grandmother, drawing a coquettish handkerchief 
from her bag and flicking its heavy perfume under the youth’s nose. 
                                                          
2 The many name changes for Sylvia and her mother suggest the mutability of the forces 




   “I can smell,” said Arnold, and sat down in his chair, fingering absently 
the pattern of the tablecloth, waiting till these creatures, supercilious 
because of their supernatural gift of sight, should think of him again and 
take him away. 
    He had been born blind.  (212)  
One source of disquiet in this opening is the flirtation between Arnold and his female 
relatives. The grandmother is depicted “drawing a coquettish handkerchief from her bag and 
flicking its heavy perfume under the youth’s nose,” while Arnold compliments the woman 
who is his mother on the perfume she is wearing. Stead wastes no time in suggesting that 
some encroachment upon a taboo, incest, is harboured in the story. This hints at what later 
develops to fearful proportions in the narrative. Having fleetingly evoked the taboo, Stead 
temporarily suppresses it, only to develop it fully in the story’s second part. This brief 
surfacing of the taboo can be understood in Freud’s terms as the return of the repressed. It is 
also uncanny in the terms given by Friedrich Schelling, cited by Freud: “‘everything is 
unheimlich that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light’” (“The 
‘Uncanny’” 345). This point is reinforced by the secretiveness surrounding Arnold’s family, 
as articulated by the Matron, who says, “‘that’s the closest family that ever I met. . . . there’s a 
skeleton in the cupboard’” (214). Here the notion of the family harbouring a secret correlates 
with the close relationship between the homely and the unhomely, the unheimlich in the 
heimlich, that Freud notes at the beginning of his essay. The double quality associated with 
the term “uncanny” is also suggested in the Matron’s use of the word “close,” with its two 
meanings of not being open, and being tight-knit. 
          A further source of disquiet flows from the dualities Stead creates in this passage. These 
dualities associate Arnold with the qualities of silence, darkness, and solitude, qualities that 
Freud links with the uncanny. Arnold is blind while the women have sight; he is behind the 
window, and he is waiting for, beholden to, and outnumbered by his female relatives. 
Dwelling in darkness and solitude, Arnold begins to emerge as an uncanny figure. He is 
mostly silent too: his institutional status silences him, as he waits without comment while his 
family bicker over who is to care for him, as though he were also deaf or unfeeling (213). In 
addition, due to his “thick articulation,” his powers of speech seem limited. He contents 
himself with comments about smell, the emphasis on smell underscoring his lack of sight. 
Arnold embodies darkness, silence, and solitude; he is infantilised by these qualities, and, 
accordingly, placed in the realm of childhood.  
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          Arnold sees enough, however, to view his “aunt” and grandmother as “supercilious 
because of their supernatural gift of sight” (212). What they take for granted is for him 
supernatural. Arnold’s perception of this distinction alerts the reader not only to his isolation 
and difference, but also to the uncertain line between the supernatural and the everyday. The 
supernatural, the narrative suggests by Arnold’s observation, is relative. In the Doctress’s 
narration, nothing is made of this first little breach of familiar reality, but it becomes relevant 
in Kate’s subsequent narration, which both blurs and breaks the line between the familiar and 
the supernatural.  
          This initial scene, then, introduces relationships between sight and blindness, ignorance 
and knowledge, and the real and the supernatural. It first signals the disturbance of these 
things, disturbances that increase as the narrative unfolds. The details by which it does this, 
perhaps passed over in a first reading, become more disquieting in hindsight as their 
implications develop in the narrative. 
          In my opening paragraph above, I mentioned that the Doctress’s voice is stressed as 
scientific. This is one way that her narrative establishes a “common reality,” to use Freud’s 
term (“The ‘Uncanny’” 374): on other occasions the translation is “familiar reality.” Freud 
claims in “The ‘Uncanny’” that writers achieve uncanny effects from the surmounted uncanny 
by first establishing such a common reality, and then exceeding it by the introduction of the 
supernatural, the magical, or the animistic. The reader is “tricked” into embracing old 
“superstitiousness” which they thought they had surmounted (374). The feeling of the 
uncanny emerges at the breaching of the common reality. This authorial strategy, as outlined 
by Freud, would take time to achieve in a narrative. In “The Triskelion,” however, uncanny 
effects are evident at the beginning of the story, as the passage above shows. There has been 
no time for authorial tricks. According to Freud’s theory, these uncanny effects cannot derive 
from the surmounted uncanny. The passage shows that uncanny effects are elicited in the 
common reality first established by the narrative: no intrusion of the supernatural is necessary.  
          It is the first hint of the breaking of the incest taboo, and the darkness, silence, and 
solitude associated with Arnold, that begin to produce uncanny effects in “The Triskelion.” In 
Freud’s terms, the story elicits uncanny effects not by the surmounted uncanny, but the 
repressed uncanny, in particular, the return of repressed fears and desires to do with childhood 




          As the narrative proceeds, two authorial techniques in particular modulate the growing 
uncanny effects: these are foreshadowing, and the sharp definition of the contrasting narrative 
voices.  
          The incest theme, for instance, is carefully foreshadowed. This is done by the Doctress 
in her narration mentioning a number of relatively small transgressions of socially acceptable 
limits. These encroachments incrementally prepare the way for the eventual bringing to light 
of the broken taboo, and other large transgressions, in the narrative’s second part. The first 
small breach of limits is the flirtation between Arnold and his grandmother in the opening 
scene. Then the grandmother and Sylvia the mother belittle Arnold as they discuss his future, 
as though “he was deaf because blind” (213). A more flagrant transgression occurs when 
Arnold is depicted behaving inappropriately in front of the Doctress, playing with himself 
when she visits him after he has left the institution (215). There is also his reported voracious 
sexual appetite. Other apparently peripheral transgressions are mentioned. The reader is 
informed that Arnold’s mother, Sylvia, now known as Mrs Skelton, has left her marriage by 
fleeing overseas. This is reported in the gossip columns of the city newspaper, a report which 
ends with the suggestive and salacious question: “[w]hat’s the fly in the jampot?” (214).3 This 
foreshadowing is an example of how the breaking of the taboo, and its far-reaching 
consequences, is approached obliquely in the narrative. The incestuous relationship between 
Sylvia and her father never becomes the story’s open focus. This is one reason that the story is 
not received as superficial or overly sensational, but in control of its potentially overwhelming 
themes.  
          Then there is the issue of narrative voice. The moment the Doctress commences her 
recount of Kate’s narrative, a sudden shift occurs in “The Triskelion.” The narration by the 
Doctress has been explicitly crisp and no-nonsense, preceded with these words: “[a] doctor 
can’t be mystic. Besides, I have always been very matter-of-fact: it’s my fault, I admit it. And 
you wouldn’t like to hear a case history, I suppose!” (211). A case history has connotations of 
scientific objectivity, rationality, and emotional distance. The Doctress’s manner is stiff. She 
puts on a disingenuous show of reluctance to tell a story. In contrast, Kate embraces her 
narration with an outpouring of weeping, and a declaration that assumes the existence of the 
supernatural (217). The reader leaves behind a sober, scientific-sounding narrator, and is now 
                                                          
3 This seemingly throwaway remark is the first mention of jam in the narrative, a metaphor for 




presented with a narrator who not only believes in the supernatural, but goes back in time to 
her childhood to relate experiences from the point of view of a child, and a dreamy, 
imaginative child at that. With this change of narrator, Stead alternates a narrative voice, 
characterised by a familiar, measured, rational reality associated with the adult sphere, with a 
voice that embraces the kind of reality found in a fairy tale, where anything might happen. Yet 
for the most part, the contrasted narrators do not jar or undermine one another (an exception is 
discussed below). Stead manages to marry a narrative comprised largely of two highly 
contrasting voices: the scientific, and the marvellous. The form of the story thus reflects its 
emerging theme of the strange being contained in the familiar, as Kate’s marvellous narration 
is contained in the Doctress’s realistic narration. The hidden and strange emerges most clearly 
in the second part of the narrative provided by Kate: then it is buried again near the story’s 
end, with the brief return of the Doctress’s voice, followed by the Lawyer’s addendum.  
          As indicated, Kate’s narration is a recount of her stay as a twelve-year-old with her 
family at Ascalon, the boarding-house at the Entrance. Being the eldest of six children, and at 
the “dawn of adolescence” (218), Kate is free to wander the beach by herself: “my mother and 
her maid were occupied with the little boys. . . . I often sat all day in a hollow of the sand, 
returning only at lunch-time and in the evening” (218). Kate’s innocence is stressed. A 
childhood holiday by the sea, where one day merges into another, might be remembered as 
the height of childish freedom from worldly concerns. “O,” she says, “that distant time, 
happy, morbid, cud-chewing dawn of adolescence!” (218). Kate’s voice is nostalgic and 
sentimental. Her odd use of the word “morbid” seems to betray the young Kate’s ignorance of 
what really constitutes morbidity. Her “o” might constitute her openness and blankness. This 
voice could be described as homely, a voice apparently open, hiding and suspecting nothing. 
Kate is shown adopting the beach as a home, sitting “all day in a hollow.” “Hollow” here has 
connotations of a womb or a burrow, of comfort, familiarity, and protection. The homely and 
secure feeling is strengthened by the knowledge that Kate’s holiday at the Entrance is a kind 
of homecoming, as Kate has memories of an earlier trip to neighbouring Terrigal when she 
was six. This latest trip is characterised as a return to a familiar, comfortable place: “I saw, in 
anticipation, the familiar landscape drenched with romance” (217-18).  
          Home and familiar may be how Kate feels the beach to be, yet her isolation in the 
dunes, apart from supervision, makes her potentially vulnerable. It is at the beach that Kate 
first sees something strange and unfamiliar, the triskelion. Alone, in the approaching dark, 
Kate sees it coming into view under the Skillion, the beach’s northern headland: 
30 
 
“I had at that time marvellously long sight, not blunted and blinded as I am 
now, reading for examinations. Something moved in the obscurity under the 
distant head, at first I thought a buggy, and next it was like a giant turning 
hand-springs by the sea; then I saw a wheel with three spokes; it approached 
rapidly, and last I saw there were three legs sprouting from a hub, bound 
together at the ankles to form a wheel, by a twisted cord, grey as spindrift, 
blanched as stranded seaweed, trundling along at an unnatural rate towards 
the Entrance. The circumference of the wheel was about twelve feet: the 
legs were whitish-brown, thick and muscular, and all were from the right 
side.”  (218-19) 
The beach becomes the scene of the intrusion of the unheimlich into the heimlich. If the 
triskelion is interpreted as an image of male genitalia, its appearance may be the first 
knowledge of male sexuality, and perhaps the potential violence associated with male 
sexuality, into Kate’s consciousness. The scene after all takes place at the Entrance. 
This interpretation seems to gain strength when immediately after the triskelion’s 
appearance, Kate describes the landscape in terms distinctly violent and sexual, terms 
lacking before: “I sat for perhaps a quarter of an hour, while the swart sea assaulted the 
beaches and rammed the dunes” (219). This is in contrast, yet perhaps not entirely 
unrelated, to a landscape “drenched with romance,” that is, the landscape as it has been 
remembered by Kate for the preceding six years. It is as though Kate is experiencing the 
dawning realisation that romance and sex might be two sides of the same coin, and that 
violence can be associated with sex. In terms of Eros, a coupling of the homely with the 
unhomely, the familiar with the unfamiliar, has begun to occur. In Stead’s story, the 
familiar is feminine, and the unfamiliar masculine. Freud, in “The ‘Uncanny,’” would 
have it the other way around (367-68). 
          A closer look at the account of the triskelion reveals it has several curious aspects, as 
does Kate’s reaction to it. In the face of the appearance of the apparently unfamiliar in the 
familiar, Kate’s calm reaction is noteworthy. She describes the triskelion as though it has not 
really surprised or alarmed her. Is this because she is stunned and cannot fully comprehend it 
– or because it is already familiar? This is left ambiguous. The triskelion may be so unfamiliar 
that Kate cannot place it: she does not know what the triskelion represents, and that it is 
potentially harmful. Yet her lack of surprise might also connote some familiarity with the 
triskelion after all. The familiarity might come from her feeling so at home on the beach. Her 
narration suggests that the triskelion is part of that landscape, and that it comes out of the 
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headland. Her apparent lack of surprise at the triskelion is reflected in another aspect of the 
depiction of the landscape, given by Kate immediately after sighting the triskelion, which 
expresses a world-weariness: “[t]he stars began to appear faintly in the dishevelled heavens, 
to light some grey-headed drop of spume or some belated leaf for a moment on its unfated 
way” (219). The romance of the landscape has abruptly diminished. It is also curious that after 
Kate sees the triskelion, she then waits “a quarter of an hour. . . . to see if another 
phenomenon would pursue the first” (219), before returning to the boarding-house. Kate is in 
no hurry to return to her family.  
 
 
The appearance of the triskelion causes a strain in the narrative not apparent before, to do with 
the introduction of the supernatural. It seems too much that an apparition such as the 
triskelion should appear in Kate’s otherwise recognisable seaside holiday. Stead appears to 
attempt to ameliorate this strain in a number of ways. There is the intimation that the 
triskelion corresponds to something internal to Kate, that this strange thing is already 
somehow familiar. This helps reduce the jarring effect of the sudden introduction of the 
supernatural. Also, Kate is an imaginative child who likes telling stories. She has seen the 
apparition in a liminal time and place, at twilight, alone by the sea, when an imaginative child 
might be susceptible to the sensational. Her imaginative qualities, and storytelling ability, are 
stressed when she returns to the boarding-house after seeing the triskelion. Kate goes to the 
kitchen and looks into the kitchen fire, then amuses the staff by describing what she imagines 
she sees in the coals. Yet as to the triskelion, Kate herself wonders, “who will believe me?” 
(219). When she finally does report seeing it, the boarding-house proprietor, Rhoda, is 
initially sceptical. When Rhoda in turn grows convinced, telling of past sightings of the 
triskelion in the area, her listeners are sceptical in turn. This appears to be an authorial 
strategy to both acknowledge the reader’s scepticism, yet also to erode it by degrees. Rhoda 
insists the triskelion exists, claiming that the triskelion’s reality is common knowledge in the 
area. “It is a sort of phantom,” she says, “‘it is called a triskelion, and appears here just before 
a crime or other grisly accident occurs in the district. I shudder at the mere thought’” (221). 
Rhoda then tells a number of stories about the hair-raising events that occurred following the 
triskelion’s appearances in the past (221-23).  
          Rhoda thus confirms that the triskelion exists externally to Kate in the narrative. At this 
point, what might have been explained as a psychic projection, or the workings of a child’s 
imagination, becomes something else, something verifiable and external to Kate, since it has 
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been experienced by many people. The narrative thus normalises Kate’s experience of the 
supernatural. With Rhoda’s testimony, the narrative ground has shifted into a reality where 
the supernatural is everyday. “The Triskelion” has jumped genres, from realism to the 
marvellous, the marvellous being a genre where there is no expectation of the narrative 
following any familiar reality.  
          Kate’s tale, then, is a marvellous one. Following Freud’s line of thinking, no uncanny 
effects deriving from the surmounted can be elicited by the appearance of the supernatural in 
such a tale, since this kind of narrative presumes that the supernatural is everyday. To elicit 
uncanny effects from the surmounted, a writer first establishes a familiar reality for the reader, 
and then introduces a supernatural element, which exceeds the established familiar reality.4 As 
a narrator, Kate does not do this, since, as in a fairy tale, she never establishes a familiar 
reality. Hers is a marvellous narration from the start, as her crediting of the supernatural in 
almost her first utterance indicates: “I’ve had the habit since childhood of crying in the 
presence of the supernatural” (217). In a marvellous narrative, the reader puts aside scepticism 
regarding the supernatural as part of the reading expectation of the genre. If a reader already 
accepts the existence of the surmounted – the supernatural, the magical, the animistic – which 
is what a reader of a marvellous narrative is asked to do for the duration of the narrative, then 
the narrative cannot elicit uncanny effects from these things. Kate’s narration is such a 
narrative. As a result, no uncanny effect is generated by the triskelion’s supernatural aspect. 




The return of the repressed is associated with the coming to light of what is normally hidden. I 
have already argued that the triskelion is an image of the introduction of some knowledge of 
sexuality into Kate’s consciousness. If Freud’s claim is admitted that repetition betrays the 
                                                          
4 This technique of exceeding an established familiar reality only produces uncanny effects 
from the surmounted if the narrative then returns to its initial familiar reality, and some 
rational explanation is possible for the seemingly supernatural outbreak. Otherwise, the 
narrative opens out into the marvellous, where anything is possible (see Todorov 44). Freud 
leaves out this last movement. A return to a familiar reality only partly happens in Kate’s 
narrative in “The Triskelion”: after the sighting of the triskelion, and Rhoda’s tales, the 
narrative gradually returns to the realistic. However, no rational or authorial explanation is 




presence of the repressed, than a further correlation between the repressed and the triskelion 
becomes apparent.5 The triskelion is associated with repetition. This is first evident when Kate 
considers the possibility of a second triskelion appearing from where the first had sprung 
forth. Then Rhoda mentions that the triskelion continually returns, and that a pattern of events 
inevitably follows each return. The triskelion is again linked to repetition through its 
association with coincidence. Not only does it keep returning, but it always appears before 
some local disaster. Coincidence is an uncanny form of repetition: “repetition of the same 
thing. . . . does undoubtedly . . . arouse an uncanny feeling” (“The ‘Uncanny’” 358-59).  
          The triskelion is also associated with repetition by its salient physical features, as 
indicated in its name. It has three legs all “from the right side.” It is circular. It is recreated to 
form a medallion, the “replica,” which turns up on the beach for Arnold to discover. Arnold 
can draw the triskelion from memory, and presumably he has, many times: “[a]fter feeling it 
carefully for days, he had been able to reproduce the design” (213). If the triskelion is the 
eternal return of a sexually charged masculine energy, then it finds monstrous repetition in the 
figure of Mr Jenkins. There is also the ability of the triskelion to engender storytelling, 
another power of repetition. For Rhoda, the triskelion is associated with a treasure-trove of 
tales, something always happens that makes an interesting story after the triskelion appears; 
she repeats several of the stories. When these repetitions are all taken into consideration – the 
triskelion’s physical features, its habit of returning, its relation to coincidence, and its 
engendering stories – then the quality of repetition becomes one of its defining aspects.  
          The content of Rhoda’s tales-within-the-tale also points to a link between the triskelion 
and repression. Her triskelion-inspired tales are all about sex and death. The tales concern 
repressed murderous and libidinous drives bursting into view, and they associate the triskelion 
with these things. An example is Rhoda’s story of the enormously fat woman who elopes with 
a showman, who then enslaves her as a circus act until he is murdered by the woman’s 
brothers (221-22). Rhoda’s tales emphasise that with the appearance of the triskelion, the 
forces of death and sex not only break into the open, they multiply. While these stories of sex 
and death appear in the middle of “The Triskelion,” the forces they suggest are just under the 
surface of the Doctress’s story about Arnold. These forces fully manifest in the story of the 
                                                          
5 On the link between repetition and repression, see Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle 




Jenkins family, and the same forces extend even into the Lawyer’s supplement, which is 
another tale-within-a-tale of death and sex, if told in a more muted key than Rhoda’s stories. 
          Rhoda gives a picture of the triskelion that intimates a still further association with the 
repressed: 
“A third time [I saw the triskelion] was last year, when the bar at the 
Entrance was thrown up so high that the flood-waters could not escape and 
the lake was seething here outside the house. In the night I looked out to see 
the level of the flood waters, and saw the sky flickering with lightning, 
although there was no thunder. In one of the flashes I saw the triskelion, on 
the submerged lawn there, by the she-oaks. I went round the whole house, 
into all the bedrooms, with a lamp to see if anything had happened in the 
house.”  (222) 
Here the return of the repressed appears to be in the process of being enacted. Associations 
are evoked between the submerged lawn, flood-waters, and the unconscious. The triskelion 
seems to rise up into view, as the repressed rises into consciousness. The proximity of the 
triskelion, and Rhoda’s subsequent inspection of the rooms in the boarding-house, suggests 
that something alien is preparing to make itself at home in an interior space.  
 
 
Another uncanny aspect of the triskelion is its relation to the symbolic. In the story, the 
triskelion is first encountered in symbolic form, depicted on Arnold’s medallion. In Kate’s 
subsequent narration, the triskelion moves from the symbolic to the real. Freud, writing on 
what he calls the literary uncanny, notes that narrative is potentially uncanny in its ability to 
make the symbolic seem real: “an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the 
distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have 
hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the 
full functions of the thing it symbolizes, and so on” (“The ‘Uncanny’” 367). This process is 
enacted in “The Triskelion” by the triskelion’s transformation from medallion to apparent 
physical reality. The triskelion being reproduced as a medallion reverses the process in a 
sense, as the “real” triskelion is given a symbolic aspect again in the coin. The triskelion is 
suspended between these categories, and it can break out of them. Here is a case of the 
ambiguity and possible multiplicity of categories. This is first hinted at in the story’s opening 
scene, again in relation to the triskelion. When Arnold gives his triskelion medallion to the 
Doctress as a parting gift, she briefly mistakes it for something else – a shilling (213). The 
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move from the symbolic to the real enacts the narrative’s ability to transform the symbolic 
(narrative) into something affective, something felt by a listener or reader as real. 
           This leads to another of the triskelion’s curious aspects. It seems to be associated with 
the source of Kate’s imagination and her storytelling. The link between words and the 
triskelion is established from the start of Kate’s narration by the name “Skillion.” Kate says 
that the name of the headland has been “haunting” her ever since she was six-years-old, that 
is, for six years by the time she visits the Entrance: 
“When I was six, we went to Terrigal [close to the Entrance], and since that 
time, three things have haunted me in imagination: a wild bull, for there was 
one loose in the district that could be heard bellowing at all times of the day; 
a wild boar, for there was one which had eaten a baby in its cradle and 
escaped and was somewhere in the woods; and third, the Skillion. The 
Skillion or Penthouse, is the headland which rises from the dark, tarnished 
lagoon at Terrigal. No one in my family knew what the name meant, and it 
haunted me and was ranged in my mind alongside the Sphinx, the Chimera, 
the Beast 666 and the Roc. We lived a month in what seemed to me the 
gloomy and marshy country of the Skillion.”  (217) 
The name “the Skillion” gathers to itself ancient stories and local folk tales, drawing in 
narrative potential. The word “Skillion” attracts images, sounds, memories, fantasies, fears – 
all elements of storytelling. In particular, the sound of it is shown to exert a fascination on 
Kate. It becomes a signifier waiting to be signified (“No one in my family knew what the 
name meant”).6 
          It is in this context that the triskelion emerges, not only physically, but etymologically 
from the Skillion. Then begins a train of word associations Stead plays on throughout the 
story (Skillion – triskelion – Skelton – skeleton – Ascalon), as though to demonstrate a quality 
of proliferating and mutating language engendered by the Skillion, and its creature, the 
triskelion. The narrative potential accrued in the Skillion is being unleashed. The creative 
aspect of the Skillion is so emphasised that to characterise what it engenders, the triskelion, 
                                                          
6 In colonial Australia, according to the Oxford English Dictionary Online, “skillion” meant 
either “a shed built against the house” or “a roof from the side of a building.” The shape of the 




only in terms of violence and sexuality would be too limiting. The triskelion is equally 
associated with story and storytelling.  
          An indication of the triskelion’s close relation to storytelling is that its reappearance 
inspires a rush of storytelling, not only in Rhoda, but in Kate. Once having seen the triskelion, 
Kate’s imagination blooms. She sees faces and creatures in the coals of the kitchen fire, and 
tells stories about them (220). Kate starts to act on her early association of the area with 
storytelling, and this further establishes the Skillion as a place of storytelling and a source of 
imagination. In “The Triskelion,” storytelling is given a birthplace at the Skillion, and a sense 
is established, extending through other stories in The Salzburg Tales, that story returns and 
repeats, insistently bringing to light hidden things to do with death and sex.  
          The triskelion, then, is felt as uncanny through an association with the return of the 
repressed, and through the symbolic becoming real. 
          Other unsettling qualities associated with the triskelion are harder to explain in Freud’s 
terms of the surmounted, the repressed, or the symbolic becoming real. For example, the 
triskelion shows an independence of consciousness and action, a need to rest, and it possibly 
has a lurking mate. These are qualities more to do with the animal than the supernatural. Why 
should the animal aspect of the triskelion be uncanny? Is it to do with a suggestion of 
regression, of the manifestation of a return to some superseded, animal state? Animal 
associations are at the origin of Kate’s memories of the Skillion, the headland from which the 
triskelion seems to detach itself. The Skillion is placed in the same class as a bull and a boar, 
and it is associated with mythological beasts. Is it classified with these things due to its shape, 
or the sound associations of the name? The narrative does not indicate the basis for this 
classification. 
 
The occasion of Kate seeing the triskelion ushers in the story of the Jenkins family. The 
family arrives at night, not long after Kate’s sighting of the triskelion. Mr Jenkins is “known 
to everyone present by his jams, was at least fifty years old, prematurely decrepit it seemed, 
with a small, creased, bearded face, on which a lascivious little smile played.” He is known as 
“the jam man” (223). Mrs Jenkins is described as “a little over thirty, thickening towards the 
forty-year, pleasant, partly the conserved coquette, partly the made-over country girl” (223-
24), while Sylvia is “a self-possessed girl perhaps fifteen years old, sprung up unseasonably, 
thin like a sapling, and yet large-breasted”: when the men in the boarding-house ask how old 
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she is, she replies, “‘I will be twelve next month: I am always taken for fourteen, at least!’” 
(224).  
          Something sexual is alluded to in each of these portraits. Additionally, the women are 
described as unnatural or preserved fruit, “sprung up unseasonably” and “conserved,” so that 
the sexual is linked with some disruption of time. Combined with the fact that Mr Jenkins 
makes jam to sell, these portraits insinuate that the whole family is somehow unwholesome. 
Food is connected with corruption, and an overflowing abundance – or decay. The reader 
learns that the Jenkins family has already sent ahead to the boarding-house crates of alcohol 
and sweets, and the family arrives bearing more provisions. Over the days following, Mr 
Jenkins doles out sweets to the children of the other holidaying guests, inciting appetite, 
possibly spreading corruption.  
          The Jenkins family begins to be felt as uncanny by the reader. This is linked with the 
seedy over-abundance associated with their consumption of large quantities of sweets and 
alcohol. It is as though the flow of alcohol and sweets, associated with the heightened 
sexuality of the family, threatens to proliferate and contaminate. Their appetites are dangerous 
and could spread. The jam associations also elicit the notion of stickiness, and viscosity, 
adding to a contagious quality about the Jenkins family: they might stick. The family is felt 
more as a force than a family. Nevertheless, there is nothing explicitly supernatural about the 
Jenkins family, and their corrupt overabundance could be associated with a natural stage of 
corruption, the over-ripeness that leads to dissolution. It is hard to find in Freud’s theory of 
the uncanny any indication as to why superabundance might be felt as uncanny. Ernst 
Jentsch’s theory, however, with its emphasis on categories, may provide a clue. 
Superabundance threatens formlessness, a lack of balance and distinction between things. The 
uncanniness of superabundance may be to do with the breaking down of orderliness, and the 
breaking of proscriptions, or taboos, in relation to controlling such excess. (I extend this point 
on the uncanniness of excess in the seventh chapter of this thesis.) The superabundant nature 
of the Jenkins family, then, would be associated with the disconcerting formlessness of 
overflowing, undiscriminating proliferation. Their boundaries are not clear. 
          These themes of excess appetite, expressed through food, drink, and sex, are entwined 
with a second source of uncanny effects, related to distortions of time. Sylvia seems older 
than she is, and Mrs Jenkins younger than she is, while Mr Jenkins is “prematurely decrepit” 
(223). Stead has already drawn attention to the importance of time and timing in the narrative 
when Rhoda recalls the coincidence of the triskelion with sexual and violent crime. This 
ensures that the coincidence between the sighting of the triskelion and the arrival of the 
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Jenkins family is unsettling. Even Mr Jenkins sending ahead alcohol and sweets is unsettling, 
as though something suspect in his person has gone on ahead of him. Stead creates a narrative 
where the time is out of joint. These distortions of time related to the Jenkins family (and, 
earlier, to the triskelion) underline their time-defying, or timeless, aspect. They are returning, 
repeating, and operating outside time, in excess of time. They cannot be bound by time, as 
their appetites cannot be bound either. The treatment of time in relation to the Jenkins family 
undermines the linear, conventional understanding of time.  
          The uncanny effects associated with the Jenkins family accumulate slowly and 
incrementally. At first the family appear merely odd, and eccentrically close. Like-minded, all 
of a piece, they form an independent unit. The closed nature of the family is stressed by the 
Matron in the first part of the story when she says “‘that’s the closest family that ever I met’” 
(214). The Jenkins family grow uncannier as this closeness begins to be felt as increasingly 
secretive rather than homely. Something strange about the family becomes apparent in their 
relation to the other families holidaying at the boarding-house. They seem different. They 
begin to grate. By sending ahead extra stores, the Jenkins family break boarding-house 
protocol even before they arrive (223). Then they are inappropriate in other ways. Kate tells: 
“After the first day or two the Jenkins family spent little time with the other 
guests, walking alone, and even taking meals in its own room. The servants 
complained first, because they could never make the full tale of dessert 
knives and plates. There were always several in Mr. Jenkins’ room. Later, 
the ladies found Sylvia too pert for her age, too indifferent to the dignity of 
married ladies, and too assured with the boys. And she was dressed far, far 
too well for a child. . . . The report spread that ‘the whole family drank’: the 
boys said that old Jenkins’ jokes, off colour from the first, were now ‘too 
much of a good thing’: solemn, excited little girls, guests in the house, 
brought to their mothers shillings and cakes given them by the old fellow, 
and were sent flying back to return these gifts.”  (224-25) 
Here Stead depicts Ascalon as a kind of community of shared values and common spaces. It is 
a “house” in the sense of a “household.” Standards of behaviour associated with maintaining 
the place and the position of the traditional family are stressed, standards associated most 
notably with the respectable Vandenbrigh family. The Jenkins family wall themselves up 
inside this community, and are exposed as alien and offensive. Nevertheless, they are firmly 
ensconced in the house. They are the unheimlich present in the heimlich. Not only do the 
Jenkins family offend morally, but spatially and temporally: they lock themselves up, they do 
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not come out of their room at appropriate times, and their appearances do not match their 
ages. The strangeness of the Jenkins family is most associated with their appetites. A 
dangerous excess of appetite has taken up residence inside the boarding-house. 
          In Kate’s narrative, as in the preceding Doctress’s narrative, large transgressions are 
foreshadowed by a series of smaller offences. The little insults to the guests detailed above are 
the harbingers of far larger insults. The penultimate offence, before several crimes are 
committed, occurs when Kate is lying in the dunes by herself and Mr Jenkins appears, 
invading her dreamy solitude: 
“One day I lay under the boughs of a little hollow by the sandhills, listening 
to the pleasant distant cries of the Vandenbrigh boys. . . . The breeze rustled 
intermittently. I heard a prolonged rustling, and looking over my feet, saw 
Mr. Jenkins peering like a satyr through the branches. I sat up and said 
nothing: I disliked him as if he were a piece of dirty rag. He smiled 
ingratiatingly and approached. He sat down facing me, cross-legged, and 
began scraping in the sand between us, in a curious manner. Presently, he 
took a shilling out of his pocket and offered it to me, without a word. I 
pushed it away, while my heart thumped hard. His two small eyes were 
reddish and ichorous, as if they were two little wounds looking on an 
interior ulcer.”  (225-26) 
Several aspects of the encounter are uncanny. Mr Jenkins has apparently been watching Kate 
in a voyeuristic way. This is improper, but more than this, he is portrayed as teetering on the 
point of breaking a taboo. Mr Jenkins’s eyes are weeping, their soreness mirroring a corrupt 
interior and revealing what is normally hidden. These points recall the idea of the strangeness 
that unmasks, alluded to by Barnard Eldershaw (27).  
          Other aspects of the scene are uncanny. Mr Jenkins is portrayed as a satyr, the 
mythological creature associated with unbridled licentiousness. Satyrs are half animal, so as 
to emphasise the predominance of supposedly baser instincts, and a still close connection to 
nature. The combination of the human with the animal blurs the customary category between 
human and animal. Examples of such a blurring have occurred earlier in the narrative: the 
triskelion has human legs, and some of the mythical beasts it is classed with (the Sphinx, the 
Chimera) have a hybrid, human aspect as well. The merging of different categories involves 
the dissolution of categories. The merging of the animal with the human might also be 
uncanny since it involves a perceived regression. The animal in the human is usually 
repressed, although it is always there, if hidden. When it is allowed to show, or it asserts itself 
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and appears, it is a kind of surrender to an earlier stage of the self. Mr Jenkins is further 
associated with nature, and a threatening aspect of nature, by his entrance, when the rustle of 
the leaves becomes the rustle of his approach. 
          The depiction of Mr Jenkins as a satyr also intimates that Mr Jenkins is a returning type, 
a recurrence. His particularity is erased at this moment, since although he is portrayed as 
being “like a satyr,” the cumulative evidence, beginning with his initial portrayal, suggests 
that he is a satyr. For all his strangeness, he has been long known, known since ancient times. 
Even the naïve Kate intuitively recognises in Mr Jenkins qualities which are normally hidden, 
because considered corrupt. “I disliked him,” she says, “as if he were a piece of dirty rag” 
(225). It is perhaps the sexual intuition, or awakening, intimated by the earlier appearance of 
the triskelion, which so tempered Kate’s “romance” with the landscape, that has allowed her 
enough insight to recognise Mr Jenkins’s nature and intent, to refuse his proposed exchange, 
and to survive this encounter unmolested. 
          The scene in some ways enacts a repetition of two preceding events in the narrative: the 
triskelion’s appearance on the beach, and the Jenkins family ensconcing itself in the boarding-
house. Again, the unheimlich is depicted entering the heimlich. In the sandhills, Mr Jenkins 
enters a space Kate has made private, a place where she feels safe, and where she is dwelling 
on her internal world. The scene begins with Kate recalling that “one day I lay under the 
boughs of a little hollow by the sandhills, listening to the pleasant distant cries of the 
Vandenbrigh boys.” This too recalls an earlier moment in the narrative, in this instance the 
opening scene of “The Triskelion,” which depicts Arnold waiting to leave the institution. In 
both scenes, sound is highlighted, and sight diminished. The sensory disturbance creates a 
disquieting effect. In Kate’s case, this is done by emphasising the distant, disembodied sounds 
of the Vandenbrigh boys at play somewhere up the beach. Her sight is limited also. She is 
lying down, looking up at the sky, and she has to look over her feet to see Mr Jenkins. Kate 
seems sealed off from the rest of the world. This sense of solitude and limited vision 
highlights her vulnerability and the invasive nature of the sudden appearance of Mr Jenkins. 
Kate feels she is in a protected place, a homely place, into which the unhomely, in the 
uncanny figure of Mr Jenkins, enters. 
          Mr Jenkins then offers Kate a shilling. “He sat down facing me,” she tells, “cross-
legged, and began scraping in the sand between us, in a curious manner. Presently, he took a 
shilling out of his pocket and offered it to me, without a word. I pushed it away” (225-26). 
The moment of this proposed exchange between Mr Jenkins and Kate is perhaps the 
uncanniest aspect of this scene. The “scraping” recalls a shift to the animalistic in Mr Jenkins. 
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By this movement, he seems to move from the category of human to that of animal. Most 
uncannily, the symbolic (the shilling’s monetary worth) is proposed as exchange for the real 
(a sexual act). With this proposed movement from the category of the symbolic to that of the 
real, what is normally hidden and repressed, that is, Mr Jenkins’s paedophilia, is on the verge 
of coming to light.  
         The common currency of the shilling unsettles by only highlighting how little common 
currency there is between Mr Jenkins and Kate. The uncanniness of the proposed exchange 
works through a series of such contrasts. The shilling is so familiar, yet the exchange is 
something to be hidden. The shilling is so generic; the intention so specific. The shilling 
might be offered to a prostitute, yet Kate is sexually inexperienced. The shilling is legal 
tender; the proposed act is criminal. In this scene contrasting categories, such as the familiar 
and the unfamiliar, innocence and experience, come uncomfortably close together, or overlap.  
          Highlighting the dramatic contrast between Mr Jenkins and Kate is that he attempts to 
imitate her. He positions himself before her in a childlike pose. For an adult male, this is an 
explicit pose, as the legs are open. In this pose, Mr Jenkins becomes a kind of three-legs 
himself, resembling the triskelion. This apparent imitation is unsettling, not only because of 
the contrast between the two unlike figures in the same pose, but because he attempts to 
mirror her, and not only physically. For there is some common currency between Mr Jenkins 
and Kate, no matter how slight, and this might be the most disturbing kernel of “The 
Triskelion.” Stead has depicted the twelve-year-old Kate as being on the cusp of adulthood, 
and having the first stirrings of self-conscious sexuality, alluded to in her “romance” with the 
landscape, and by her considering the landscape in a more sexualised way after seeing the 
triskelion. Mr Jenkins attempts to mirror Kate’s just-forming sexuality in an enlarged, 
externalised, corrupted, aged, and masculinised form. The very extremes of possibly the same 
original impulse – corrupt, unbridled, masculine, aged sexuality, and romantic, nascent, 
feminine, youthful sexuality – are presented facing one another in the same time and place.  
         The mute aspect of Mr Jenkins’s proposal is also disquieting. This proposed exchange is 
pre-verbal. 
         Some nights later, Mr Jenkins rapes and kills a girl. The girl’s cries wake Kate:  
“One night I slept very uneasily, and waking, found myself, although 
conscious, paralysed. The darkness sat over me like an incubus. I strained 
from side to side, as I imagined, and beat on the bed, doing all I could to 
utter a cry that would waken my mother. Suddenly I heard that cry, a 
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dreadful cry, ringing in my ears. I found myself at the same moment awake, 
and my mother sitting up in bed. 
   ‘Did you hear that?’ 
   ‘Perhaps it was I,’ I said. ‘I tried to call out.’ 
   ‘I thought it came from outside, though.’”  (226) 
At this point the narrative blurs the line between the real and supernatural. There is a possible 
rational reason that Kate should cry out at the same time as the victim, as it is not unusual to 
discover a dream or nightmare has incorporated an external sound. The experience of waking, 
yet being unable to move for some time, is not unknown. However, the effect is that Kate is 
felt to be the dying girl’s double, and her voice becomes indistinguishable from the dying 
girl’s voice. Inside and outside no longer hold as opposites. “That cry” is both Kate’s and the 
dying girl’s. Adding to the scene’s uncanniness is that most readers would identify the 
paralysing incubus as a transformed Mr Jenkins: first a satyr, then an incubus, Mr Jenkins 
seems to inhabit ancient narrative constructions of evil. This is an instance of the symbolic 
merging with the real, the return of the repressed (fears of death and sex), and perhaps even 
the return of the surmounted (in Kate’s hint at a returning belief in the reality of the incubus). 
If, as mentioned above, coincidence can become an uncanny form of repetition, then the 
coincidence of Kate waking and screaming at precisely the moment that the dying girl is 
screaming is uncanny.  
          Kate’s experiences at this point of the narrative still potentially fall into the realm of 
familiar reality. The narrative has been returning to a more familiar reality ever since the 
appearance of the triskelion and the outlandish stories told by Rhoda. The story of the Jenkins 
family, for example, is rarely told in terms of the magical or the supernatural. In tone, this 
latter part of Kate’s narrative resembles the Doctress’s tale. Kate’s narrative ends by moving 
toward a reality that coincides with the Doctress’s. This is confirmed when Kate’s mother’s 
maid ascribes the horrific cry of the dying girl to some animal outside the boarding-house, 
that is, to something natural and explicable:  
“It was a dog, or a curlew in the swamps,” said my mother’s maid, holding 
her knees, as she sat up in bed, with her curl-papers swarming round her 
head. 
   “It seemed different from a curlew’s cry, horrid as that is,” said my 
mother, discontentedly, “but it may have been. How I hate those birds. And 
how I hate this everlasting gush and hiss of the sea, and those swishing 
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trees. What, in heaven’s name, possessed me to come to ‘Ascalon?’ I hate 
nature: it is full of cries and tears like a female madhouse.”  (226) 
It is not animistic nature that has produced the fearful cry, however, and the point is made that 
what is truly frightening and mystifying comes from within, not without, and from the realm 
of familiar reality, not beyond it. The curl-papers “swarming” around the maid’s head suggest 
the closeness of the danger. What is fearful and uncanny here is not so much a return of 
surmounted animistic beliefs, but the coming to light of normally repressed murderous and 
sexual violence.  
 
I have argued that, in terms of Freud’s theory of the uncanny, uncanny effects are produced in 
the main by the repressed uncanny in both the first and second parts of “The Triskelion.” This 
includes the part of “The Triskelion” which resembles a marvellous tale, which suggests that 
the repressed uncanny is independent of whatever reality a narrative presupposes. The broader 
implications for literature are that the repressed uncanny may be elicited not only in works of 
realism, but also in fairy tales, fantasies, romances, or any kind of narrative. Freud suggests: 
wish-fulfilments, secret powers, omnipotence of thoughts . . . all the 
elements so common in fairy stories, can exert no uncanny influence. . . . 
that feeling cannot arise unless there is a conflict of judgement as to whether 
things which have been “surmounted” and are regarded as incredible may 
not, after all, be possible; and this problem is eliminated from the outset by 
the postulates of the world of fairy tales.  (373) 
Freud argues that no uncanny effects can occur in a marvellous tale, which he equates with a 
fairy tale. Here Freud omits noting that it is only one of the several classes of the uncanny 
which he himself identifies – the surmounted uncanny – that “can exert no uncanny 
influence” in fairy tales and other marvellous narratives. Kate’s narrative shows that fairy 
tales, or marvellous narratives in general, can be uncanny, if the uncanny effects derive from 
the repressed rather than the surmounted.7 
 
 
                                                          
7 Jack Zipes (309) and Robin Lydenberg (1083) also think Freud is wrong to argue that only 




Kate’s narrative ends with the revelations that Sylvia and her father were in an incestuous 
relationship, that Sylvia murdered her father, and that she had a child by him some time after 
being committed to an asylum. The Doctress then reveals that Sylvia’s child is Arnold. The 
story appears to have come full circle. There is more, however. At this point, the personage of 
the Lawyer recounts his recent coincidental encounter with Sylvia’s mother, Mrs Jenkins 
(now Mrs Jeffries), and Sylvia. This is when the reader learns that Mrs Jeffries has made off 
with Sylvia’s fiancé. This story of Eros-out-of-control keeps repeating: “‘[w]hat a three-
legged history!’ said the Doctress. ‘I begin to think it will never stop’” (230). As death and 
sex keep recurring, it never does stop. These things, especially when associated with violence 
and abuse of power, beg intrinsic questions about the nature of the human. “The Triskelion” 
presents the impulse to narrative as equally intrinsic to the human. Sex, death, and narrative 
keep returning, and it is their return that Stead explores in “The Triskelion.” All three are 
associated in equal measure with the triskelion. 
          The Lawyer’s coda is a parting reminder of the role of coincidence, or repetition, in 
“The Triskelion.” It is only by a series of coincidences that the story falls into shape: Arnold 
happens to find a medallion of a triskelion in the sand, which he happens to give to the 
Doctress; by chance the Doctress’s friend, Kate, sees the Doctress wearing the medallion, 
which leads to her story; through Kate’s story, the Doctress learns of Arnold’s family history; 
then, by chance, one of the personages listening to the Doctress repeating Kate’s story is able 
to provide the narrative’s last (for the moment) instalment. This points to the apparently 
endless supplementarity of narrative, to which Stead gives form in The Salzburg Tales, a book 
overflowing with an abundance of story, one story leading into and out of another.  
          I have argued in part that uncanny repetition is at work in “The Triskelion” by the 
continual return of the repressed, primarily in the form of the triskelion and Mr Jenkins. Yet 
the narrative is also concerned with the return of repression, with the curtain coming back 
down on the irruption of the repressed. It appears that blind Arnold is in the dark as to what 
caused his blindness, at least at the beginning of the narrative. The silence about the breaking 
of the taboo means he does not know he is the child of incest, and that he is possibly suffering 
the effects at birth of syphilis (Mr Jenkins’s weeping eyes and premature ageing suggest this). 
The return of repression also might explain why the personages who have been listening to 
the Doctress’s tale appear not to react to the horrors of “The Triskelion,” apart from this sole 
comment upon the end of the story: “‘[a]nd you can still bear to wear that ornament?’ said the 
young lady, irritably” (230). The “young lady” refers to the medallion of the triskelion worn 
by the Doctress. This is hardly the response of a “titillated” audience, as claimed by Brydon. 
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The Doctress replies, “‘[i]f I throw it away, I am afraid it will start rolling again, making more 
business for clerks, registrars and judges’” (230). 
          “The Triskelion” suggests that narrative has a symbiotic relationship with repression: 
things need to be buried before they can be dug up. Stead may be alluding to this in the 
burying of the triskelion medallion on the beach, only for it to come to the surface again 
through the searching fingers of blind Arnold. This would place Arnold somewhat ironically 
in the literary tradition of the blind having special powers of insight, as it is through Arnold 
that the hidden story comes to light – his story, which he does not know.   
          “The Triskelion” appears to be circling such ideas to do with the origins of narrative. 
As mentioned, Kate says that the name “the Skillion” haunts her for six years. It could be said 
that out of the name came the thing, the triskelion, and the rest of the narrative follows. “The 
Triskelion” keeps returning to issues of language, memory, imagination, and repetition, the 
basic elements of narrative. To take the last of these, repetition, Peter Brooks writes that 
“[n]arrative always makes the implicit claim to be in a state of repetition, as a going over 
again of a ground already covered: a sjuzet repeating the fabula. . . . This claim to an act of 
repetition – ‘I sing of,’ ‘I tell of’ – appears to be initiatory of narrative” (97). Kate’s story is a 
variation of one of the oft-repeated local horror stories told by Rhoda. It might also be seen as 
a repetition of the stories to do with such mythical creatures as the Roc, the Chimera, the 
Sphinx, and the Beast 666. In a different way, Kate’s narrative, as a kind of flashback, goes 
over the ground already covered in the Doctress’s initial narration, and the Lawyer’s 
concluding narration reminds us that the story persists.  
          Another potential hint that Stead probes the origins of narrative in “The Triskelion” is 
her frequent allusions to the oldest forms of story, the oral folk and fairy tale. Stead deploys 
some of the common narrative devices of these forms. Kate’s narrative is like a fairy tale, for 
instance, with its assumption of the supernatural, its setting in the realm of childhood, and its 
message of moral dangers recognised and averted, at least for the young protagonist. The 
story overall also recalls the fairy tale form in its insistence on the number three. “The 
Triskelion” has three parts, three narrators, three time frames; its imagery is centred on the 
three-legged triskelion; and it focuses on an incestuous three-way relationship. Of the 
significance of the number three in narrative, Brooks writes, “[i]f we think of the trebling 
characteristic of the folktale and of all formulaic literature, we may consider that the repetition 
by three constitutes the minimal repetition to the perception of series, which would make it 
the minimal intentional structure of action, the minimum plot” (99). Story seems to have at 
base a dependence on the number three as the means for organising and generating plot. The 
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number three produces a sense of change, disruption, and restless, unbound energy. “Three 
things have haunted me in imagination,” Kate says at the beginning of her narrative, as though 
distilling all that follows while preparing to “sing of” the triskelion (217). With its various 
configurations and permutations of the number three, “The Triskelion” appears to be sorting 
over the building blocks of narrative.  
          “The Triskelion” can also be interpreted as concerned with narrative origins in a more 
particular way, that is, in relation to other stories that evoke the uncanny. Allusions in the 
narrative to E. T. A. Hoffmann are almost as frequent as allusions to the fairy tale form.8 One 
way in which “The Triskelion” recalls Hoffmann is by drawing attention to damaged eyes. 
Arnold is born blind; Kate ruins her eyesight by studying for examinations; and Mr Jenkins 
has weeping eyes. Stead’s naming of Kate de Lens Ormonde self-consciously points to a 
preoccupation with the optical, a preoccupation found so frequently and with such uncanny 
effect in the works of Hoffmann. For example, the focus on eyes, particularly damaged eyes, 
recalls a theme of Hoffmann’s “The Sandman.”9 In this story, the protagonist, Nathaniel, is 
terrified of having his eyes ripped out by the Sandman (185-88), and he succumbs to a fit of 
madness when he witnesses the automaton Olympia’s eyes falling out when she is torn apart 
by her creators, Spalanzani and Coppola / Coppelius, the lens-maker (211). The name 
“Cornelius” resembles “Coppelius,” in “The Triskelion.” The Lawyer tells that Cornelius is 
the name of Sylvia’s fiancé, who ends up marrying Sylvia’s mother. The name “Cornelius” 
also appears in another story in The Salzburg Tales, “The Marionettist.” “The Triskelion” 
again evokes “The Sandman” in a short yet strangely memorable transitional scene, in which 
Kate comes back to the boarding-house kitchen after seeing the triskelion. She looks into the 
kitchen fire, “where wood, charcoal and twigs burned. ‘Look, look,’ I cried, laughing, ‘here is 
a Turk with long beard, fierce, with purple eyes: here is a stuck pig bleeding, here is a judge 
in ermine and red, and here is a barrister with his hand lifted, in charcoal’” (220). This recalls 
the scene in “The Sandman” in which Coppelius and Nathaniel’s father appear to be 
conducting an alchemical experiment. The boy Nathaniel looks on as the two men peer into a 
                                                          
8 Stead alludes to Hoffmann’s work in several other stories in The Salzburg Tales, most 
clearly in the opening story, “The Marionettist,” and in “The Mirror.” Ackland’s article, 
“Whatever Happened,” discusses this. 
 
9 Freud, in his reading of “The Sandman,” argues that the damaged eyes are to be read as 




hearth, or crucible: “Coppelius poked the red-hot tongs and drew bright glowing masses out 
of the thick smoke and began assiduously to hammer them. I fancied that there were men’s 
faces visible around about, but without eyes, having ghastly deep black holes where their eyes 
should have been” (188). Both scenes show the forging of imagined beings out of a fire, the 
narrators focussing on the eyes and threatening demeanour of the imagined beings. These 
scenes are in some respects the central points of their narratives. 
          The allusions to “The Sandman” could be extended if one considers that “jam man,” Mr 
Jenkins’s sobriquet, half rhymes with “Sandman,” and sand is continually mentioned in “The 
Triskelion.” It is out of the sand that Arnold digs up his replica triskelion, in the hollow of the 
sand where Kate nestles and Mr Jenkins scratches, and the triskelion appears moving along 
the sand.  
          Of all Stead’s published works, “The Triskelion” may be the earliest in composition. 
According to Stead in her autobiographical essay, “A Writer’s Friends,” she rewrote three 
stories from an earlier manuscript to include in The Salzburg Tales (Ocean 498). The three 
had initially been part of a collection of stories and illustrations offered to the publishers 
Angus and Robertson before Stead left Australia. The manuscript was lost, and Stead rewrote 
those stories she could best recall. “The Triskelion” is one of these three. Even in composition 






“The Mirror,” “The Death of Svend,” “Gaspard,” and the Freudian Uncanny 
 
Before discussing “The Mirror” and “The Death of Svend,” two of Christina Stead’s stories in 
The Salzburg Tales, I clarify the Freudian concept of the surmounted through which I read 
them. In Freud’s essay, “The ‘Uncanny,’” the surmounted refers to ways of viewing the world 
that have become discredited and abandoned under everyday conditions. As mentioned in the 
introduction above, surmounted material consists of outdated “modes of thought” (370), or 
“primitive beliefs” (372). These include beliefs in magic, animism, or the supernatural: “we 
have surmounted these modes of thought,” writes Freud, “but we do not feel quite sure of our 
new beliefs, and the old ones still exist with us ready to seize upon any confirmation. As soon 
as something actually happens in our lives which seems to confirm the old, discarded beliefs 
we get a feeling of the uncanny” (370-71). For most people, to think that they were seeing a 
ghost would “confirm the old, discarded beliefs” that they hold concerning ghosts. It would be 
felt as uncanny. A writer can induce in a reader a similar experience, the experience of the 
return of the surmounted, by setting up a familiar reality, and then introducing an element that 
seems in excess of this reality (374). 
          Freud’s conception of surmounting is that it is a timeless psychic process. Rejecting 
beliefs that are no longer useful or credible is a process integral to human beings. The content 
on which the process acts changes over time. Content, or ideas, to do with magic, for 
example, have been surmounted for hundreds of years in the West. These days most adult 
Westerners are sure that magic is neither real, nor is it credible. Yet many of these same 
people would not be so sure that some form of afterlife, for instance, is not real. Belief in an 
afterlife is still in the process of being surmounted. Put simply, some ideas are more 
surmounted than others. I argue that the degree to which a belief is surmounted determines 
how easily it can be returned to a reader by a writer, in order to create uncanny effects. It 
determines how easily the reader can be “tricked” into “overstepping” a common reality, to 
use Freud’s terms (374).  
          This point is pertinent to my reading of Stead’s “The Mirror” and “The Death of 
Svend.” In both stories, a supernatural episode is introduced into an initially realistic 
narrative. In “The Mirror,” this supernatural content (clairvoyance in a mirror) is effectively 
surmounted. In “The Death of Svend,” however, the supernatural content (a personification of 
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Death) is not so surmounted. How this difference influences the eliciting of uncanny effects in 
Stead’s stories is the subject of the first part of this chapter. I then focus, in the second part, 
upon Stead’s treatment of death in her stories, and how it evokes uncanny effects. 
          “The Mirror,” of all the stories in The Salzburg Tales, is the most clearly indebted to E. 
T. A. Hoffmann, on whom it draws for atmosphere, plot, and character. The narrative has a 
Gothic and Germanic feel, and features a plethora of motifs associated with Hoffmann’s 
uncanny stories, including doubles, changelings, clairvoyance, the mirror, and persistent 
intimations of death. These features are also closely entwined in the sometimes suffocating 
style of Hoffmann. Most of these themes are associated with what Freud classes as the 
surmounted, which, in the case of “The Mirror,” means the supernatural. Any reader familiar 
with Hoffmann will be cued to read “The Mirror” for the uncanny, Hoffmann being the 
widely acknowledged master of evoking uncanny effects.1 
         “The Mirror” can be placed in a long line of narratives concerned with the disturbing, 
seemingly magical aspects of mirrors and optical instruments. Optical instruments, including 
mirrors, become a site for the changing worldview in Enlightenment times.2 In “The Mirror,” 
the personage of the Mathematician begins the story by telling how his sister, Giselda, falls in 
love not with a mirror but its frame, specifically with a carving on the frame: 
We had a mirror in the hall, four feet long by three feet wide, mounted in a 
heavy gilt frame. The frame was carved in a rococo design and surmounted 
by a knot of twisted acanthus leaves, which my sister called “The Violin 
Master” or “Metternich.” This knot, to the fantastic eye, was a courtier in 
long-tailed coat and in breeches, with sleek wig bowing low over a fine 
jabot. . . . The lines of the foreshortened face were cruel, aged and cunning. 
The head of hair with its middle parting, was almost heart-shaped. In a half-
light, “Metternich” alone stood out on the frame and seemed to examine the 
mirror.  (180) 
                                                          
1 Stead’s story is possibly a parody of Hoffmann’s mode of writing. Another possibility is that 
Stead gets caught between parody and creating a narrative in her own style, and that “The 
Mirror” is a rare instance of the author not fully assimilating her influences. 
 
2 Terry Castle explores this in The Female Thermometer (1995): see, for example, chapter 
nine, “Phantasmagoria and the Metaphorics of Modern Reverie,” which explores the 
fascination with “phantasmagorical spectacle” (155) in the late eighteenth and early 




Metternich3 is a personification of the mirror, a character who does not exist outside Giselda’s 
imagination. He is associated with the past, music, the irrational, the half-light, and the heart. 
Through the heart he works on Giselda. Adolescent, sheltered, and isolated, Giselda declares 
that she is married to the imaginary Metternich. When she meets and consequently becomes 
engaged to Ernest Jourdain, a friend of the Mathematician, Metternich is provoked: acting 
through various incarnations, he jealously holds Giselda to her prior promise of marriage to 
him. He continues to return at crucial moments in her life, such as at her engagement party, 
and when she is giving birth. In a long scene early in the narrative, Giselda reads her future in 
Metternich’s mirror. What she foresees fills her with dread. After her marriage to Jourdain, 
and the death of their first child, as predicted by the mirror, Jourdain buries the mirror and 
makes a pond over it. The pond, a kind of mirror, becomes a haunted and dangerous place.  
          This brief synopsis indicates some correspondences between “The Mirror” and 
Hoffmann’s “The Sandman.” There is an emphasis on optical tricks, and the always returning 
and malevolent changeling, Metternich, is reminiscent of Coppelius, the changeling character 
who haunts Hoffmann’s Nathaniel. For my argument, the most important similarity between 
the stories is the use of contrasted, competing voices. Each narrative pits a rational against an 
irrational voice. In “The Sandman,” Nathaniel’s ravings are opposed to his fiancée’s (Clara’s) 
voice of reason, while in the passage above in “The Mirror,” the Mathematician’s tone is 
sceptical, “the fantastic eye” clearly belonging to his sister. This contrast is also apparent 
when the Mathematician witnesses Giselda reading the future in the mirror. In this scene 
Giselda “dragged a chair in front of the glass and sat down, and with Jourdain leaning on the 
shoulder of the chair, she began to improvise, pretending that she had a vision of their future” 
(186). Here, in keeping with the Mathematician’s ostensibly more rational voice, Giselda’s 
action is described as “pretending,” and she “improvise[s],” a somewhat derogatory, musical 
metaphor.  
          To make concrete the contrast between the rational and irrational, Stead emphasises 
different ways of physically viewing the world, showing another debt to Hoffmann. For 
instance, Metternich’s mirror is contrasted with the telescope that belongs to the father of 
Giselda and the Mathematician, a lightly sketched-in character who is an astronomer. The 
                                                          
3 The name seems to be an allusion to the nineteenth-century Austrian diplomat, Klemens von 
Metternich, whose hairline in portraits is indeed heart-shaped. He was conservative, and 




mirror figures the fanciful and inward-looking, an old way of seeing: the telescope represents 
the rational, scientific, and outward-looking.4 
          Stead groups her characters according to their allegiances to these different optical 
instruments, and the contrasting worldview the instruments represent. The marvellous is 
personified in the character of Metternich, the man of the mirror, and the rational in the 
astronomer, the man of science. This organising pattern is then doubled in Giselda, married to 
the mirror, and in Jourdain, who attempts to bury the mirror. This last couple’s contrasting 
attitudes to the mirror dramatise conflicting ways of seeing the world: Giselda is shown to be 
doomed by her lingering fidelity to the inwardness and fancifulness of the mirror, while 
Jourdain recognises the mirror’s dangers and sees the need to repress it by burial. Optical 
instruments are thus used in “The Mirror” not only as points of dramatic tension and thematic 
contrast, but as an organising principle in the narrative. 
          These groupings of characters are dynamic. Jourdain consciously moves away from 
being associated with the mirror and the supernatural. He eventually buries, or represses, it. 
The astronomer, and, to a lesser extent, the Mathematician, return to crediting the 
supernatural. This is one way that the process of surmounting superstitions in relation to the 
mirror is shown to be in flux. The story also indicates a spectrum of powers attributed to the 
mirror, from Giselda’s belief that it can show the future, to Jourdain’s troubled encounter with 
his own reflection (both points are discussed further below). In these interactions with the 
mirror, the triumph of the rational is by no means assured: the opposite is suggested, as 
superstition is shown to be lingering in even the most rational characters. Outmoded ways of 
thought regarding the mirror are always ready to return.  
          Each of the major characters in the story, then, is shown to have a different relationship 
to mirrors. Characters move back and forth, or remain fixed, as the case may be, on a 
spectrum of superstitious belief in regard to the mirror. These contrasting relationships are 
                                                          
4 This is the opposite to how the telescope works in “The Sandman,” in which it is an 
unsettling tool of the demonic. The contrast offers an example of how the surmounted is 
historically determined: a telescope, due to its seemingly magical powers, might be felt to be 
uncanny in Hoffmann’s day, but not in Stead’s. The pervasiveness of the interest in optics in 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century popular culture is apparent in Castle’s book. Writing 
of Hoffmann’s story, John Jervis in Uncanny Modernity notes, “[t]he optical supplement is 
the eye of the other, the transformative vision that risks madness and death” (31). In 





explored in different scenes in the narrative. In these mirror scenes, Stead modulates the 
balance between the rational and irrational; fantastic and scientific; inner and outer; and also 
destructive and productive creativity, a related theme perhaps not fully integrated into the 
narrative. The astronomer, succumbing to superstition on his deathbed, requests that every 
mirror in the house be turned to the wall so that his soul may depart unhindered (190-91). His 
son, the Mathematician, appears more strongly wedded to reason and science. Nevertheless, 
he is shaken when a mirror showing his reflection falls from the wall, and he cannot help feel 
it is “a very unfortunate omen” (192). Events that are unfortunate for him do follow, although 
they are not the end of him. The Mathematician also feels the danger associated with the pond 
where the mirror lies buried. After seeing a man by the pond who resembles Metternich, the 
Mathematician hurries away, muttering, “[t]hat’s a bad omen, that’s a bad omen, I’m afraid” 
(196). He goes home to the news that his sister, Giselda, is on her deathbed. In these scenes 
seemingly rational, scientific characters are depicted as harbouring a lurking unease toward 
the mirror. 
          Giselda’s relationship to the mirror is more headlong. Having pledged herself to the 
mirror as a girl, and having perceived the true nature of Jourdain by observing him in 
reflection (183), the mirror then presents her with the truth about herself. It is so faithful she 
can accurately read her future in it (186-88). Giselda’s death is heralded by her dropping and 
breaking a hand-mirror (198).   
          Jourdain’s relationship to the mirror is the most complex, as it is the most agonistic. 
Jourdain is initially associated with the mirror. While he seems to have some knowledge or 
past relationship with it, however, he is not beholden to it, as Giselda relates:  
“One afternoon [Jourdain] . . . came into the hall by the windows, so that I 
saw him approaching in the mirror. The light fell on him from above. That 
moment I saw him in his true light, and my head began to swim, as in those 
moments when one sees an extraordinary verity that puts the rest of the 
world askew. I thought suddenly, If he came near me now, I could not bear 
it, such a strange man (as if he were a Nubian or a Turk!). He hesitated . . . 
went to the glass between the windows and peered in at himself . . . and 
continued to look in for some time, as if he had some commerce with it.”  
(183) 
Here Jourdain belongs to the mirror to the extent that Giselda can read him through it, and he 
has “some commerce with it.” Elsewhere in the narrative, however, he is shown to be able to 
maintain a boundary between the worlds inside and outside the mirror, in contrast to Giselda.  
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           Jourdain grows warier of the mirror as the narrative progresses. This first becomes 
evident when he recognises the danger of Giselda’s mirror-reading. He curtails her 
clairvoyance. Then, nine years later, some time after the death of their first child, he is 
disturbed by his reflection in the same mirror. Despite being a composed character, Jourdain 
is “inexpressibly startled” when he sees: 
a strange man with a singularly familiar, lively, but pensive expression, a 
face distinguished but distorted, diabolically intimate. He gazed for a full 
moment at the self-possessed intruder, and suddenly recognised himself! . . . 
This poignant face which appears in an unsuspected mirror, like the peaked 
child-faces one sees at a window at night, seem glimpses of a man’s own 
spirit, and harden, isolate and terrify him as if he were alone in the world.  
(193-94) 
Jourdain’s experience of not recognising himself in the mirror is a familiar enough one, and it 
draws attention to the still potentially uncanny aspects of the mirror: the meeting of the 
intimate and the strange, the confusion of inner and outer, the sense of internal estrangement a 
reflected image can provoke, and the disquiet verging on fear, or even panic, which follows.5 
Stead’s pun in the phrase “self-possessed intruder,” and the seemingly contradictory phrase 
“diabolically intimate,” express that it is self-as-other that confronts Jourdain. These phrases 
anticipate the uncanny confluence of self and other explored by theorists of the uncanny, 
including Julia Kristeva in Strangers to Ourselves, and the phrase “diabolically intimate” 
might well be a definition of the uncanny. This is perhaps the first point in the story that the 
reader feels the mirror to be uncanny, as here the disconcerting powers associated with it are 
not unfamiliar. The reader is far more likely to accept Jourdain’s rather than Giselda’s 
experience of the mirror as realistic, as his is a common experience, if still disquieting. 
          This distinction in effect, then, is due to the different attributes given to the mirror by 
different characters. The differences in attitudes are heightened in the narrative by Stead’s 
choice of narrative viewpoint, or how the narrative is focalised in its different parts. I take as 
correct Freud’s observation that, in order to produce uncanny effects from the surmounted, a 
writer has first to persuade the reader that they are reading of a familiar reality. In “The 
Mirror,” the familiar reality changes according to which character is narrating. While the 
Mathematician, whose voice is defined by a familiar rationality, is the story’s ostensible 
                                                          
5 The passage is reminiscent of Freud’s much-analysed anecdote of an encounter with his 




narrator, long stretches of the narrative are free of his voice. It is Giselda who narrates most of 
the story’s supernatural episodes. An example is the three-page-long mirror-reading scene, 
witnessed by the Mathematician, who recounts Giselda as saying: 
“I see myself in my wedding-dress; and you [Jourdain] are standing behind 
me in your new suit. . . . I see you on another evening, trying to tell me that 
my father is dead. And I see again our children: two are playing noisily, but 
one is standing by himself in a corner without a sound, smaller than the 
others, and strange to say, transparent: he is not a child at all, but the shade 
of one. What can that mean?” 
   So my sister detailed their life from stage to stage, while Jourdain stood 
quiet, waiting to hear the end. She cried, “Ernest [Jourdain], I am sitting up 
in bed, very ill, and I know I am dying. I am afraid to die and be without 
you, always to be alone, to have the sods pressing me down. . . . I am lying 
still now, in the buried box. My features are altering rapidly, and dark 
colours mottle my flesh. I see myself as if naked now, I am of another flesh, 
and I am beginning to rot.”  (186-88)  
          This passage shows how Giselda acts as a second narrator, and one not so different 
from Kate in “The Triskelion.” They are narrators for whom the marvellous is everyday. As 
Giselda’s narrative proceeds from a marvellous reality, it is unlikely any uncanny effects will 
ensue, at least not from the surmounted uncanny. Belief in clairvoyance by means of a mirror 
is now an unfamiliar “mode of thought,” surmounted to the extent that it cannot be reanimated 
in the reader. The supernatural content of the story, as a result, is not felt as uncanny, but 
marvellous.  Even when Giselda glimpses Jourdain looking in the mirror, and perceives him 
in his “true light,” little or no uncanny effect ensues, despite Jourdain being both familiar (“an 
extraordinary verity”) and strange for her (“as if he were a Nubian or a Turk”). In this 
instance, the concurrence of the familiar and unfamiliar is not felt as uncanny, since it is 
Giselda narrating this scene.  
          When Jourdain has a similar response to his own image in the mirror, as given above, 
the confluence of familiar with unfamiliar becomes uncanny. This is because Stead’s 
construction of Jourdain’s relationship to the mirror resembles one that remains familiar to 
most readers. His “diabolically intimate” and “self-possessed intruder” still exists in the 
reader’s familiar reality. Jourdain’s experience of the mirror – in which the mirror seems to 
reveal something alien in the self, and dissolves the categories of inside and outside – is not a 
mode of thought fully surmounted. Such uncanny moments are passed over in “The Mirror,” 
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and the narrative’s overall effect, determined by Giselda’s viewpoint, remains more to do with 
the marvellous. 
          In some of the stories in The Salzburg Tales, however, the reader is returned to 
reanimating surmounted beliefs for prolonged stretches of narrative. This happens in “The 
Death of Svend,” a story in which a potentially supernatural event is uncanny. No critic has 
engaged with “The Death of Svend.” Only six pages long, it is a first-person narration told by 
the personage of the Danish Woman. Stead gives the Danish Woman the voice of a practical, 
down-to-earth character, with few illusions. The story begins in a matter-of-fact way, 
immediately establishing a familiar reality. “In the gloomy January of a recent year,” begins 
the Danish Woman, “my brother Svend came home to Copenhagen to marry. He had worked 
two years in Germany and five in France, perfecting himself in the bookbinding trade” (130-
31). What follows appears to be a straightforward tale of unrequited love between two ill-
matched natures. The wooden and silent Svend, brother to the narrator, falls in love with the 
flighty Karen. Svend comes home to marry Karen, after seven years of frugal and chaste 
living while working at his trade in another country. In the meantime, Karen has begun and 
ended several engagements. Faced with the impending reality of a lifetime with the dour 
Svend, Karen baulks and reneges on her agreement to marry him. Svend goes into an 
irreversible decline, stops work, takes to bed, and refuses to talk. The Danish Woman nurses 
and attempts to console her brother, but the single-minded Svend will not be consoled, and 
dies broken-hearted. 
          “The Death of Svend” climaxes with two encounters that befall not Svend, but the 
Danish Woman. These climaxes can be characterised as irruptions of the uncanny. Small 
details early in the narrative prepare the reader for these uncanny scenes. These preparatory 
details are a bit odd and unsettling, but not necessarily uncanny. From the first, Svend is 
associated to an unusual degree with silence and solitude. He is a loner who rarely speaks. He 
is often heard at work tapping with a hammer, disembodied, in another room (133). He has 
one green eye, and one blue eye (131). The intrusion of something strange is felt most 
strongly at the story’s first turning point, when Karen abruptly breaks off her engagement 
with Svend after looking in a mirror. She reads in the mirror an unbearably tedious future with 
her husband-to-be: “[w]hen Karen saw [Svend] again and heard his patient, plodding plans for 
the future, she looked three times in the glass, became afraid to tie such a pretty face and body 
to such a poor destiny, and refused him” (132). Karen’s glance in the mirror is unobtrusive, 
and may or may not be clairvoyant. It is narrated almost in passing. Yet the brief possible 
foray into the marvellous signals that the narrative is prepared, and is preparing, to move 
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beyond the everyday reality it has established. This shows Stead beginning to put into practice 
the commonly used narrative technique for creating uncanny effects from the surmounted: 
first, to lull the reader into lowering their guard by establishing a familiar reality, then to 
exceed this reality by introducing what appears to be the supernatural. The brief mirror-
reading episode is not felt as uncanny, since it passes as another quirk in Karen’s changeable 
character. The incident, however, breaches the story’s initial familiar reality. Such details, 
small in themselves, smooth the way for the narrative to go a step beyond this initial reality.  
          After Svend falls ill, the theme of the double begins developing in the narrative. The 
Danish Woman, while nursing her brother through the nights, becomes aware of their kinship-
within-kinship: “in the waking nightmares and sick torpors that crush the watcher through the 
long nights, I perceived that Svend was closely knit to me in nature and affection. It is often 
like that in a large family; a sister has one true brother, or sister – the others are strangers” 
(133). Here and elsewhere the narrator stresses her closeness to Svend, and her finding 
familiarity in him amid surrounding strangeness. As Svend becomes more ill, the Danish 
Woman draws closer to him. The story’s first climax, on what turns out to be the evening of 
Svend’s death, involves an encounter between the Danish Woman and a strange-looking old 
woman in the street. What follows is one of the striking passages that distinguish Stead’s 
work: 
One day in January, gloomy and windy, but with a clear, high, northern light 
in the nave of the sky, I was returning from marketing, and, feeling a twinge 
of pain around my heart, let my eyes fall to the pavement. I walked a few 
steps in meditation, thus. I lifted my eyes and saw at fifty paces from me, an 
old woman about five feet high, neatly dressed in a black cloak, with white 
collar, both voluminous, advancing towards me over the blue-black 
pavement. Her white hair was tightly drawn over her skull; a great white 
plaster covered one eye and half the head; the other eye was ringed with a 
thick black ring which looked dreadful on her bony face, chalk-white and 
hollow. She advanced steadily, as if she would run me down, although she 
was so small. The breath sprang out of my lungs and gently blew out her 
cloak: “It is Death,” I thought, very certain. A moment afterwards, I 
thought, “She must know she looks deathly, poor woman; I will look away.” 
I did so, with an effort. As she came near, I was obliged to look at her again, 
to be sure that this extraordinary impression was not all a dream. No, there, 
firmly, without deviating, she walked towards me as if she would walk 
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through me. I wondered if she were blind. The sunken, large bright eye was 
steady and looked soberly but directly at me, the skin was bone-white, the 
cheekbones and jawbones prominent. The terror of death entered me, and I 
already gave up my spirit. I struggled a little, thinking I could avoid her 
perhaps, with a heart-sickening wrench. The woman came up with me, 
brushed my coat with the edge of her faded, blue apron which she held in 
her hand between the folds of her cloak, and suddenly turned at a right angle 
to the left, and entered the sculptured door of a rich apartment house I was 
passing.  (134-35) 
In a familiar street, after doing the shopping, the strange, disconcerting something that the 
narrative has been skirting around is finally brought to the forefront. It is Death. Or is it 
death? The reader, along with the Danish Woman, experiences an uncertainty, hesitating 
whether to view the old lady allegorically as Death, or as a physically real old woman 
(“deathly, poor woman”), or some mix of the two. Either way, the effect of the old woman is 
clear. She is unsettling, partly because she is unclassifiable, and partly because the looming 
sense of extinction which she represents is felt as a harbinger of some particular death. Along 
with the Danish Woman, the reader is reminded that death is strange, yet instantly 
recognisable, and returns inevitably. Death is given action. It not only approaches, it steals: 
the Danish Woman herself has her life stolen for a moment, her breath taken by the old 
woman. The sense that the Danish Woman has died is compounded when, like a spirit, she 
considers herself able to be passed through (“as if she would walk through me”). The Danish 
Woman is poised on the border between life and death, crossing back and forth from one 
realm to the other: “[t]he terror of death entered me, and I already gave up my spirit.”6 
               As in “The Triskelion,” various dualities are established in “The Death of Svend,” only 
to be collapsed. A colour scheme helps Stead to suggest the duality of the living and the dead: 
blacks and blues are set against white. This evokes an ambiguity of category to do with the 
old woman, who wears both dark colours and white. Stead then depicts the point of 
dissolution of the duality in the woman’s actions (“[t]he woman came up with me, brushed 
my coat with the edge of her faded, blue apron . . . and suddenly turned at a right angle to the 
left”). Stead also foreshadows a momentary crossing over into another realm, where the living 
are incorporeal and death is personified, by depicting the winter street scene as being under 
                                                          
6 This recalls Tzvetan Todorov’s observation of the uncanny as being “linked . . . to what we 




the “nave” of the sky, and the Danish Woman as being in meditation. The Danish Woman is 
already in an otherworldly place, with an altered consciousness, even before she sees the old 
woman.  
          Another duality dissolved is that between idea and action. The idea of Death literally, if 
briefly, kills the Danish Woman, the symbolic causing a real action. 
          Two factors in this scene which contribute to its uncanny effect, then, are the Danish 
Woman’s experience of uncertainty over how to categorise the old woman, and the unsettling 
proximity of death. These factors combine to facilitate the return of still precariously 
surmounted modes of thought concerning death. These modes of thought include the lingering 
suspicion that Death can incarnate, that it walks, searches, touches, chooses, that it returns in 
its own time. The surmounted is made to return in the reader through identification with the 
Danish Woman. The reader first feels her confusion, then her dread. As old ways of thinking 
return in the character, they do too in the reader. Stead has accomplished the “trickery,” as 
Freud terms it, of producing an uncanny effect, betraying the reader to the “superstitiousness 
which we have ostensibly surmounted” (374).  
          Helping to make the Danish Woman’s experience of the supernatural credible is her 
vulnerable and extreme psychological state at the time of her encounter with the old lady. The 
experience occurs at the height of the crisis of her brother’s dying. The Danish Woman has 
stressed her closeness to her brother, which allows the full dramatisation of the psychological 
disturbance caused by Svend’s decline. This lends veracity to the Danish Woman being 
susceptible to the limits of experience, including experience of the supernatural.  
          Along with her handling of psychology, Stead’s descriptive powers are also crucial in 
generating uncanny effects at this point in the narrative. Her language is assured to the extent 
that it draws the reader, stripped of critical reserve, into the unfolding events.  
          When these factors are combined, the commonly induced reading state of suspending 
disbelief becomes more a state of questioning disbelief. The reader is made to think: this 
might really happen, after all. 
          Following this scene, the narrative directly proceeds to the story’s second uncanny 
irruption. This begins as the Danish Woman distractedly watches the old lady go into a “rich 
apartment house,” immediately after their encounter: 
What was she doing there? Was she a midwife; an old companion kept out 
of charity? My heart seemed a drop of jet. At the next crossing an 
automobile, powerful and silent, rolling at a great pace, knocked me over 
and spun me into the centre of the roadway. The thick dusk was falling, the 
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lights were not yet on. Half-unconscious, I lay amongst the traffic in the 
middle of the road unseen, escaped miraculously and crawled, as a sea-
elephant crawls, by little leaps and bounds, to the pavement. . . . Presently, I 
could walk, yet I was under a spell and felt myself scarcely flesh at all, but 
spirit, as if I had really been killed; and the people passed like dumb 
shadows.  (135) 
Again, the Danish Woman seems to have passed into another realm where the automobile and 
the people passing are silent and shadowy, and she is “unseen. . . . scarcely flesh at all, but 
spirit.” The shock of the accident, coming so close upon the meeting with the old woman, 
alters the Danish Woman’s familiar reality, and the reader’s perception of it, too. The reader 
is not inclined to question that under such extreme circumstances the narrator might feel 
“under a spell” – that she might think she “really had been killed.” Here the reader, along with 
the narrator, is taken into a realm beyond the physical. Barely surmounted modes of thought 
concerning the existence of a non-physical realm falter, and are briefly overwhelmed. 
          As in the encounter with the old lady, in this scene Stead depicts a regression, in this 
case not a psychological regression, but a physical regression to a primal, animalistic state. 
The peculiar movement of the sea-elephant, to which the Danish Woman is reduced, strikes 
the reader with its uniqueness – so odd, yet, odder still, somehow familiar (“little leaps and 
bounds”). In a moment of crisis, the animal in the human exerts itself, an animal strangeness 
always contained in a human familiarity, yet rarely so openly displayed. This involves the 
reader in experiencing an unsettling doubling: the Danish Woman is part animal, part human, 
or perhaps mostly animal; or simultaneously somehow all human and all animal. Again, 
essential categories are blurred. The choice of the term “sea-elephant,” with its odd coupling 
of apparently contrary things, underscores this blurring. 
          Uncanny effects are heightened in the scene through atmosphere and perspective. For 
example, liminal states are emphasised: it is twilight, the Danish Woman is knocked “half-
unconscious,” and she lies in “the middle of the road.” In liminal states confusions of 
perception are more likely to arise, as presumed relations of time and space come into 
question.  
          Svend dies on the night of the Danish Woman’s accident, but not before he tells his 
sister of a visitation by a figure resembling the old lady. The Danish Woman’s response to 
this is that Death “made a pass at me, and settled on him” (136). The idea of the Danish 
Woman nearly becoming a substitute for Svend makes her encounter with the old woman 
even more unsettling and dramatic in hindsight. The reader might recall that the Danish 
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Woman brushed against the old woman, before she abruptly turned off “at a right angle,” as 
though she had arrived at a sudden realisation or decision. Then there is the following near-
death experience with the automobile, which suggests that Death returned for a second 
attempt at claiming the Danish Woman. The speeding automobile is foreshadowed in the 
initial encounter with the old woman, who “advanced steadily, as if she would run me down” 
(134): the automobile and the old woman are linked by the manner of their movement as 
different manifestations of the same remorseless agency. Death returns, and will eventually 
also lay claim to the Danish Woman. This can be taken for granted. That Death should have 
confused the Danish Woman with her brother, however, is strange. It is an almost human 
mistake, which again suggests the confusion of the real with the supernatural. The confusion 
over the Danish Woman and Svend also reinforces how closely doubled they are, that Death 
has trouble distinguishing between them. The ambiguity of categories is continued, the 
supernatural merging with the human, the human with the animal, the Danish Woman with 
her brother. Ambiguity of time and place at times amplifies and underscores these confusions. 
          In the last paragraph of “The Death of Svend,” the reader is returned to the narrative’s 
initial familiar reality. After Svend’s death, the Danish Woman goes back to the street where 
she encountered the old woman, as though compelled to seek a rational explanation for her 
disturbing experience: 
I enquired for [the old woman] and many had seen her, but no one knew 
where she lived, and no-one gave an exact description of her, as I did. Then 
I heard that an old woman who had been living alone in a lumber-room over 
the bootmaker’s shop, had disappeared on a night that seemed to be that of 
Svend’s death, taking all her old rubbish with her in a big bundle on her 
back: a coal-merchant had given her a lift and had put her down with her 
bundle outside the town. She had not been seen since . . . these old ones 
survive somehow and wander all over the land.  (136) 
The narrative returns to a resemblance of social realism, in which all things have a material 
explanation. The attempt by the Danish Woman to rationalise her experiences only highlights 
the strangeness of the preceding events. If the Danish Woman had discovered that other 
people in that part of town had had similar experiences to her, if other people had died at the 
sight of the old woman, then the story would become marvellous. The ambiguity about the old 
woman’s nature would disappear, and she would be clearly identified as a personification of 
Death. Instead, the Danish Woman’s doubts are left unresolved, and doubts remain free to 
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grow as to how to classify this story: is it a story of the supernatural, or the story of an 
extreme emotional and psychological state? 
           Some contrasts are now apparent between “The Death of Svend” and “The Mirror.” 
These contrasts indicate why the former story is felt as uncanny, while the latter is only 
intermittently so. In “The Mirror,” Giselda’s worldview is less likely to be identified as 
realist, or belonging to a common reality, than the Danish Woman’s worldview. This means 
that Stead has little or no chance of generating uncanny effects, at least not from the 
surmounted, from a character reading the future in the mirror. In contrast, Stead’s treatment of 
the theme of death in “The Death of Svend” still touches on uncertainties and fears in the 
reader concerning death. Most people, presumably, remain unsure how death arrives, appears, 
happens, and I expect most would agree with Freud when he asserts, “there is scarcely any 
other matter . . . upon which our thoughts and feelings have changed so little since the very 
earliest times, and in which discarded forms [of belief] have been so completely preserved 
under a thin disguise, as our relation to death” (“The ‘Uncanny’” 364). It is because attitudes 
to death are so in flux that uncanny effects can easily be elicited when writing of death. 
          Freud’s assertion in regard to death is made in the context of a discussion of the 
surmounted uncanny, and the wording highlights how his concept of the surmounted uncanny 
is evolutionary, even geological: each effort of surmounting overlays a preceding effort. 
Presumably the more surmounted a belief is, the harder it is for a writer to understand and 
reanimate the mode of thought in order to induce uncanny effects.  
          In relation to literature more generally, distinguishing the process of surmounting from 
the content that is surmounted should make possible the articulation of what constitutes a 
distinctly modern or contemporary uncanny, if, as I argue, the surmounted is historically 
determined. Such articulations would not need to exclude the uncanny from other epochs, as 
writers have recently tended to do.7 A contemporary uncanny, or at least uncanny effects 
derived from the surmounted, would consist of the surmounted beliefs that can still be made 
to return in contemporary times. It is elicited when these uppermost layers of modes of 
thought, the most recently and least effectively surmounted, are challenged and temporarily 
dissolve. Deeper layers might have been reanimated in past times, but they can be no longer, 
or else accessing them becomes increasingly difficult.  
                                                          
7 Castle argues that the eighteenth century “invented the uncanny” (8), a view which informs 
most of the essays in Uncanny Modernity. Nicholas Royle links the uncanny to the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism (8). The corollary is that the uncanny was never felt before 
modernity. I do not see how this is possible, if it is admitted that the uncanny derives from 





Many stories in The Salzburg Tales dramatise the superseding of modes of thought, or the 
process of surmounting. The growth of a rational worldview, for example, is a theme to which 
Stead repeatedly returns in the collection. It is a commonplace that the scientific and industrial 
revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were driven by a growing insistence on 
rational thinking, and coincided with a general, if inconsistent, weakening of religious and 
superstitious modes of thought. An exploration of this particular turn (or return, if the history 
of Rome is considered) in Western thinking is not only a recurrent theme in The Salzburg 
Tales, but appears to be one of its organising principles. For example, four of the last five 
stories in the book deal with the conflict between scientific and supernatural ways of viewing 
the world. The theme provides the book with its crescendo. These stories are, in order, “The 
Wunder Gottes,” “Overcote,” and the third and second last of the Centenarist’s tales. The 
Centenarist’s final tale, and the last story in the book, is a variation on the theme. A brief look 
at these last stories reveals the dramatic and thematic importance of conflicting worldviews in 
The Salzburg Tales.  
          The fifth story from the book’s end, “The Wunder Gottes,” dramatises the clash 
between scientific and religious explanations of phenomena. The story is told by the Old 
Lady, who recalls the day the first steam-train came to her German village. To a largely 
peasant population, the appearance of a train is “Ein wunder Gottes!” (474), a wonder of God. 
The Old Lady’s elder brother, a doctor, angrily dismisses this religious response, and stays 
inside his house, refusing even to look at the train: “[a] very simple thing, I’ll explain the 
principle to you in five minutes, but not now, not now. There is no wonder in it” (474). The 
next story is “Overcote,” told by the Public Stenographer. The Stenographer introduces the 
character of her father into the story by saying, “[m]y father was a free-thinker. He attended 
church every Sunday, coming in late to make a disturbance, and sitting in the front row to 
laugh and make remarks aloud about Darwin and Galileo to annoy the minister during the 
sermons. The minister prayed aloud for the salvation of my father’s soul, to his face, every 
Sunday” (476). The conflict between science and religion is here baldly personified. Then 
comes the Centenarist’s tale about his grandmother’s experience as a servant girl in a Polish 
castle: “[i]t was well known that there was a secret chamber in the house [of the castle], but 
no-one could locate it, and the many tales of mystery and apparitions which circulated among 
the peasants and servants, late at night, or by their firesides, seemed to be without foundation” 
(486). The resourceful servant girl, by applying some mathematics, seeks to prove that the 
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supernatural stories are indeed without foundation: “my grandmother was dying of curiosity 
to find out the truth about the secret chamber. . . . She could get no plan of the house, but she 
calculated the sizes and heights of the rooms and went outside to see if there was any space 
left over” (486). This spirit of enquiry is rewarded when the girl discovers a secret chamber in 
the house. It turns out this chamber contains a deformed person, who, one night, escapes into 
the corridor. Before the person can be hidden again by the owners of the house, he or she (“it” 
in the text) is glimpsed by the servants. The tale ends in a flat, rationalising tone: “some of the 
ghosts of haunted castles, which scare strangers but live peaceably with the tenants, are these 
unfortunates born monsters” (488). This is a story of superstition deflated, and deflated by a 
lower class girl with nous. The next tale by the Centenarist gives the theme a different turn. It 
begins: 
A physician, in a family of physicians, died and left his skeleton to his son. 
He told his son to have no superstitious fears, because he would never haunt 
him nor any member of the human race as long as the skeleton was 
permitted to live in the living quarters of the family and to be present at 
consultations. The son and family, far from superstitious, smiled at this last 
jest of the old free-thinker, and in accordance with his whim, had the 
skeleton set up and placed in a closet in the doctor’s consultation room.  
(488-89) 
The skeleton makes its displeasure known by “strange noises” and “rattling” whenever it is 
moved from the consultation room, its abode of choice (489). Eventually the family has to 
accept that their ancestor’s ghost is real. This story causes an outcry among the Centenarist’s 
listeners: 
“You should be ashamed, Centenarist, to foist that dreadful farce on us.” 
   “I am perfectly serious,” protested the Centenarist. “I believe I read the 
story in a book on the unseen and the unconscious, or something of the sort, 
by a reliable psychologist. . . .” 
    “You slander science,” said the Doctress.  (491-92) 
In each of these stories, Stead dramatises the point of separation of the empirical and the 
rational from either religious faith or belief in the supernatural. The Centenarist then tells his 
last tale of the book, perhaps intended as a potential, if comical, blending of the scientific and 
the supernatural. It is a Jewish joke about the transmigration of a human soul into a horse: “I 
am afraid it is about death too, but it is pythagorean” (492). With the reference to Pythagoras, 
Stead returns the reader to a point in Western thought when the supernatural and the scientific 
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were reconciled. The earlier potential reference to Freud (“I believe I read the story in a book 
on the unseen and the unconscious . . . by a reliable psychologist”) might intimate that science 
and the supernatural have again become bedfellows. Much of Stead’s thematic material in The 
Salzburg Tales, then, derives from the rise of scientific thinking and the abeyance, yet also 
persistence, of belief in the supernatural. 
          Another way of tracing how Stead arranges her material throughout The Salzburg Tales 
around the theme of the conflict between science and the supernatural is to follow, as the book 
progresses, the changing emphases of the Centenarist’s tales. The Centenarist rounds off each 
of the seven days of storytelling with a collection of short tales, fragments, anecdotes, or 
yarns, meaning his stories are interpolated seven times into the narrative. At first the 
arrangement of these stories seems haphazard. However, taken as a whole, they tell their own 
tale. For the first four days, the Centenarist’s tales are stories of religion and superstition, 
stories of believers, saints, devils, and gods. The theological and supernatural are evidently his 
areas of interest. This point is emphasised by the stories in The Salzburg Tales being divided 
into seven days: the Centenarist is identified as the author of this arrangement in his role of 
facilitating, and wrapping up, each day’s proceedings. On the fifth day, however, the 
Centenarist’s stories begin addressing the advent of the scientific. On the sixth day they 
address atheism. By the last day, he proffers the tales discussed above, which verge on the 
uncanny. These last tales of the Centenarist, placed at the end of The Salzburg Tales, explore 
the spaces that open up when faith, with its answer-for-anything, is spurned for science, which 
is yet to explain everything. The arrangement of the Centenarist’s tales follows the recent 
historical arc of the changing Western worldview. A sure sense of these changes in worldview 
allows a writer to evoke uncanny effects from the surmounted. As far as generating uncanny 




In “The Death of Svend,” Svend wills himself to death. His demise seemingly comes from 
within. In “The Mirror,” Giselda witnesses her future death in the mirror: that a reflection of 
the self provides this image suggests an inner origin for Giselda’s death also. In these stories, 
and the many others in The Salzburg Tales that deal with suicide and other self-destructive 
behaviour, Stead depicts an internal urge to oblivion.  This indicates affinities with Freud’s 
thinking on the death drive. Some critics refer to Freud’s theory of the death drive in relation 
to Stead fictions. Bruce Holmes, for instance, writing on House of All Nations, notes that 
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Jules, one of the novel’s protagonists, “appears tantalized by the prospect of tragedy, and in 
this respect illustrates the Freudian construct of the death wish” (278).  The remainder of this 
chapter focuses on what Freud claims is least surmounted in human thinking, that is, ideas to 
do with death. I explore how Stead’s writing on death is often experienced as uncanny. 
          I should highlight some aspects of Freud’s thinking on the death drive which are 
relevant to the discussions of Stead stories that follow. In “The ‘Uncanny,’” Freud admits that 
he probably should have started with effects to do with death as those most exemplary of the 
uncanny. He writes: “[m]any people experience the feeling [of the uncanny] in the highest 
degree in relation to death and dead bodies, to the return of the dead. . . . We might indeed 
have begun our investigation with this example, perhaps the most striking of all, of something 
uncanny” (“The ‘Uncanny’” 364). As noted above, Freud stresses that “[t]here is scarcely any 
other matter . . . upon which our thoughts and feelings have changed so little” as on death 
(364). As Freud’s thinking on death develops, it becomes clear that what is most uncanny 
about death is not so much the difficulty of surmounting superstitious modes of thought 
regarding it (the “discarded forms . . . so completely preserved”), but that there should exist in 
each living thing a hidden drive compelling it toward death.8 In Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, which appeared the year after “The ‘Uncanny,’” Freud labelled the compulsion 
toward death, or quiescence, the death drive. This was later glossed as Thanatos by Freudians. 
The death drive manifests in a subject through compulsive repetition (Beyond 290-91). It is 
expressed in some subjects by a feeling of being pursued by “a malignant fate” – an 
apprehension of the inevitable fulfilment of the death drive (292). 
          Freud argues that the death drive is felt as uncanny when its normally hidden or 
contained presence is somehow brought to attention, when the “thin disguise” of beliefs 
around death is broken (“The ‘Uncanny’” 360-61, 364). My understanding of the relationship 
between the death drive and the production of uncanny effects differs from Freud. I consider 
that the surfacing of the usually hidden drive is not sufficient in itself to create uncanny 
effects. Repetitions, doubles, or foreboding, as manifestations of the death drive, do not in 
                                                          
8 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud speculates that the death drive is a principle 
governing all instincts (or drives, as later translations have it). With the death drive, “we may 
have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in 
general. . . . that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of 
things” (308); “all instincts tend toward the restoration of an earlier state of things” (310); 





themselves create uncanny effects. Rather, it is the difficulty in categorising these things, once 
they come to light, that causes uncanny effects. Such a relationship between the uncanny and 
the death drive is evident in several of Stead’s short stories. To explore this further, I focus in 
particular on a story in The Salzburg Tales, “Gaspard,” and, to a lesser extent, “A Russian 
Heart” and “The Marionettist,” also in The Salzburg Tales.  
          My argument explores three ways in which the death drive, or something like it, 
emerges in these Stead stories. The first is the handling of time in narrative. I suggest that if 
past or future time is felt to inform a narrative present more than is usual, then this can imply 
the death drive: a surfeit of the past in the present is felt as haunting, while the future 
intruding into the present is felt as foreboding, a harbinger of death. In either case, the 
presence of death in life is revealed. The second way is to invoke associations to do with the 
figure of the double, the double being a potentially uncanny figure of death. A third way 
something resembling the death drive is brought to a reader’s attention is by repetition. One 
form of repetition that evokes the drive is the depiction of things in mechanistic or 
deterministic terms, for example, characters that are reduced to automata, and whose actions 
and identity seem generic. In these three manifestations of the death drive, it is the revealing 
of the drive, in combination with an ambiguity in regard to categorising what has been 
revealed, that causes uncanny effects, as already argued in relation to “The Death of Svend” 
above. 
          Death permeates almost every story in The Salzburg Tales. “The Divine Avenger” tells 
of a suicide. “In Doulcemer” ends with a man on a highwire falling to his death. “The Death 
of the Bee” meditates on death, as does “Day of Wrath.” The Centenarist’s last three tales 
ruminate on the perils of returning from the dead, the perils of not heeding the wishes of the 
dead, and the death of a deformed person hidden by their family, and so on. The Salzburg 
Tales also explores dying as part of life, in depictions of exhaustion, ennui, despair, waste, 
corruption, illusion, and other forms of loss. In these stories, the suggestion of a force 
resembling the death drive rarely develops in isolation in the narratives. Almost always, it is 
entwined with a love story of some sort. This correlates with Freud’s thinking that all life 
instincts (Eros), such as sexual instincts, contain in them the death drive (Thanatos).9 As 
                                                          
9 Freud in his early writings uses the term Eros to refer only to the sexual instincts, but in his 
later writings broadens the definition to include all “life instincts.” Jean Laplanche and Jean-
Bertrand Pontalis, in the authoritative The Language of Psychoanalysis, state: “Freud employs 
[the term Eros] in his final instinct theory to connote the whole of the life instincts as opposed 
to the death instincts” (153). Defined in Freud’s terms, Eros seeks to obey the “pleasure 
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Joanne Faulkner suggests, the relationship between the two is “best characterised as 
dialectical instead of oppositional” (161). The coexistence of forces akin to Thanatos and 
Eros forms a kind of dance in Stead’s fiction. It is not always a struggle. This occurs in a 
sequence of three stories in The Salzburg Tales, “To the Mountain,” “On the Road,” and “A 
Colin, a Chloé,” each of which depicts lovers of different kinds given to deathly compulsions. 
Then there are “Gaspard” and “The Gold Bride,” tales of obsessive love, in which both lovers 
die. In “A Russian Heart” a man who suicides leaves behind an abandoned lover. “Don Juan 
in the Arena” dwells on the romantic betrayals that lead to the womanising bullfighter’s 
demise. “The Triskelion” tells of multiple murders and suicides connected to various sexual 
entanglements. Each of these stories can be understood as exploring the relationship between 
Thanatos and Eros. A recurring and deep link between death and sex, or love, is articulated in 
another story in The Salzburg Tales, “The Amenities.” In this story, Sara, having left her 
husband to marry her younger lover, Isidor, says, “[e]ven love – at the bottom of the greatest 
passion is a feeling of horror and an icy and hopeless boredom: under the flitting, delusive 
flame is the jet of marsh-gas” (297). Throughout The Salzburg Tales, Stead returns repeatedly 
to the destructive or fatal effects of romantic, sexual, and even filial love. Joan Lidoff notes 
this when she writes that, in the book, “[s]exuality tends to find expression as incest, love 
affairs lead to disfigurement and death, murder and mutilation are the consequences of most 
passions” (110).10 
          A closer reading of some of the stories in The Salzburg Tales reveals that Stead works 
through the relationship between Thanatos and Eros in contrasting ways. In “The 
Marionettist,” which ends with the middle-aged protagonist returning to live with his elderly 
mother, the drives seem reconciled: the return to the mother produces a sense of quiescence at 
the story’s finish, as though the protagonist’s independent life is over, yet there is also 
something Oedipal at play. More typical is “A Russian Heart,” which treats Eros and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
principle” and have its wishes granted, sometimes bringing it into conflict with the external 
world, or the reality principle. When Eros does come into conflict with reality, it is repressed. 
For the purposes of discussing Stead’s stories, I equate the terms Eros and Thanatos with 
Freud’s later theories on the life instincts and the death drive. 
 
10 The entwining of sex or love and death is also apparent in Stead’s first novel, Seven Poor 
Men of Sydney, written (at least in large part) before The Salzburg Tales, although published 
after it. In this novel one of the protagonists, Michael, says to his sister, Catherine, “I have no 
meaning in ordinary life, and this is what releases me from being silent about my love [for 
Catherine], and it is what makes me love, perhaps, the image of myself: it is hunger and lust 
for death at root” (274). Passages articulating similar sentiments recur in Seven Poor Men. 
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Thanatos as ultimately irreconcilable. Maria, the protagonist, is portrayed as returning 
vengeance on the man who spurned her attentions. Maria had been in love with a professor 
when she was a student. He fobbed her off. Some years later, Maria leaves her husband and 
walks for days across the countryside with her two young children to visit the professor. At 
first he claims not to remember her. When she reminds him, he chastises her for being silly 
enough to leave her husband for him. Maria condemns the professor for never having had the 
courage to act on the love that she is convinced he feels for her. Then, while looking through 
the open window onto the courtyard of the professor’s apartment-block, she observes the 
child of the professor’s maid, and realises that the professor is the child’s father. Maria 
spitefully reveals this intuition, terrifying the professor with her discovery. As she is leaving 
the apartment-block he kills himself, by letting the open window fall on his neck.  
          Maria can be interpreted as a personification of Thanatos. She is principally 
characterised by her remorselessness. Nothing will put her off destroying the professor, not 
the passing of years, the encumbrances of marriage and children, the distance between where 
she and the professor live, or the professor’s indifference to her. Maria first irritates the 
professor, then mocks, threatens, and terrifies him. She insists on her return. There is a hint in 
“A Russian Heart” that Maria is only one of many students the professor has led on, and that 
Maria’s return has a karmic quality: he has asked for it. This contributes to his seeming to be 
pursued by “a malignant fate” in the person of Maria. After Maria’s visit the professor 
recognises that his time is up, so that he is ultimately responsible for his own death. As 
though she is an aspect of his self, Maria insists that the professor knows her, and loves her. 
She knows him better than he knows himself: she knows all about him, as her prescience in 
identifying his child indicates. In this story, thwarted Eros transforms into Thanatos. That 
Maria is as much a force as a character is intimated by her complete disregard for time. She 
reappears in the professor’s life without warning after an absence of some years, and insists 
that they take up where they left off when they last met. 
          An image which appears early in “A Russian Heart” signals that this is a story about 
sex and death, and intimates a close relationship between the two. Maria, recounting her visit 
to the professor to an old university friend, tells how, “[o]n the way [to see the professor] I 
passed two lovers behind a bush: a tarantula crouched over them and she was slowly dropping 
on to their heads. Then I saw that they were only spiders themselves, with eight legs, or 
looked like it” (305). In this depiction, the spider subsumes the identities of the lovers behind 
the bush, figuring their erasure as individuals. The lovers regress to a single, primitive 
creature. This portrayal of the sexual act provides an image of Eros and Thanatos as entwined, 
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and images a regression to an earlier self, a self united before splitting. The uncanny image 
lays bare the normally hidden drives: it weds the conventionally separate categories of human 
and animal, single and plural, even the symbolic and the real (the real lovers become an image 
of a spider). It includes both repetitions (doubling, eight limbs, the reproductive act), and 
erasures (the lovers lose their identity as individuals and humans). Simultaneous repetition 
and erasure is seemingly impossible.  
          One effect of such an image is to undermine the narrative timeframe. Maria’s narration, 
encompassing events that happen over a number of years, is encapsulated in an image 
glimpsed, and read, in seconds. The image also disrupts linear time in the narrative by 
foreshadowing the manner of the professor’s death, as the deathly spider drops like the 
window: that the spider drops slowly only adds emphasis. The image is synecdochic, 
intimating the story as a whole. In “A Russian Heart,” Eros and Thanatos are so entwined that 
they cannot be distinguished, until Thanatos vanquishes Eros. 
          A similar treatment of the relationship between Thanatos and Eros is given in 
“Gaspard.” The drives are presented as in conflict, until Thanatos inevitably triumphs. As 
with “A Russian Heart,” “Gaspard” has been addressed by critics only in passing. The story is 
told by the Frenchwoman, and is set in France in the days leading to the Revolution. Stead 
dwells on the time of the Enlightenment, an era that informs many of the stories in The 
Salzburg Tales. As with “The Triskelion,” this is a longer story about social and personal 
transgressions, in this case revolution and the crossing of class boundaries, as well as murder, 
suicide, and adultery. “Gaspard” tells the story of Isabella, destined to be the last of an 
aristocratic line. Isabella is portrayed as somewhat limited, a throwback to simpler stock, and 
“not one to revive by her grace alone the fields of Castelreal” (336). The aristocratic line is 
about to come full circle. Isabella is married off young to Nigaudin, a bourgeois merchant. 
Through this marriage, Nigaudin acquires the ancient castle of Castelreal, and the title of 
Marquis. He has no interest in Isabella herself, and she soon begins an affair with a peasant 
named Jean, a man who happens to enjoy Nigaudin’s confidence. Isabella meets Jean in a hut 
in the woods at night. Mid-way through the narrative, Nigaudin is shown stumbling across the 
lovers’ hut.  
          By this point in “Gaspard,” a sense of the uncanny is established. Something strange, 
even frightening, insists on almost showing itself in the narrative. Whatever it is keeps shying 
away from the surface of the story. Stead achieves this disquieting effect in a number of ways. 
Near the beginning of the narrative, not long after Isabella’s marriage to Nigaudin, Isabella is 
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drawn to a grave-like trench which some workers are digging by the castle wall. She keeps 
returning to look at it. While staring at the trench, she sees her future lover for the first time: 
The Marquis [Nigaudin] was now draining his property and making new 
roads. A trench had been opened between the chestnut grove and the 
southern wall, under the windows of Isabella’s tower. Half a dozen men 
worked there, and among them Jean, the Dwarf, called “Eveille-chien,”11 a 
thickset, sunburnt blond, squarish in physique, said to be abnormally strong 
and agile. His traits were almost those of Isabella, but he was more 
decidedly fair and was transfigured by a fair beard and severer lines. The 
digging of this deep trench fascinated Isabella, as if it had been a moat or 
grave.  (338-39) 
The passage intimates that Isabella is looking at her own grave being dug by Jean, and in a 
sense this comes true, as their liaison destroys them. However, it is not only the image of the 
grave and its associations, or the strength of Isabella’s fascination for it, that contribute to the 
scene’s uncanny effect. While linking images relating to death with a character’s interiority is 
a means of alluding to the potentially uncanny forces of destruction inside a character, a less 
direct way of achieving this is by the manipulation of time in a narrative. In the passage 
above, the disruption of time is at least as important as the image of the grave in producing a 
sense of the ominous, of impending death. It will be recalled that in “A Russian Heart,” 
Maria’s sudden reappearance in the professor’s life is a form of temporal distortion: the past 
intrudes upon the present, from which it fails to distinguish itself. A similar disruption of time 
is at work in the passage in “Gaspard.” Jean is portrayed as a kind of throwback, a dwarf who 
is abnormally strong, like a figure in a fairy tale, or a folk memory of an earlier race. Then the 
opposite movement in time is introduced, and a sense of foreboding enters the story. Isabella 
seems to be glimpsing the future and seeing her own grave. Something lying in wait, which 
derives from the past, is felt in the present. This is one of several instances in “Gaspard” 
where the future impinges upon the present, in ways more subtle than in “The Mirror.” Both 
foreboding, and the irruption of the past into the present, signal an inevitable return to the 
inanimate state. The dissolving of categories to do with time produces an unsettling effect. In 
                                                          
11 Jean’s soubriquet, Eveille-chien, probably alludes to a character of the same name from 
medieval French history, an independently-minded French noble of the eleventh century who 
participated in an uprising against his king. This links Jean to the impending revolution, and 
provides another commonality with Isabella, who is the last of an aristocratic line. 
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this way, distortions of time suggest Thanatos in a narrative. Such treatment of time is 
common in Stead’s fiction. 
          Foreboding is also created in “Gaspard” by the figure of the doll. Isabella has a 
favourite doll, which makes a brief yet significant appearance. Nigaudin, exploring the woods 
he now owns, spies Isabella’s doll hanging in a tree. At this point in the story he knows his 
wife is pregnant to another man, but he does not know the man’s identity. Significantly, he 
discovers the doll, or “mannikin,” only moments before finding his wife and Jean’s trysting 
place: 
Leaning back and looking at the woven sky of the thinning wood, our friend 
[Nigaudin] began to divert himself by throwing pellets of earth at the trees; 
and in a moment he noticed there, dangling vivaciously against the sky, a 
mannikin of rag, with arms and legs stuck out, hanging by a Chinese pigtail 
from the twigs, some child’s toy thrown up for an instant’s flight, and kept 
for a permanent lodger by the shivering buds. The Marquis had met the 
fellow before, surely: a doll of his wife’s, bought by her nurse once in 
Bordeaux. She must have played with it here, walking with her nurse in the 
summer. Under the flippant gestures of the superior and unkind little man, 
he thought with sour anxiety of the child coming to cloak itself in his name, 
and claim the result of his labours.  (348) 
The mannikin is portrayed again as Nigaudin leaves the area: “the little Chinese dangled a 
debonair farewell, as if the intruder, for all his curiosity, left the mystery intact” (350). 
          A mannikin hanging in a tree is uncanny, particularly when it is given attributes of a 
living thing, and is animated by Nigaudin transferring onto it his fears and insecurities over 
the man cuckolding him, so that it becomes “flippant,” “unkind,” “debonair,” and “superior.” 
More unsettling for Nigaudin is that the mannikin signifies something he cannot understand, 
“for all his curiosity.” A familiar or homely object, the doll is out of place, hanging in a tree in 
the woods, when normally it would be seen inside the house. Its Chinese quality, ascribed to 
the doll by its pigtail, underscores its illegibility to a Frenchman (348). Yet while Nigaudin 
cannot read the doll’s meaning, the doll becomes metonymically associated with his 
cuckolding and the illegitimate child who will bear his name. The mannikin’s communication 
is by “gesture.” Mute gesture leads Nigaudin to thinking about his cuckolding. He then 
discovers the hut, and evidence in it of his wife having been there. The mannikin, by a trail of 
association, brings to light hidden Eros. It marks the trysting place, presumably the place 
where the child was conceived. However, the mannikin also brings to light Thanatos. 
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Thanatos is intimated in the confusions of time distilled in the phrase “thrown up for an 
instant’s flight, and kept for a permanent lodger by the shivering buds.” By depicting a hung 
man, the doll foreshadows the loss of wife, reputation, property, and life that Nigaudin is 
about to suffer.  
          Nigaudin discovers in the hut a cushion, “worked with an escutcheon of Castelreal . . . 
those arms . . . were carried in derision at the sacking of the thirteenth-century castle” (349-
50). The discovery is another instance of the past, intruding into the present, being combined 
with foreshadowing, because there is a revolution currently brewing in Castelreal. An event 
from centuries in the past is about to be repeated. Around this mid-point of “Gaspard,” the 
narrative seems to be floating, suspended in time. The reader becomes unusually aware of a 
particular present moment in the narrative, but only because it is more than usually pregnant 
with the past and future. In Jacques Derrida’s terms, Stead creates a moment that is a “present 
present,” but also a “present past,” and a “present future” (Specters xix), so that reconfigured 
time becomes a medium for the spectral. As the familiar, structuring order of linear time 
dissolves, Thanatos comes to light. 
 
 
A further source of uncanny effects in “Gaspard” is associated with the motif of the double. 
This motif is central to “Gaspard,” and recurs frequently, in various forms, in Stead’s writing, 
as already touched on in my discussions of “The Triskelion” and “The Death of Svend” 
above. A closer look at some theoretical connections between the double, the death drive, and 
the uncanny might be helpful at this point. In “The ‘Uncanny,’” Freud claims that uncanny 
effects to do with the death drive derive from the double. This is connected with the double 
being an integral aspect of the Western understanding of death, one of the lingering 
“discarded forms” of thinking about death. Freud argues that the uncanniness of the double 
stems from its reminding the subject of a surmounted phase of human belief, “a stage, 
incidentally, at which it [the double] wore a more friendly aspect. The ‘double’ has become a 
thing of terror, just as, after the collapse of their religion, the gods turned into demons” (358). 
Here is an ambiguity of classification: the double can be both good and bad. These links 
between the double and death are anticipated by Otto Rank in his 1914 study, The Double, in 
which he traces how the self was initially split into a soul and a body as an insurance against 
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the death of the body: later in the development of the psyche, the double became the harbinger 
of death (49-68).12 
          Freud goes on to claim, while analysing the uncanny qualities in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s 
writings, that the double is a kind of key pointing to a general rule, whereby all regressions to 
earlier phases in the evolution of the human self are uncanny “along the same lines” as the 
modern subject’s relation to the double: “[t]he other forms of ego disturbance exploited by 
Hoffmann [to create uncanny effects] can easily be estimated along the same lines as the 
theme of the ‘double.’ They are a harking-back to particular phases in the evolution of the 
self-regarding feeling, a regression to a time when the ego had not yet marked itself off 
sharply from the external world and from other people” (358). In this formulation, the double 
collapses boundaries between categories of inner and outer, self and other, past and present. 
Freud, more concerned with theorising regression, does not focus on the ambiguities of 
category which he enumerates in relation to the double. The uncanniness of the double, 
however, is surely not only due to its signifying regression, but to its undermining customary 
categories to do with the individual being considered discrete, singular, and unitary.  
          In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud expands on connections between the double 
and death to include Eros. Freud notes that the deathly is combined with the erotic in the 
figure of the double in Plato’s Symposium, in the passage in which Aristophanes tells the story 
of a primeval human who combined male and female characteristics, until separated into two 
people by Zeus. The divided parts long to be reunited: “[s]hall we follow the hint given us by 
the poet-philosopher,” writes Freud, “and venture upon the hypothesis that living substance at 
the time of its coming to life was torn apart into small particles, which have ever since 
endeavoured to reunite through the sexual instincts?” (331-32). Two returns can be discerned 
in the process of reunification of the separated halves, as told by Aristophanes: the return of 
one half to its other half, and the return of the reunited whole to an earlier state. Through these 
                                                          
12 It is likely that Stead had read Rank’s essay, “The Double.” In an undated letter written in 
1937 or 1938, she writes: “I have books which cover the great eternal themes of literature, as, 
for instance, the ‘double’ or ‘wraith’ theme: that is the theme of the ancient folk-legend of 
‘Don Juan’” (Web 81). Rank published his analyses of the Don Juan figure, which has links 
with his thinking on the double, together with “The Double” in 1914. Neither essay was 
translated from German into English until the 1970s. This suggests either that Stead read in 
German by this time, or that William Blake translated or summarised the works for her. 
Another possibility is that Stead read Rank’s work in French, because a French translation of 




two regressions the double figures the union of Thanatos and Eros. In this thinking on the 
double, ambiguity of categorisation is evident again: does the double signify wholeness, or 
dissolution? 
          The double’s erotic force is evident in its long being a staple of romantic productions. 
The combination of its erotic aspect with its deathly aspect is commonly evoked (in the phrase 
“fatal attraction,” for instance). Stead often depicts Eros and Thanatos coinciding in a double, 
as already evident in the spider image of the doubled lovers in “A Russian Heart,” and 
implicit in “The Death of Svend,” through its two especially-close siblings. Returning to 
“Gaspard,” in this story Isabella and Jean’s disastrous attraction is attributed to their being a 
double. Stead demonstrates the erotic power of the double by having it override class 
strictures, the narrator of “Gaspard,” the Frenchwoman, declaring, “[i]s it improbable that a 
delicately-bred lady loved a man of the common people, and one not even handsome? Who 
shall explain these things; misalliance is common, and ladies of high rank have been happy 
with peasant husbands” (341-42). Even before Isabella meets Jean, she is waiting for her 
double, as though she is not complete in herself: “[Isabella] seemed to wait patiently . . . 
among these kindly-disposed aliens, for the brother Geminid a coincidence of birth had surely 
planted for her somewhere, burning among the dispassionate legions of the earth, first and last 
dream of the heart” (338).13 When Isabella’s double, Jean, duly appears, the reader learns that 
“[h]is traits were almost those of Isabella” (338-39). Jean and Isabella appear to be telepathic, 
as when he hears her death cry from impossibly far away (356). Both are associated with 
dreams: Isabella “spoke in a slow style of reverie” and is characterised as being 
“unconscious” (337), while Jean “slept under a cataract of dreams” (339). Both have an earthy 
appearance. He, for instance, is a dwarf of abnormal strength, first seen digging in the earth, 
suggesting a troll, while Isabella is portrayed as a return to an earthier type, with “peasant 
traits, a broad face covered with fine golden down, thick brows and lids . . . and a coarse wide 
nose” (337). Their simple and rather mute manner (they are not once depicted talking to one 
another) also suggests a regressive quality. Isabella and Jean, by entering a state of being 
doubled, become figures “harking back,” as Freud writes, regressing “to times when the ego 
                                                          
13 Here the double, longed for as a lover, is cast as a brother or sister. Stead explores this 
further in the love between Catherine and Michael in Seven Poor Men, and Nellie and Tom in 
Cotters’ England. The theme of the romantic double is also present in “A Harmless Affair,” a 
story first published in Ocean of Story, which works with the idea of a lover restoring a lost 




had not yet clearly set itself off against the world outside and from others” (“The ‘Uncanny’” 
358). 
          Stead further aligns Isabella and Jean with what corresponds to Freud’s idea of the 
regressive by their intimacy with an animistic nature. Nature in this context can be equated 
with Freud’s “external world” (358). The external world is not really external to Jean and 
Isabella. Rather, the boundary between these characters and the world outside dissolves. Jean 
and Isabella first meet in the woods near the castle, away from other people, where their 
natures are unhindered in recognising and embracing one another. Stead depicts the woods as 
brimming with consciousness, and Isabella and Jean are portrayed as creatures belonging to 
this parallel, animistic realm. Jean likes to sleep in the wood during breaks from digging the 
ditch: 
One day after he had thus lain for a while he woke. The wood still trembled 
in the heat, the air was still filled with the tumult of sounds, the birds’ song, 
the stream’s song and the noise of sleep departing four-footed through the 
air. A quiet fell then, and he saw coming towards him, unawares, the 
Marquise [Isabella], wandered from her attendants, dressed in a blue dress, 
buxom, with forehead, breast and arms gilded by the sun, and dark refulgent 
eyes. When she looked at him, he rose, bowed almost ceremoniously, 
smiled, his large white teeth appearing in his brown face like almond flesh 
in its shell, and he began turning through the Wilderness in a circle, weaving 
the bushes and trees in a fillet, with hand-springs and tumbling. Jean 
approached again, and sitting on his haunches, began to whistle softly, 
calling the birds. They answered, hopped, whirred and came with 
murmurings nearer.  (340) 
This passage shows Isabella and Jean communicating not with words, but looks, gestures, and 
movements. Their communication resembles that between animals rather than humans. Jean 
talks to the birds and seems to call upon them as his familiars, and his dance resembles a 
bird’s courtship display.  
          It seems the double is not for this world. Isabella and Jean’s love ends in catastrophe. 
When Isabella bears her child by Jean, Nigaudin arranges for it to be fostered. Learning of the 
arrangement, Jean spirits the child away. Distraught by these developments, Isabella attempts 
suicide. Jean returns to her deathbed: he is caught, tortured, and executed. Meanwhile, peasant 
unrest has been growing in the countryside, and the story ends with the storming of the castle 
of Castelreal in a peasant revolt. Nigaudin is captured by the mob, and dies at their hands soon 
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after. The three main characters die in this story, and the old aristocratic social structure is 
destroyed. As in “A Russian Heart,” this story ends with the triumph of Thanatos. 
 
 
As noted above, the revolution depicted in “Gaspard” repeats an earlier revolution. I have also 
mentioned that repetition is another way that the death drive manifests in Stead’s stories. 
Many critics note the importance of repetition in Stead’s writing. By the time of the 
publication of Stead’s third book, repetition has already been identified by Barnard Eldershaw 
as a distinctive feature of her fiction: “[t]he rich quality of the books expresses itself . . . in 
repetitions and cumulations” (25). Repetition, in form and content, grows in importance in 
Stead’s work. It is frequently noted how her characters are often compulsive talkers, while 
formally her narratives circle. Freud asserts that the death drive reveals itself through 
compulsive repetition, and that this revelation is uncanny. This repetition compulsion lends 
“to certain aspects of the mind their daemonic character. . . . whatever reminds us of this inner 
‘compulsion to repeat’ is perceived as uncanny” (“The ‘Uncanny’” 360-61).14 Are there 
occasions when repetition in Stead’s work elicits the uncanny, and is this because it provides 
a glimpse of the death drive at work?  
          At the time of writing The Salzburg Tales, Stead was still developing the techniques of 
monologue and circular form that characterise her novels. Repetition was, however, already a 
feature of her work, although differently expressed, as Barnard Eldershaw notes. In The 
Salzburg Tales, repetition is figured in motifs, such as the double, the doll, or the mirror. In 
terms of plot, it is frequently expressed by a return: examples include the return of the 
triskelion, Metternich’s persistent returns in “The Mirror,” and the return of Death to the 
Danish Woman in “The Death of Svend.” Repetition is also expressed in the book’s form, 
there being an apparent superabundance of stories in The Salzburg Tales, which are often 
variations – repetitions – of well-known and ancient story types. Many of the stories appear to 
spring from the preceding story, as though a supplement becomes a new narrative. Often 
short, discrete stories are secreted in a longer story’s form: Rhoda’s tales in “The Triskelion” 
                                                          
14 Freud’s use of the supernatural terminology “daemonic” is ambiguous. Despite his frequent 
use of this word, it is not found in Laplanche and Pontalis’s The Language of Psychoanalysis. 
The word has changed meaning. Rosemary Jackson traces how the depiction of the demonic 
moves from a diabolic external other (in Shakespeare for example) to an internal aspect of the 




are an example of this. With its many representations of repetition and return, The Salzburg 
Tales reminds the reader that narrative itself is a form of return, a representation of a memory, 
dream, incident, wish, or fear, and that there is an impetus behind the return of these things. 
Foreshadowing Stead’s characterisation of compulsive talkers in her novels, every personage 
who tells a story in The Salzburg Tales does so with a palpable eagerness, albeit often 
disavowed.  
          In “Gaspard,” repetition is evident in the figure of the double, and in the return of the 
past. A sense of déjà vu pervades the story. In “A Russian Heart” repetition is apparent in 
Maria’s return to the professor, and in the image of the lovers as a spider. Of all the stories in 
The Salzburg Tales, however, repetition is perhaps most notable in “The Marionettist.” In this 
opening tale, repetition occurs in form, plot, character, and motif. I conclude this chapter with 
a brief reading of this story, suggesting links between its uncanny effects, repetition, and a 
force akin to Freud’s death drive. 
          “The Marionettist” begins with a young James assuring his mother that he will never 
leave home, as his elder brothers have done. He soon repeats his brothers’ actions, however, 
when he leaves home for art school. Here he meets Anna, whom he marries. They have a 
family, and together run a marionette theatre. At the age of thirty-eight James deserts Anna 
and his children, breaking his pledge to his wife as he did to his mother. When his wife and 
children do not welcome him back unconditionally after a fifteen-year absence (a first return), 
he returns to live with his elderly mother (a second return).  
          An overarching, repetitive patterning or programming operates not only on James and 
his brothers, but on their mother. This is signalled at the start and the end of the narrative by 
the mother recounting two very similar dreams, which frame the story. This passage is near 
the beginning of the narrative: 
When winter came round, James’s mother would look out at cloaked figures 
making tracks in the snow along the Nonnthalgasse beneath black 
Hohensalzburg, and say:  
   “I dreamed last night that Peter and Cornelius [James’s runaway elder 
brothers] knocked at the door on a day like this. They were wrapped up in 
so many rags that I did not at first recognize them. They looked at me a 
moment, asked me for something to eat and then fell down flat on their 
faces like empty clothes. Even in my dreams, you see, I know they are not 
here.”  (57) 
This passage comes from close to the end: 
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But James’s mother looked out at the cloaked figures making tracks in the 
snow along the Nonnthalgasse beneath gloomy Hohensalzburg and said:  
   “I dreamed last night that Peter and Cornelius met me in the street on a 
bright sunshiny day; they were little boys and were going to school. . . .”  
   “Your dreams are always the same, mother,” said James’s father.  (69) 
“The Marionettist” ends by repeating its beginning. In form it figures James’s return to his 
mother. Both the mother and James repeat compulsively, until the reunion of mother and son 
at the story’s end, which reads as the reaching of stasis. 
          Repetition is figured by the marionettes that feature in the story. The marionette motif is 
introduced at the narrative’s beginning, with Stead giving a puppet-like attribute to James’s 
two elder brothers in the mother’s opening dream. Stead continues the motif of person-as-
puppet in James and Anna’s first child, who is also named Anna. Little Anna is like a 
marionette in that she cannot walk, at least until she is seven. However, the actual marionettes 
in “The Marionettist” are significant to the narrative not so much in themselves, but because 
they suggest, by metonymy, how James and his two brothers are marionette-like. The brothers 
share a character trait of lacking an individual will, and they repeat similar actions. This is 
reinforced when James’s unexpected return to his wife and children is prefigured by a 
similarly unannounced visit to the family by Peter, one of the elder brothers. As with their 
disappearances, the brothers act in parallel in their appearances.  
          The brothers’ shared qualities undermine their individuality. They seem reproducible in 
the way marionettes are reproducible. They appear generic. Even in their mother’s dreams, 
the brothers are reduced to simulacra. The brothers can be read as figuring the repetition that 
Freud identifies as betraying the death drive’s presence.  
          Most uncannily, these repetitions blur the boundaries of conventional categories. Are 
James, his mother, and his brothers, in their lack of will and in their reproducible quality, 
automata or humans? The same questions do not apply to Anna, her daughters with James, 
and their suitors and husbands, all of whom are treated more or less in a realist manner. 
Despite mother and daughter having the same name, the two develop into quite different 
characters, and the daughter overcomes her inability to walk. Their lives are not compulsive, 
or patterned, or determined by any “daemonic” force. The oddly mechanical quality isolated 
in James and his original family, and its attendant uncanniness, is highlighted by being placed 
in relation to relatively commonplace characters.  
          This leads to potential confusions over genre: is “The Marionettist” to be read as realist, 
or marvellous? Can it be both at once? Stead’s story seems to resist either category by 
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inhabiting both.15 In particular, it is at the points in the narrative in which the workings of the 
death drive are revealed, that the story’s genre becomes ambiguous. This suggests a link 
between death and that which cannot be categorised, which I investigate further in my next 
chapter.
                                                          
15 This is not dissimilar to the shifts in register found in fairy tales, such as “Hansel and 





“I Live in You”: Uncanny Narrative 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, and in the preceding chapters, I argued that something is felt 
as uncanny when it appears ambiguous in category. In this chapter, I explore story, the 
storyteller, and storytelling1 as potential mediums for what is difficult to categorise. I do this 
by reading a number of Christina Stead stories which give portraits of storytellers. These 
portraits are examples of how story is able to present the categorically ambiguous. This aspect 
of story is frequently, although not exclusively, to do with a story’s content. For example, 
Stead’s storytellers tell of things that include the inconvenient, the puzzling, and the 
marginalised, such as death. Story is not only able to present the categorically ambiguous, but 
is able actively to blur or undermine categories. In doing these things, story itself is perceived 
as uncanny. I also argue that a story’s form can elicit uncanny effects, if the form is difficult 
to categorise. Uncanny effects can be created, for instance, by including repetitions which 
seem coincidental in a realistic narrative. In making these arguments I discuss at most length 
“I Live in You” and “My Friend, Lafe Tilly.” The former story was first published in 1973, 
while the latter appeared in 1984. Both were collected in Ocean of Story (1985), and their 
composition probably dates from the 1940s.2 In addition I discuss “The Marionettist” and 
“The Mirror,” in The Salzburg Tales, and draw on some of Stead’s essays in Ocean of Story. 
          In a 1996 article, Robin Lydenberg investigates the idea that there is something peculiar 
to narrative which is uncanny. Lydenberg refers to narrative theories which “suggest that 
perhaps the most essential quality of narrative is uncanniness, a notion that in turn illuminates 
                                                          
1 I keep in mind distinctions between narrative, narration, and narrator (or story, storytelling, 
and storyteller). “Narrative” I take in the sense of the term as given by Gerard Genette: “oral 
or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or a series of events” (25). As the 
chapter progresses, and I begin to talk about some of the more technical aspects of narrative 
and narrating, my use of the term “narrative” moves toward Genette’s second sense of the 
term “narrative”: “the succession of events, real or fictitious, that are the subjects of [a] 
discourse, and . . . their several relations of linking, opposition, repetition, etc” (25). 
 
2 I assume this date of composition from the narrative style, and from Stead’s habit of setting 
her stories in the place where she was currently residing, or had just left. “I Live in You” 
contains an allusion to The Man in Grey, a novel by Eleanor Smith, first published in 1942, 




the more general uncanniness of language and of the speaking subject” (1073). According to 
Lydenberg, drawing on Paul de Man, Homi Bhabha, and others – and to simplify – narrative 
is uncanny since language always contains otherness. I suggest that this aspect of story is a 
recurring concern in Stead’s work. In making this argument I place Stead’s ideas of story, as 
extrapolated from her portraits of storytellers, and as expressed in her essays in Ocean of 
Story, in the historical context of some traditional Western lines of thought on story, the 
storyteller, and storytelling, including those explored in Walter Benjamin’s essay, “The 
Storyteller” (1936). My analysis of Stead’s portraits of storytellers has a particular bearing on 
her characterisation of great talkers, one of the distinctive features of her fiction.  
          The nature of story evidently intrigued Stead from her first published writings. The 
Salzburg Tales can be read as a meditation on story, its forms, effects, and origins. One way 
this meditation plays out is in the ongoing speculation between the assembled personages on 
the nature of story. Their banter between tales touches on questions such as: What constitutes 
a story? What are its rules? What is its purpose? What is its relation to truth, and to real life? 
The personages often give opinions on such questions in response to a story, such as this 
chastening comment by the Old Man upon hearing the Centenarist’s tales at the end of the 
second day: “‘[l]et me hear something respectable and natural tomorrow, some tale about 
people with good hearts and natural sentiment. An old man can’t afford to go about with these 
cynical, salacious remarks in his ears. . . . I don’t want to hear ribald tales from others: that 
upsets my ideas’” (174). In response to a later story by the Centenarist, the Doctor declares:  
“But that is a stupid story. . . . According to these tales, you can get even the 
Fiend himself to work for you with a few formulae. . . . I like modern tales, 
myself: I have no patience with this mumbo-jumbo. The credulous age has 
passed: nowadays, the poorest mother studies pediatrics, the simplest 
workingman asks his doctor about the functions of the endocrine glands. . . . 
I can dissect what is before my eyes and I like rigorous thinking – but 
describe what isn’t there, or build fantasy on platitude: it’s a horror to me. 
Still, I admire those who can reel it off without thinking.”  (383) 
The Doctor’s comments contribute to the intermittent yet ongoing discussion about the 
relation between truth and story. The Frenchwoman has her say on stories that are found in 
newspapers: “‘how horrible! I don’t want to hear those things that you can read any day in the 
daily paper, but a real horror: frighten us, startle us, but tell us something true, nevertheless’” 
(244). The Centenarist obliges, relating a fearful story about the not-so-distant First World 
War. To this the Banker responds, as though to confirm the power of story over information 
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such as that found in a newspaper report: “‘[i]s it possible? Who has ever heard of such a 
terrible thing?’” (247). The Philosopher says of story and truth: “‘I only tell fairy-tales . . . for 
I would rather be seen in their sober vestments than in the prismatic unlikelihood of reality. 
Besides, every fairy-tale has a modern instance’” (231).  
          At one point, the Lawyer celebrates the sheer pleasure of the communal aspect of 
storytelling, saying to the assembled company: 
“Let someone else tell us a tale! And why shouldn’t we fill in our leisure 
hours this way, listening to tales! What a company we are! We come from 
every corner of the earth: we have seen the world; we know Life. Let us 
amuse each other.” 
   “Or even if we ignore life,” said the English Gentleman, “let us amuse 
each other.”  (98-99) 
          The personages are portrayed as a varied lot, although only some of them are given a 
distinct storytelling style, as, for example, is the self-consciously rational Doctress of “The 
Triskelion.” In the various stories told by the personages, however, portraits of very different 
narrators emerge. There is the impressionable and imaginative Kate of “The Triskelion,” who 
herself recounts the tale-telling of the excitable Rhoda, the boarding-house proprietor. The 
Mathematician in “The Mirror” tells of his sister, Giselda, who creates a marvellous narrative 
by telling what she sees of the future in a mirror. The Mathematician earlier gives an account 
of the contrasting narrative style of Jourdain, Giselda’s fiancé, who is an accomplished 
raconteur, and whose storytelling technique is carefully noted.  
           Stead often emphasises the effects these storytellers have on their audiences. She 
shows different relationships between teller and listener. Rhoda’s tales in “The Triskelion,” 
we are told, are met with scepticism. Giselda’s narrative of clairvoyance in “The Mirror” 
causes Jourdain, her future husband, considerable alarm. Jourdain himself is portrayed as 
charming his audience. The response of a listener is put to good use in “A Russian Heart,” 
when Maria’s friend is shown to be shocked by what Maria tells. This highlights a strange 
callousness in Maria. 
          One of the more detailed portrayals of a storyteller in The Salzburg Tales is given a 
privileged place in the book, being placed near the start of the opening story. This is a portrait 
of James the marionettist, the protagonist of “The Marionettist,” who is depicted as losing 
himself in a fever of narration while telling stories to his daughters at their bedtime: 
[James] came in from his attic workshop at night, when the children were in 
bed, bringing in some new puppet, to tell them a new chapter in an endless 
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story that he made up as he went along, one which sprang naturally out of 
the events of their daily life, with incidents he read in the newspapers, and 
memories of his childhood pieced in. He could imitate marvellously the rain 
on the roofs of villages, and the rain on the railway station at Vienna, with 
the chatter of the travellers underneath: if they closed their eyes, he could 
make them hear the wind rising in a valley, a motor-horn approaching 
around a winding road and scattering a barn-yard; a shepherd yodelling on 
the mountains with the echoes catching his song. Then he would act for 
them, with his wooden dolls, “Faust,” “Romeo and Juliet,” “Cyrano de 
Bergerac,” fantastic pieces, a “Hexentanz,” “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice,” 
and many other ancient themes. He lost himself in his performances, 
keeping his little daughters up late at night, till their flushed cheeks were 
turned to the pillow and their eyes suddenly closed. He often interrupted 
himself in a scene to find himself alone awake.  (58-59)3 
This passage indicates a number of potentially uncanny aspects of storytelling, story, the 
figure of the storyteller, and their relationship to an audience. These include a sense that 
something outside James, something other, is working through him. He becomes a 
mouthpiece, a medium, as much a marionette himself as a marionettist. The boundless energy 
and possibilities animating the stories he tells do not originate in him, but use him as their 
conduit. James’s original identity is erased by storytelling (“he lost himself”), or, more 
accurately, he seems to assume a new identity, one more expansive than his everyday self. It 
is as though James is possessed, and becomes two people. His original self is reduced to a 
vessel that is reanimated by an alien, narrative energy. This otherness of story is uncanny 
since it cannot easily be placed or categorised: what is its nature, where did it come from, and 
how can it enter and inhabit the discreteness and singularity of someone’s character? 
          Mingled with this picture of a storyteller are some potentially uncanny aspects of the 
act of storytelling. Storytelling alters James, sending him into a different state of mind. 
Storytelling is presented as an act which induces a specific kind of consciousness, one distinct 
                                                          
3 It seems fitting that “The Marionettist,” a story that depicts a scene of the birth of story, 
should be placed first in Stead’s first published book. James’s storytelling scene might be read 
as a cornucopia, depicting and becoming a fountain-head in relation to the stories that follow 
in The Salzburg Tales: the book itself might then bear a similar relation to the rest of Stead’s 
oeuvre. This would be a different way of considering The Salzburg Tales from Diana Brydon, 




from wakefulness, sleep, dreaming, or daydreaming. It appears most similar to trance or 
rapture. This state of mind is shown to be produced by imitating sound and movement, a 
receptiveness to word play, an appreciation of old story forms, the arrangement of memories, 
and a suspending of disbelief. It transforms the storyteller, and, if the storyteller is effective, 
the audience. While James only sends his children to sleep, that is his intention, and the 
transformation of their consciousness is emphasised (“their eyes suddenly closed”). Story 
moves the teller, and the listener, from one state to another.  
          Storytelling is shown to transform not only the teller and the audience, but also 
commonplace experience. One way it does this is by drawing upon everyday life for material, 
and then making this material fit old, generic story-lines. So while the material of James’s 
storytelling “sprang naturally out of the events of their daily life,” it is reshaped from these 
particulars into generic “ancient themes.” Story is shown to dissolve the boundaries between 
categories: the particular becomes the general, the everyday becomes magical, and the real 
becomes the symbolic. Story is shown to have an ability to restructure time too, as James’s 
anecdotes organise contemporary life to fit into established patterns from the past. 
          The presentation of story as something alien to the storyteller is perhaps the uncanniest 
feature of James’s portrait. Story flows into James, and this is emphasised by its having a 
teeming, self-perpetuating quality. These qualities are symptoms of story having an 
irrepressibly independent life. Story’s generation seems inevitable and, once called upon, 
unstoppable. James’s stories are “endless,” and it is only when he tires that they stop. If he 
had the energy to continue, presumably the stories would never cease. In this way, story is 
shown to be exterior to the storyteller. James tells his stories through puppets, and this, too, 
emphasises something exterior about story. As something other, it enters and works through 
the storyteller. James is not fully in control or conscious of his storytelling abilities, and story 
uses him as though he himself is a puppet. This gift for being a medium for story is not 
peculiar to James, and that he is a man of ordinary abilities is stressed in “The Marionettist.” 
The story force or drive is not confined to any individual, but is free and roaming. 
          The portrait stresses the organic qualities of story, and organic profuseness becomes a 
metaphor for story throughout The Salzburg Tales. That story is akin to the organic is not only 
betrayed by its profusion, but by its perpetuating itself. Stead articulates this on several 
occasions in The Salzburg Tales: 
[The personages] urged the Centenarist to speak again, all the evening until 
very late they sat there and lapped up his tales which he squirted under 
pressure through natural juiciness, as a ripe pear liquor, a ripe breast milk, 
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and over-saturated moss, water: and they retired at the end and slept 
profoundly, dreaming of a thousand odds and ends; but it is impossible to 
recount all the tales of the Centenarist.  (325) 
And again, from the last page of the book: 
the great tale-teller [the Centenarist] and the master of tongues [the 
personage of the Viennese Conductor] sang on through the quiet night. 
There was no indication that they would ever stop. . . . No one can believe 
[the personages] listened another day: but this we will never know, for the 
recording ear that heard them all, began to hear blow most loud the wind . . . 
from other corners of the earth, and it flew off with the night-wind to any 
other spot you like, for the earth breeds tales and songs quicker even than 
weeds.  (497-98) 
Story’s ability to reproduce itself is shown at work on many occasions in The Salzburg Tales, 
for example, when one tale immediately inspires another, such as the School Boy’s tale, 
which is a direct response to the preceding “The Death of the Bee.” Stories are shown to be 
born out of story, or engendered within stories. A sense of narrative creation is embodied in 
the book as a whole by the allusive division of its tales into seven days. 
           The character of Jourdain in “The Mirror” is a more urbane and self-conscious 
storyteller than James. While James appears almost an accidental storyteller, Jourdain is 
clearly an old hand. Jourdain’s interest as a storyteller is in part to give pleasure to his 
audience. He draws the content of his stories from memory and close observation. He is 
depicted by the narrating Mathematician as: 
talking, talking perpetually, talking as if we were not bodies but ears, and as 
if the soul were in the ear, recalling to us our own pasts, things he had 
guessed from some chance reference, things he had been told, which others 
had already forgotten, raking up strange acquaintances he had all over the 
world, ransacking all his unforgotten lore for tales, analogies and arguments.   
(182-83)  
Jourdain is a great rememberer, drawing on experience and archaic material to shape his 
stories. In addition, he has access to, and uses, an external store of storytelling accrued over 
time, the “lore,” which suggests the impersonal, and a kind of otherness. He also employs 
rhetorical technique. Repetition is part of his technique: “[t]alking, talking perpetually, 
talking.” His talk resembles an incantation. In an indication of future developments in Stead’s 
writing, this magic works through the ear, as Jourdain talks to his audience “as if we were not 
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bodies but ears, and as if the soul were in the ear.” The command of the voice gives Jourdain 
the long-endorsed authority of possessing logos, possessing not only the word, but reason. 
This allows him to fit generic storytelling material to his particular audience (reversing the 
process of James’s storytelling, which fits particular material to generic stories). He provides 
his audience with stories which are shown to give his listeners a restored coherence and 
happiness. The character of Metternich, the diabolical musician in “The Mirror,” creates a 
contrasting kind of art, more to do with illusion, and more self-serving of the artist.  
           The passage portraying Jourdain blends the seemingly magical and the everyday. 
Jourdain is, for instance, given near-magical qualities. With his unusual powers of memory 
and grasp of rhetorical technique, Jourdain employs a benevolent enchantment with words. 
He is close to telepathic and omniscient. He possesses a universal quality, as though he is a 
force that circles the globe, “raking up strange acquaintances he had all over the world.” He is 
presented as almost outside time, as having access to “unforgotten lore”: he retains lived 
experience to an extent that exceeds the normal human capacity for memory – even for an 
historian, as Jourdain is.  
          Under some circumstances, the magical becomes uncanny. This would be the case if the 
magical occurs in a rational context. In such a context, the seeming magic defies explanation, 
yet the context depends on the possibility of an explanation. When the magical cannot be 
placed in regard to the rational, it becomes uncanny: this is the sensation a skilled illusionist 
or magician induces. I argue in chapter two that “The Mirror” is, in parts, a marvellous story. 
Jourdain’s near-magical characterisation, for instance, seems to overreach the realistic. He is, 
however, ultimately associated with the rational and the realistic parts of the story. This is the 
reason his powers verge on the uncanny.  
          Also uncanny is the focus on the relationship between storyteller and audience: the 
storyteller returns something once familiar, yet also long estranged, to his listeners, “recalling 




These Stead portraits of storytellers at work can be related to storytelling in a larger context. 
Both portraits, for instance, allude to an otherness in story, a theme which has preoccupied 
Western literature from its beginnings. In the works of Homer and Hesiod, the poets refer to 
storytelling as drawing on a demonic, exterior element, the divine. Plato muses on poetic 
inspiration in the Ion, in which Socrates is shown enlightening the rhapsode, Ion, as to why he 
87 
 
is so good at reciting Homer’s works: Ion’s power of recitation ultimately derives from a 
divine source, through Homer, as by a power emanating through a string of magnets (422-23). 
Plato also writes that “a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to 
indite until he has been inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer in him” 
(423). James in “The Marionettist” is portrayed much as a link in the chain imagined by 
Socrates, “put out of his senses.”  
          A parallel archaeology of poetic inspiration would excavate the line of magic rather 
than divinity. This line might run from Gorgias to writers such as Mallarmé, who maintains 
that “poetry rests on the ‘magic of words’” (qtd. in de Romilly 85). Jourdain in “The Mirror” 
is more in keeping with this kind of storyteller. Christina Stead herself appears to subscribe to 
this school of thought. “Story is magical,” she writes in her 1968 essay, “Ocean of Story” 
(Ocean 6), and she frequently expresses this idea in the late non-fiction pieces in the 
collection of the same name. Later in the autobiographical “Ocean of Story,” for instance, 
Stead suggests that “story has a magic necessary to our happiness” (7). In another essay 
included in Ocean of Story, “A Waker and a Dreamer” (1972), Stead gives an instance from 
her own life of this “magic” at work. In this essay, she recounts early memories of her family, 
and especially her father, David Stead (or David G. Stead, as he came to style himself). Well 
known in his day, David Stead was a naturalist and an author of popular books and newspaper 
columns on marine creatures.4 Christina Stead writes of recognising her “own experience” 
when reading one of her father’s books: 
After [my father’s] death, his widow Thistle Harris produced from his MSS. 
another book, Sharks and Rays of Australian Seas. When I dip into this 
book, I am at home again and hear the old sea names I knew well. For he 
told us everything he could; he “expatiated,” as he said. Now, I read a bit 
about the Wobbegong and I see suddenly a real wobbegong I saw 
somewhere, at Bateman’s Bay perhaps, when a child; I hear the eucalypts 
                                                          
4 Although David Stead’s books are purportedly scientific, they are full of curious, often 
tantalising anecdotes concerning encounters with sea creatures. David Stead displays a 
storyteller’s flair for the detail or situation that will lodge in a reader’s mind. One anecdote in 
his posthumously published work, Sharks and Rays of Australian Seas, tells of fishermen near 
Sydney seeing a creature so vast in size that the author teasingly hesitates to venture the 
dimensions in print (46). Anita Segerberg (in “Getting Started”) and Hazel Rowley (in “How 
Real Is Sam Pollit?”) argue that David Stead’s influence as a storyteller on Christina Stead’s 




rustling at old Lydham [Stead’s early-childhood home], the cockchafer 
beetles, burnished gold, falling from the boughs, smell their peculiar smell; 
and the whole landscape of childhood rises up, a marvellous real world, not 
bounded by our time, fragrant, colored by the books he liked, Typee, The 
Voyage of the Beagle, Extinct Monsters, a book I loved as well as Grimm, 
The Sleeper Awakes.  (492-93) 
Here are some of story’s magical attributes, which appear to overlap in some instances with 
the uncanny effects explored in the passages in “The Marionettist” and “The Mirror.” 
Narrative reorganises, for example, the customary categories by which time is ordered. The 
past invades the present. While reading her father’s narrative, time collapses, and Stead is 
back in her childhood world, “not bounded by our time” (493). The power of words to 
produce, or reproduce, the world anew is also stressed, so that the symbolic becomes real: “I 
see suddenly a real wobbegong I saw somewhere” (492). Story also has the power to 
transform the generic (Wobbegong) to the particular (wobbegong). Story, through her father’s 
recollections, induces the lines between categories to falter. 
          In these late autobiographical essays which reflect on the nature of story, Stead often 
returns to the figure of her father, and in particular her absorption of his storytelling ability. 
Since even her autobiographical pieces have an allegorical turn, it may be better to say that 
she returns to the original storyteller, and the original act of listening to and absorbing the 
original story, “the powerful story rooted in all things” (“Ocean of Story” 8). An account of 
such a scene is found near the beginning of “A Waker and a Dreamer,” where Stead recollects 
the time in her life when her father would tell her bedtime stories:  
I was born into the ocean of story, or on its shores. I was the first child of a 
lively young scientist who loved his country and his zoology. My mother 
died – he mothered me. I went to bed early and with the light falling from 
the streetlamp through the open slats of the venetian blind he, with one foot 
on the rather strange bed I had, told his tales. He meant to talk me to sleep; 
he talked me awake.  (4) 
Stead emphasises the transformation of consciousness, emblematic of other transformations. 
She also links storytelling to being born. She goes on:  
A younger child, fatherless, had come to take my cot; and my bed was made 
up on a large packing case in which were my father’s specimens, a 
naturalist’s toys, things from the oceans around us and from the north, 
Indonesia, China, Japan. There was the crocodile head with a bullet hole 
89 
 
over the left eye, the whale tooth, splendid ivory with an ivory growth in the 
root canal, the giant spider-crab, the dried human heads, shrunk, painted and 
with coconut fiber hair, a plate-sized bony disc picked up on a near beach, 
the kneecap of some monster extinct millions of years before, a snake’s 
beautiful skeleton. “What is in the packing case?” I would tell and, what I 
forgot, he told.  (4) 
As though instructing an apprentice, Stead’s father helps and demonstrates when Christina 
stumbles (“what I forgot, he told”). The main lesson, however, is that nature is magical and 
marvellous, as the catalogue of items in the packing case demonstrates. This scene locates the 
point of the forging of the natural and the marvellous (the “marvellous real world”) which 
runs through Stead’s fiction. These categories are often kept separate, but this is not so in 
Stead’s work, as some critics note. Bruce Bennett, for instance, writes that Stead’s stories 
“recognize two qualities that some writers and commentators try to keep apart: the ‘magic’ of 
a story, and its representation of ‘real life.’” Bennett continues: “[u]nlike [contemporaneous 
Australian short story writers Vance] Palmer and [Marjorie] Barnard, Stead downplayed the 
conscious ‘art’ of storytelling and replaced it with the notion of a magic storyteller” (120). As 
mentioned, when fused with the everyday, the magical can become uncanny. 
          The passages above indicate that part of nature’s magic is its abundance (the ocean, the 
long list of the packing case’s contents, the many nights), and its unassimilable strangeness 
(“an ivory growth in the root canal . . . a snake’s beautiful skeleton”). The passage also shows 
that for Stead, story is primary, linked to birth and nurturing. Stead presents her birth as a 
birth through story, and she is nourished on story in the absence of a mother. Story is a 
sustaining life-force. This passage recalls several in Stead’s fiction, the best known being 
Louisa Pollit’s storytelling to her younger half-siblings in The Man Who Loved Children. It is 
also reminiscent of the scene cited above in “The Marionettist,” in which James tells bedtime 
stories to his daughters. 
          In these passages from Stead’s essays, the magic inherent in story and storytelling is 
inseparable from the storyteller as magician. Stead’s father casts a transforming spell: “[h]e 
meant to talk me to sleep; he talked me awake” (4). The storyteller as magician is also evident 
in Stead’s depiction of her father’s storytelling as weaving a kind of intellectual spell: “I must 
leave out all the stories of those many nights, a thousand, between [the ages of] two and four 
and a half, which formed my views – an interest in men and nature, and a feeling that all were 
equal” (“Ocean of Story” 5). Stead here alludes to her father as a Scheherazade. This 
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storyteller not only informs the listener, he acts as a midwife to her consciousness, forms her 
mind, and what he tells is spun out through her life. 
          Stead indirectly refers to herself as a magician in her role as writer in another late 
autobiographical essay, “Another View of the Homestead” (1970), also included in Ocean of 
Story. Here she recalls how she transferred to an American setting her adolescent experiences 
of Watson’s Bay, Sydney, in order to write the novel, The Man Who Loved Children: “[b]y a 
magic that I came by by accident, I was able to transport Watson’s noiselessly and as if it 
were an emulsion or a streak of mist to the Chesapeake; and truly, the other place is not there 
for me anymore; the magician must believe in himself” (515). Elsewhere, Stead refers to the 
storytellers she has come across in her life as though they are magical figures. These 
storytellers, or “marvellous rememberers,” are mentioned in “Ocean of Story”: “[w]ho 
remembers [stories] so that they pass endlessly across city life? I know some of those 
marvellous rememberers who pass on their daily earnings in story” (3).  
          Stead never analyses what she means by the word “magic,” and she uses the word 
apparently conventionally. A lack of belief in magic as it is strictly understood, however, does 
not preclude the power of the association between magic and words. Jacqueline de Romilly 
makes this point when writing on the rhetorician Gorgias, who, she argues, draws on magical 
incantation and formulae in developing his rhetorical style. “Sacred magic,” she writes, “was 
mysterious; Gorgias’ [rhetorical] magic technical. He wants to emulate the power of the 
magician by a scientific analysis of language and of its influence. He is the theoretician of the 
magic spell of words” (16). In terms of the use of language and storytelling technique, Stead 
also might be identified as emulating “the power of the magician by a scientific analysis of 
language.”  
          It is evident that in the passages cited, both fictional and non-fictional, Stead’s writings 
on the storyteller allude to the archaic nature of storytelling, and the presence of a universal, 
impersonal storytelling voice informing each individual’s storytelling. “Ocean of Story” is 
built around these themes of the timelessness and universality of story, and the essay starts by 
linking the two:  
I love Ocean of Story, the name of an Indian treasury of story; that is the 
way I think of the short story and what is part of it, the sketch, anecdote, 
jokes cunning, philosophical, and biting, legends and fragments. Where do 
they come from? Who invents them? Everyone perhaps. Who remembers 
them so that they pass endlessly across city life? I know some of those 
marvellous rememberers who pass on their daily earnings in story; and then 
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they are forgotten to become fragments, mysterious indications. Any 
treasury of story is a residue of the past and a record of the day.  (3) 
The “marvellous rememberers,” the storytellers, exemplify a seemingly contrary blending of 
the universality of the short story with its particularity. “What is unique about the short story,” 
writes Stead, “is that we all can tell one, live one, even write one down; that story is steeped 
in our view and emotion” (3).  
          Much of what Stead refers to as magical in the essays becomes uncanny when 
encountered in her fiction. I have already mentioned the uncanniness of two characters, James 
in “The Marionettist” and Jourdain in “The Mirror.” The primary reason for the shift from the 
magical toward the uncanny, as I have suggested, is that Stead ascribes the perceived magical 
qualities of story to characters or narratives that are read, in the main, as realist.  
          Some of the qualities attributed to storytellers by Stead correspond with Walter 
Benjamin’s composite, archetypal storyteller figure, analysed in “The Storyteller.” 
Benjamin’s essay provides more links between the storyteller figure and the uncanny. The 
essay was published in 1936, making it close to contemporaneous with The Salzburg Tales. 
As Stead does, Benjamin emphasises the importance of experience and memory to the 
storyteller’s art, in addition to the need for an appropriate audience. On memory, for example, 
he writes:  
Memory creates the chain of tradition which passes a happening on from 
generation to generation. . . . It starts the web which all stories together form 
in the end. One ties on to the next, as the great storytellers, particularly the 
Oriental ones, have always readily shown. In each of them there is a 
Scheherazade who thinks of a fresh story whenever her tale comes to a stop.  
(97-98)       
He also identifies certain age-old storytelling types, such as the trading seaman (84-85).5 
These storytellers draw on the collective memory of the age-old lineage of storytellers (87, 
91-92), so that collective memory becomes a third source of the potential otherness in 
narrative, in addition to magic or the divine. Perhaps the most pertinent link between 
Benjamin’s storyteller and theories of the uncanny, however, lies in his claim that storytelling 
ultimately derives its authority from death: “[Death’s] authority is at the very source of the 
                                                          
5 In regard to storytelling types, Stead shares Benjamin’s linking of storytelling with the 
artisan class. “The Death of Svend” and “The Marionettist” are examples of stories centred on 




story. . . . Death is the sanction of everything that the storyteller can tell. He has borrowed his 
authority from death. In other words, it is natural history to which his stories refer back” (94). 
If this is so, then the links between death and the uncanny, explored in the previous chapter, 
may also contribute to the uncanniness of story more generally. Benjamin argues that 
storytelling is in decline, and the main reason for this is story’s ultimate dependence on death: 
death has lost its authority in modern times, due to its becoming increasingly hygienic, 
contained, and hidden. As death is hidden and its authority diminished, as a consequence 
storytelling loses its authority. That death is increasingly hidden is undoubtedly true, but 
whether this contributes to any weakening of the power of storytelling is debateable. The 
reverse could be argued: hiding the source of story might make storytelling more powerful, 
because it becomes more mysterious and ultimately revealing. The hiding of the relation 
between death and story could certainly contribute to making story uncanny. 
          Another reason for the decline of storytelling, argues Benjamin, is that the storyteller 
depends heavily on experience, but the value of experience is eroded in ever-changing 
modernity. The result is that “[l]ess and less frequently do we encounter people with the 
ability to tell a tale properly. More and more often there is embarrassment all around when the 
wish to hear a story is expressed. It is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the 
securest among our possessions, were taken from us: the ability to exchange experiences” 
(83). Here is another potential link between storytelling and the uncanny: what was once 
familiar, or “inalienable,” is no longer so familiar. Benjamin also claims that with the decline 
of repetitive manual work, the appropriate state-of mind for an audience to best receive a 
story – a kind of boredom induced by repetitive work – is ever-dwindling (91).6 The 
developments Benjamin claims as detrimental to storytelling have surely grown since his 
essay was written.  
          Stead’s portraits of storytellers in some ways contrast to Benjamin’s storyteller figure. 
Jourdain in “The Mirror” is a successful storyteller, and so, in his own way, is James in “The 
Marionettist.” This seems to counter Benjamin’s claim that the storyteller is in decline in 
modernity.  
                                                          
6 This recalls Stead’s interest in the idea of “the carpet weavers,” expressed in a letter in 1976: 
“what makes a writer write is the urgent intention to say something . . . I call it to myself, 
‘The Carpet-weavers Are Calling.’ In North Africa and the East wherever they wove carpets, 
the workers who were seated before these frames for long hours engaged . . . storytellers to 




          Stead’s later story, “I Live in You,” however, presents a less successful storyteller, who 
in many ways does correspond with Benjamin’s portrait of a type in decline. Peter is a 
storyteller in whom the voice of experience speaks of death, yet he is somehow an 
embarrassment and an anachronism, and anachronistic despite being a character who seems 
more immediate and contemporary than Jourdain or James. As mentioned, “I Live in You,” 
included in Ocean of Story, was first published in 1973, but probably written in the 1940s, 
when Stead was living in the United States. The protagonist, Peter, is perhaps Stead’s fullest 
portrait of a “rememberer” in her shorter fiction. The story is a highly distilled exploration of 
the relationships between story, storyteller, and listener. “I Live in You” also explores the 
relation of story to forces not unlike Freud’s understanding of Eros and Thanatos. As with 
“The Triskelion,” this is a story about sex, death, and narrative. It has passed unremarked in 
the scant critical commentary on Ocean of Story. 
          Peter’s story, and the stories he tells, are related by an unnamed narratee, who plays no 
part in the narrative other than to characterise Peter for a page or so at the outset, repeat a 
series of anecdotes as told to her by him, and give a further half a page at the narrative’s end 
to relate Peter’s demise. Peter, the reader learns, is a kind of womaniser, a tale-teller, and a 
lover of the macabre. The story’s first line is: “Peter, a lover, is dead now” (196). The story 
never clarifies if the narrator and Peter were lovers in a conventional sense, or in what way 
Peter is a lover. Despite this ambiguity, the opening line does suggest that the ensuing 
narrative is in part an act of remembrance of Peter. With this beginning, what Benjamin says 
about the storyteller borrowing “his authority from death” seems true of “I Live in You” in 
two ways: the narratee uses the reader’s up-front knowledge of Peter’s demise to give weight 
to what she recounts, which has the gravity of being about death. In form, the use of two 
narrators resembles links in a chain of storytelling, reminiscent of Plato and Benjamin’s 
conceptions. 
          Peter is always looking for the best way to pique his listener’s interest, always keen to 
exercise the power of story. He is highly aware of his audience and his effect on them. In the 
short term, a meal might depend on it, although it is clear that more is at stake than that. Also 
emphasised early in this portrait is that Peter is a “minstrel . . . a minnesinger” (197). He is a 
wanderer who floats through people’s lives, appearing unexpectedly: “perhaps the minstrel 
must wander” (197). As a wanderer, Peter broadly correlates with one of Benjamin’s “two 
archaic types” of storyteller, the “trading seaman” (“Storyteller” 84). Stead characterises Peter 
as a type, too, his generic quality being stressed above his individuality: “he was a stray, a 
sample, from a swatch of metropolitan man” (197). Peter interrogates the meaning of his life, 
94 
 
his lost opportunities, the nature of his desires, and the nature of others, by the stories he tells. 
His storytelling has an urgent, compulsive quality, as though he has to tell himself into being, 
so that Peter’s existence seems to depend on his stories, which in turn depend on holding an 
audience. He is a tissue of his stories, and the reader knows little about him except from the 
series of tales he tells. While self-consciously constructing a persona in the choice of stories 
he offers about himself, he also uses narrative to place others: 
[Peter] had with him a bag of wishes, dreams, happenings . . . and he poured 
out its contents on the café table or standing in the doorway, or at ease in the 
apartment, trying out the lewd, coarse, smutty, strange, unheard-of, 
romantic, trying to fit you, poetry of artists, customs of the race-divided 
southland, craft erotica, as of laundrymen and undertakers, the love-hunger 
of living and dead.  (196) 
          Yet Peter struggles to gain any authority from the stories he tells. “It was curious that he 
did not hold his audiences,” notes the narratee (196). Despite his facility for storytelling, Peter 
is presented as a failed storyteller, without an interested audience, and even apparently 
struggling to understand the implications of what he is telling. Peter fails despite sensitivity to 
the power of death to enliven narrative, evident in the first of his tales, which sets the tone of 
those to follow: 
He told of the horrors of war, (as Goya says “Great deeds against the dead”) 
how American soldiers in Alaska mutilated their victims just as the Welsh 
women did in Henry IV and hung their trophies on their tents to dry in the 
sun, a biltong or pemmican to take home to show their girls: and their camp 
could be nosed miles away, like reindeer, in the cold waste.  (197) 
This signals the nature of Peter’s anecdotes: they are about death, and they are about sex, 
usually in some relation to each other. Continuing his theme of the erotic and the deathly, 
Peter goes on to tell a story of an old, ailing, and rich woman, a Mrs Gollardy, who befriends 
the young Peter and his wife: Mrs Gollardy inveigles the couple to take turns in staying up 
night after night to look after her, in this way preventing the young couple from sleeping 
together. Meanwhile she tempts them with an open purse stuffed with money and left, clearly 
visible, under her bed (199-200). Then there is the story that Peter tells of the young lovers 
who suicide by gassing themselves, only for the woman to revive and sit up while being 
prepared by the undertaker. The undertaker feels obliged to kill her, knowing the injuries he 
has just given the woman with a knife “so thin and fine” are fatal (201). Peter’s last recounted 
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anecdote recalls his sexual encounter with a woman he imagines is “a young girl,” but turns 
out to be an old lady (203-04).  
           Peter’s tales are also characterised by presenting the moment that something meant to 
remain hidden comes to light. For example, he relates a tale of his almost overwhelming 
desire for an unknown woman he encounters only months after he has married. His desire for 
this stranger completely surprises him (197-99). The undertaker’s story is one not meant for 
the light of day, and Peter’s last recounted tale ends with his realisation that he has not slept 
with a young woman, but an old one. Almost all these realisations involve a coincidence of 
lust and death, as though the revelation, the moment of illumination, consists of the normally 
hidden coincidence of the two. That Peter does not grasp this is shown by his basically telling 
the same story repeatedly. “Christina Stead,” notes Terry Sturm, “dramatizes ideas at points 
where they are not quite conscious in the minds of the characters, where they clash in 
confusing and often destructive ways with inarticulate aspirations and needs” (93-94). This 
process is at work in Peter. The confluence of the erotic and the deathly cannot be explained 
or rationalised by Peter, yet he tells of it compulsively. 
          That Peter cannot grasp the essence of his stories only stresses their alien quality. The 
stories are working through him, and he is merely repeating them, without approaching an 
understanding of them. The potential power of story to give meaning to life eludes him. While 
Peter himself cannot see what the stories he tells repeatedly illustrate, the narrator bluntly 
makes explicit that she thinks Peter fails as a storyteller because he does not understand Eros: 
“he did not hold [his audience] because he did not hold his women” (197). In contrast, the 
character of Jourdain in “The Mirror,” a more self-aware and successful storyteller, seduces 
the young woman, Giselda, by storytelling.  
           Peter is a recognisable type, a wanderer and a collector of experiences. He tells of 
death, and is keenly aware of his audience. In these ways he embodies aspects of Stead’s 
“marvellous rememberers” and Benjamin’s storyteller figure. Peter’s character also illustrates 
some of the challenges which face the storyteller, as noted by Benjamin. While the narrator in 
“I Live in You” blames a shortcoming of Peter’s for not holding his listeners, could it be that, 
as Benjamin maintains, storytelling itself now struggles to hold listeners? It is the currency of 
life experience that Peter banks on, and if life experience now has little value, then the likes of 
Peter can derive no advantage from it. Then there is Benjamin’s claim that storytelling is 
losing its authority since death is losing its authority: 
It has been observable for a number of centuries how in the general 
consciousness the thought of death has declined in omnipresence and 
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vividness. In its last stages this process is accelerated. And in the course of 
the nineteenth century bourgeois society has, by means of hygienic and 
social, private and public institutions, realized a secondary effect which may 
have been its subconscious main purpose: to make it possible for people to 
avoid the sight of the dying.  (93) 
This process has no doubt redoubled in the last eighty or so years. As detailed above, Peter’s 
theme is death: his repeated stories of thwarted desire are a form of death. Such an obsession 
with death might undermine Peter’s chances of holding an audience, if, as Benjamin 
maintains, no one wants to know about death. So while Peter seems to fulfil all the 
requirements of a good storyteller, he appears an unwanted anachronism, an outsider.  
          And yet death does still have authority, as Benjamin concedes: 
It is, however, characteristic that not only a man’s knowledge or wisdom, 
but above all his real life – and this is the stuff that stories are made of – 
first assumes transmissible form at the moment of his death. . . . suddenly in 
his [dying] expressions and looks the unforgettable emerges and imparts to 
everything that concerned him that authority which even the poorest wretch 
in dying possesses for the living around him. This authority is at the very 
source of the story.  (94) 
Presumably the more hidden death is, the stranger and potentially more potent – and uncanny 
– becomes this once familiar sight. Part of the power and strangeness of “I Live in You,” for 
instance, is that the narratee is giving voice to a dead man, as she makes clear from the first 
sentence. These are anecdotes from beyond the grave. 
           “I Live in You” is followed in Ocean of Story by “My Friend, Lafe Tilly,” a story 
which expands on the themes of the preceding tale. Again, this is a story about the 
connections between the erotic, death, and narrative. “My Friend, Lafe Tilly” appears to have 
been written at much the same time as “I Live in You,” as its style, tone, and structure are also 
similar. “My Friend, Lafe Tilly” has two framing narrators. Lafe, the inner frame narrator, 
recounts a story to an unnamed narratee. Lafe tells the narratee the story of his friend, or 
perhaps nemesis, Joe, who loses his face to a skin disease (skin disease is a recurring trope in 
Stead’s writing). The story begins: 
Lafe Tilly wore his hatbrim down, and his coat collar up; there were round 
spectacles over his hollow eyes. A little of the yellow face could be seen. He 
stood by the lamp, looking down. He did not take off his gloves. 
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   “I was at a funeral last week. There was the widow and another woman, 
the man’s brother and I myself, his only mourners. Once he had hundreds of 
friends, thousands perhaps. Hundreds of women loved him.” 
   Lafe Tilly smiled. 
   “He was cremated; and before that they had to embalm him and make him 
a new face. His was gone.”  (205) 
Lafe then goes on to tell the story of Joe, the man who has recently died. Joe was vain, a 
Casanova and a callous character. Losing his face would seem to have been a terrible 
comeuppance. Joe, once the successful lover, ends up being visibly consumed by death while 
still alive. Joe’s death is prefigured by his inability to tell his story, as he ends up with no lips, 
and is reduced to speaking through his long-suffering wife, Donna. Eventually Donna is the 
only person who can understand his malformed speech.  
          Lafe seems to take a peculiar pleasure in telling of Joe’s disintegration. Tags such as 
“Lafe Tilly smiled” become a refrain through the narrative. It is possible that Lafe enjoys 
recounting Joe’s literal dissolution out of vengeful spite, as one of Joe’s past lovers was 
Lafe’s wife. Joe casually reveals this to Lafe not long before his death. Or perhaps the 
pleasure Lafe finds in his otherwise joyless narration is a more general one in having 
witnessed death’s inevitable triumph over an unpleasant being. Joe is gone, but Lafe remains, 
and what remains of Joe – his story, his memory – now is in Lafe’s hands. The receding of 
Joe’s ability to tell his own story is foreshadowed by Donna having to interpret for her lipless 
husband in the late stages of his illness. The story depicts not only the triumph of death, but 
also the triumph of those who can still tell a story. 
          Lafe, with his display of Schadenfreude, comes across as an unattractive character 
himself. His motive for storytelling might be spite, and he himself might be a personification 
of death, with his “hollow eyes” and “yellow face,” and his tales and memories of the dead. In 
this latter aspect he resembles Peter of “I Live in You.” They seem shady characters. Like 
Peter, Lafe is depicted as just visiting, only passing by: he keeps his gloves on. And like Peter, 
this tale-teller appears out of time and place, a wanderer on the margins of society, who stands 
in the shadows. There seems no place left for the likes of Peter and Lafe, two archetypal 
storytellers. They are only passing through the warm and lit rooms of their narratees. Both 
Peter and Lafe might characterise Benjamin’s idea that the storyteller is an anachronistic 
embarrassment, on the verge of dying out.  
          Yet it could also be, contrary to Benjamin’s thesis, that the storyteller has often 
appeared on the verge of dying out. This might be necessary for the genesis of storytelling, 
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given the close association between death and storytelling. Peter and Lafe’s stories derive 
from the dregs and leftovers of life, from what is discarded, marginalised, almost forgotten. 
Most importantly, they tell of what is forbidden. Their stories tell of unwanted, inconvenient, 
and unpleasant connections between death and desire, things which ultimately cannot be put 
aside, and insist on returning. Such an origin for Lafe and Peter’s storytelling would explain 
the otherness sensed at the heart of their stories, which is comprised of what was once in 
everyday life, but has been rejected from it. Storytelling brings back these rejected things. For 
instance, both men tell undertaker stories, despite the concealment of death in recent times. 
The storytellers in “My Friend, Lafe Tilly” and “I Live in You” isolate the raw material of 
narrative, and their motives for telling it are suggested. The stories display the inner drives of 
narrative, drives personified in the characters of Peter and Lafe. The effect of this coming to 
light of the normally hidden essence of story, combined with the hard-to-categorise nature of 
the material, is uncanny.  
               Stead’s four storytellers discussed in this chapter are either repellent, yet fascinating 
figures, such as Peter, Lafe, and, to a lesser degree, James, or magical figures, such as 
Jourdain. They are slightly demonic, and felt as uncanny to varying degrees. The uncanniest 
storytellers are largely unaware, or only partly aware, of how story works. This is the case 
with Peter and James, who are shown to be acting as mediums. This gives them the uncanny 
quality of shading into automata. Lafe, in contrast, seems to collude with the power of story. 
He is like someone who has discovered a powerful secret. The secret is story’s association 
with death. Lafe’s uncanniness stems from possessing and making use of the power which 
story derives from death. Jourdain, however, while aware of how story works, mines this 
knowledge in a genial way. He likes things out in the light. In this he seems to disassociate 
himself from any potential uncanniness (just as he disassociates himself from the mirror).  
          These portraits suggest that the source of story’s uncanny otherness need not be the 
divine, the magical, or collective memory. Narrative’s otherness comprises things excluded 
from daily life, the unspoken because unwanted, embarrassing, forgotten, or forbidden. These 
things have no place in everyday discourse. This is what constitutes the otherness in the 
stories and makes them uncanny: these stories consist of the out-of-place.  
          The out-of-place need not be considered in terms of Freud’s repressed and surmounted 
material. It can also be considered in terms of what is indecorous and taboo (I address these 
ideas in the next two chapters). Recalling these hidden or proscribed, yet familiar things, is 
down to the likes of Peter, Lafe, Jourdain, and James.  
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          It is also noteworthy that reading these portraits is an experience of being both inside a 
narrative (reading a story) and outside a narrative (while reading, the reader observes a 
character being depicted creating a story). In “I Live in You” and “My Friend, Lafe Tilly,” in 
particular, this leads to the stories possessing a self-consciousness with which the narratives 
themselves seem at home, yet which might make the reader uneasy. In the stories the 
rudiments of narrative are on display and are shuffled around. For example, the stories seem 
unperturbed that they should be upending the common framing of a story, a framing which 
might go something like this: “the voice in this story is telling you, the reader, a series of 
events about which the voice knows.” These stories are different. In them, a number of voices 
are telling several stories: one voice is directed at the reader, another to the listening narratee. 
This means that the centres of the stories are not fixed, particularly as the different voices 
have varying degrees of authority (the narratee in “I Live in You” knows more about Peter 
than Peter knows). It is unsettling that the centre of the narrative shifts about. Is the centre to 
be found in the narrative as a whole, the framing narrative, or in the narrative in the process of 
being created by the storytelling character? Can a story have several centres? Uncanny effects 
derive not only from the content, but from the hard-to-classify form. 
 
 
I end this chapter by briefly discussing Stead’s portraits of storytellers in terms of some 
ancient and ongoing debates in narrative theory. “I Live in You” and “My Friend, Lafe Tilly” 
can be understood in the light of Aristotle’s theory of anagnorisis, the moment of reversal in a 
plot that can be combined with a moment of recognition.  “I Live in You” and “My Friend, 
Lafe Tilly” include a series of recognitions by the storyteller figures. At the heart of the story 
which Lafe tells is the recognition that Joe, his old friend, has slept with his wife. The lipless 
Joe tells this to Lafe by saying “[a]h ah ah” (213). Unsurprisingly, this would be unintelligible 
to Lafe, were it not dutifully translated by Donna (whether Donna is telling the truth is not 
revealed). Concurrent with this revelation, a reversal is occurring: Joe, who enjoyed the power 
to attract women, will no longer attract any woman. That such a reversal has occurred only 
dawns on Lafe in his last conversation with Joe. Similarly, Peter’s anecdotes in “I Live in 
You” constitute a series of recognitions, for example, when he tells of sleeping with an old 
lady: it is not youth he has desired and enjoyed, it is age. Then there is the story of the woman 
who taps him on the shoulder at a train station, who says, “‘I live in you’” (199). She has 
overheard Peter giving his surname to a station master, and Peter’s name turns out to be the 
name of the town in which the woman lives. This cryptic moment of recognition suggests that 
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Peter is recognised by others yet fails to act on it, and fails to recognise something of his self. 
He does not know about this woman who says she lives in him. Something unknown, 
something strange is inside him. The woman disappears. This is in contrast to Jourdain of 
“The Mirror,” who never fails to recognise others, and acts upon this recognition, in the 
process acquiring a young wife.  
          The focus of Peter’s first long anecdote is another moment of recognition: “‘I looked up 
and saw the woman. I don’t remember much; she was not beautiful, but her eyes looked 
straight at me and knew me. She had a faint smile and looked right into my eyes as if she 
knew all about me, had my number. . . . and I was will-less, almost trembling’” (198). Peter 
sees the woman again sometime later, and the same thing happens:  
“She looked at me, knew me, faintly smiled and passed on. She paused 
about eight yards away looking back. I looked at her, a pain went through 
me and I at once thought, ‘If I go after her, I will be helpless, this is a 
turning-point. If I go on to the office, I will be all right.’ I forced myself to 
go on to the office; it was a great effort of will and I kept regretting what I 
was doing. Perhaps the best way is to face these things, go towards the 
person, not away; combat them and overcome them. But you can’t combat 
those people. They have the Indian sign on you. They look at you and know. 
Just the same it must be the best of all experiences, to be completely 
possessed; and the worst?”  (198-99) 
Something in Peter is recognised by the strange woman. However, Peter rejects what the 
woman knows of him, forcing himself to turn from her and go to work instead. He will not 
allow himself to be known by others, and neither will he allow himself this knowledge. This 
passage resembles a scene in Stead’s novel, Miss Herbert (The Suburban Wife). The 
protagonist in this novel, Eleanor, meets the gaze of Edward, a man she has never met before. 
She rejects his gaze as too powerful and true. She does not want to be recognised. “He had 
looked at her,” writes Stead, “and she at him with the same intensity and knowledge that an 
animal has, when it looks straight into the eyes of a human . . . she felt a slight bruise on the 
left side of her heart, and it seemed a shadow wheeled across her. She thought, That’s like 
death. But she had never thought about death” (42-43).  
          According to Aristotle’s theory of anagnorisis, the moment of recognition in a plot, 
when the underlying connections of the story are revealed, is most powerful when a plot 
reversal occurs. Might the moment of anagnorisis, where the hidden is revealed and the 
unfamiliar is made familiar, be reconceived as an uncanny moment? Recognition and reversal 
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can occur despite the audience already knowing the story. Everyone knows the Oedipus story, 
so that the surprise which results from the moment of recognition is an instance of the familiar 
having been made unfamiliar, at least for the duration of the play and until the climactic 
moment of recognition. The moment of recognition consists of a sudden shift of categories: 
the lover becomes the son, for instance. 
          This nexus between the hidden and familiar becomes deeper if the reader can be shown 
what they did not know they knew. Randall Jarrell makes this point when noting Stead’s 
powers of provoking recognition in the reader: “Aristotle speaks of the pleasure of 
recognition: you read The Man Who Loved Children with an almost ecstatic pleasure of 
recognition. You get used to saying, ‘Yes, that’s the way it is;’ and you say many times, but 
you can never get used to saying, ‘I didn’t know anybody knew that’” (21). Remembering 
what you were not aware you knew is potentially an uncanny experience, since, in Freud’s 
terms, it corresponds to the return of forgotten yet familiar material. Jarrell states that The 
Man Who Loved Children “has an almost frightening power of remembrance; and so much of 
our earlier life is repressed, forgotten” (5), and, later, “one of the most obvious facts about 
grown-ups, to a child, is that they have forgotten what it is like to be a child” (24). Diana 
Brydon, writing of Stead’s fiction in general, notes, “the pleasures that come from reading 
Stead derive from recognition, not invention” (171).  In Stead’s storytelling figures, 
recognition is an uncanny unveiling, as the storytellers bring to light the once familiar which 
has become hidden, forgotten, or forbidden.  
          Stead’s uncanny storytellers can also be read in relation to Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
theorisation of heteroglossia. As mentioned above, Stead alludes to a generic quality in the 
storytellers she depicts. They are types, and the stories they tell have templates. In some 
instances in Stead’s fiction, the language used by the storytellers is also generic. Some of 
Stead’s talkers borrow their words from various dominant discourses, and when the reader 
realises this (it is often subtle), it is uncanny. Something mechanical is insinuated in the 
characters when their speech is understood as received. The words of these characters are 
slowly revealed as alien to the narrative in which they are contained. Susan Sheridan 
succinctly identifies this about the characters Letty in Letty Fox: Her Luck, and Eleanor in 
Miss Herbert (The Suburban Wife): 
Like Letty, too, [Eleanor] has a phrase for everything, and all the phrases 
can be traced to contemporary discourses on psychology, politics, and so on. 
They could, theoretically, all be enclosed in quotation marks. But it is more 
than that. Rather, the phrases make her, they are her reactions. Stead’s 
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writing, in all the later texts but especially in these two, repeatedly 
demonstrates that we are constructed by language, that language makes us 
rather than we it, in the sense that it gives a material existence to emotions 
and ideas which could not otherwise be knowable.  (Christina 93) 
Eleanor and Letty stream ready-made, ideologically-programmed language, and this 
language, perhaps moribund and clichéd in itself, is reanimated in the characters. Bakhtin 
suggests in relation to heteroglossia: “the writer of prose . . . attempts to talk about even his 
own world in an alien language (for example, in the non-literary language of the teller of tales, 
or the representative of a specific socio-ideological group); he often measures his own world 
by alien linguistic standards” (Dialogic 287). Bakhtin continues: “[t]he word in language is 
half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the speaker populates it with his own 
intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word” (293-94). Stead shows storytellers 
who never do make the word quite their own. The word remains borrowed, a little 
mismatched, and this is unsettling. Her portraits of storytellers intimate that the words and the 
stories remain other to the storytellers. This is particularly the case with James.  
          Stead’s storytellers also often appear compelled to speak, and a sense is created that 
storytellers such as James, Peter, and Lafe are not so much using language, as being used by 
it. This undermines presumed relationships between story, the storyteller, and storytelling, and 





“The Puzzleheaded Girl” and the Formless 
 
The formless is something that cannot be placed, either because it belongs to simultaneous 
categories, or falls between categories. I adopt this as a definition of what constitutes an 
uncanny thing, person, or state. When a story contains an element that cannot be placed, the 
story may be felt as uncanny by the reader. Sometimes this uncanniness is indicated as being 
experienced by a character or characters in the story, although this is not necessarily also the 
case. Following this definition, the uncanny effects investigated in the preceding chapters – 
including those deriving from the surmounted and the repressed, and from the death drive – 
are not uncanny only because something usually hidden has come to light, or once-familiar 
material that has become unfamiliar has returned. In addition, it is the ambiguity about how to 
categorise something that has come to light, including the once-familiar, that causes uncanny 
effects. This, for instance, makes the storytellers Lafe and Peter, discussed in the previous 
chapter, uncanny: what they bring to light cannot be placed. This understanding of the 
uncanny has its origins in the writing of Ernst Jentsch, whose theory of the uncanny I explore 
further below. 
          Why something becomes uncanny when it cannot be categorised is a question theorised 
in anthropology, particularly with reference to the formless and taboo. This chapter centrally 
relates to literary theory some of these links between the uncanny, the formless, and that 
which is difficult to categorise, in order to discuss uncanny effects in Stead’s work. The next 
chapter extends the argument to the taboo. Here it is helpful to note, however, that what 
cannot be categorised has been proscribed, made unholy, or taboo. This is especially the case 
if danger is associated with the thing that cannot be categorised. A general example of this is 
the “abominations of Leviticus,” that is, those animals listed in the scriptures as unclean, and 
therefore not to be eaten. Mary Douglas argues, in an analysis of this particular taboo, that, 
“in general the underlying principle of cleanness in animals is that they shall conform fully to 
their class. Those species are unclean which are imperfect members of their class, or whose 
class itself confounds the general scheme of the world [as it is categorised in Genesis]” (56). 
A pig is an abomination, for instance, because its cloven feet clearly place it in the antelope 
category, yet antelopes and their kind ruminate, whereas pigs do not. According to Douglas, 
this ambiguity in categorising some animals so concerned the ancient Semites that they 
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decided it was better not to have anything to do with such things: if you do not know what it 
is, do not touch it, and certainly do not eat it. Douglas continues: 
The last kind of unclean animal [listed in Leviticus] is that which creeps, 
crawls or swarms upon the earth. This form of movement is explicitly 
contrary to holiness. . . . Whether we call it teeming, trailing, creeping, 
crawling or swarming, it is an indeterminate form of movement. Since the 
main animal categories are defined by their typical movement, “swarming” 
which is not a mode of propulsion proper to any particular element, cuts 
across the basic classification. Swarming things are neither fish, flesh nor 
fowl.  (57) 
          Things that swarm move in a way that is “indeterminate” and unclassifiable; it 
associates them with the formless, and makes them unsettling, unholy, and potentially 
dangerous. The Stead stories already discussed sometimes refer to such indeterminate 
movement with uncanny effect. These include the “sea-elephant” crawl of the injured Danish 
Woman in “The Death of Svend” (135); the multitude of tics that appear in Mrs Jenkins’s face 
in “The Triskelion” (Mrs Jenkins “had a number of tics which like little animals seemed to 
ravage her against her will” [214-15]); the ceaseless movement of Arnold’s fingers in the 
same story (211, 216); and the “curl-papers swarming” on the maid’s head (226). These types 
of movement reveal something unfamiliar in the human, and point to an ambiguity of 
category. 
          The alarm, or at least disquiet, caused by the perception of the indeterminate or the 
formless, thus stems from a primal sense of danger. Douglas states: “[s]o many ideas about 
power are based on an idea of society as a series of forms contrasted with surrounding non-
form.” Douglas continues by noting several qualities associated with the formless: “[t]here is 
a power in the forms and other power in the inarticulate area, margins, confused lines, and 
beyond the external boundaries” (99). One important quality of the formless is its unknown 
power. For Douglas, the marking or delineating of non-form, or formlessness, is the origin of 
taboo (although she avoids this word): taboo isolates this potential power.  
         Formlessness in the West has traditionally been associated with threatening otherness. 
Things are most like God when they are harmonious, and this implies proper form, and proper 
place. This is the basis of Western aesthetics, as Gilbert and Kuhn outline (130-37): the 
“conception of beauty as harmony comes in principle from Plato and Aristotle” (130), while 
Augustine’s view is that “the universe proceeds by order, for God loves order and is the 
author of it. All things are created according to measure and are therefore in harmony in the 
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One” (137). These ideas intimate the reasons that a narrative which presents an unclassifiable 
person, thing, state, or place, or is itself unclassifiable in form, might be uncanny. Identifiable 
form is lacking. Formlessness is disconcerting, and the disconcerted subject is alerted to a 
potential vulnerability, a gap in their knowledge of the world.  
          This recalls Ernst Jentsch’s theory of the uncanny, outlined in his article, “On the 
Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906). Jentsch closely associates the uncanny with the formless, 
or that which cannot be categorised. He insists that a confusion of categories underpins all 
uncanny effects. Jentsch notes that “one of the most reliable artistic devices for the producing 
of uncanny effects easily is to leave the reader in uncertainty as to whether he has a human 
person or rather an automaton before him in the case of a particular character.” Jentsch goes 
on, stating, “[t]his is done in such a way that the uncertainty does not appear directly at the 
focal point of [the reader’s] attention, so that he is not given the occasion to investigate and 
clarify the matter straight away” (13). Each of Jentsch’s examples of what causes uncanny 
effects presupposes “psychical uncertainty,” as he terms it (9). It is “a lack of orientation [in a 
subject that] is bound up with the impression of the uncanniness of a thing or incident” (8). 
Lack of orientation leads to psychical uncertainty: “some stirrings of the feelings of psychical 
uncertainty arise with particular ease either when ignorance is very conspicuous or when the 
subjective perception of vacillation is abnormally strong” (9). It is this point about vacillation 
that leads Jentsch to various examples of the confusion of categories. The most well known, 
because taken up and discussed by Freud in his essay “The ‘Uncanny,’” is his example of the 
confusion over whether a person is an automaton or a living being.1 Extrapolating from 
Jentsch, the uncanny might be defined as the apprehension of formlessness. 
          In the realm of literature, the notion of a category becomes more slippery, because 
literature invites the reader to put aside received notions of category, for example, by 
“suspending disbelief.” A further complication in literature, proceeding from this last point, 
stems from this essential attribute of narrative analysed by Lamarque and Olsen: storytelling, 
or “fictive utterance” as they call it, is an “act of a certain kind – at its simplest, that of 
uttering sentences – carried out for a purpose, under the conventions of a practice. 
Fundamentally, the purpose is to invoke conventions of the practice, thereby inviting an 
appropriate response to the sentences uttered” (Lamarque and Olsen 43). Different classes, or 
                                                          
1 Jentsch makes a general point about the uncanniness of the automaton in regard to E. T. A. 
Hoffmann’s story, “The Sandman,” in which the doll-like Olympia, an automaton – that is, an 
artificially constructed semblance of a human being, which is able to move and make sounds 
that imitate the human – inflames the passions of Nathaniel, the story’s protagonist. 
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genres, of narrative provide differing cues about how they should be interpreted. 
Interpretation depends upon how they are categorised. Evoking the uncanny often involves a 
destabilising of this common feature of narrative, so that, in an uncanny story, the reading 
conventions to be applied to the text are not always clearly indicated to the reader.  
          In my introduction, I mention that critics are often baffled as to how to categorise 
Christina Stead’s works. The works make categorisations of genre problematic. In “The 
Triskelion,” for instance, Kate’s marvellous narrative is inserted in the middle of the 
Doctress’s realist one. The significant differences between the two narrators’ voices are 
smoothed over in ways I outline in my first chapter, by making relative what is supernatural, 
for instance. Other small details help the reader to reconcile the contrast between the realistic 
and the marvellous. Kate’s narration is modulated near its start by this statement: “I had at 
that time marvellously long sight, not blunted and blinded as I am now, reading for 
examinations” (218-19). Here the marvellous is intimated as in the distant past, and no longer 
active. These are early examples of how Stead integrates the expectations of different genres 
into a single narrative. Most critics of The Salzburg Tales, notably R. G. Geering and Jennifer 
Gribble, remark how marvellous fairy tale elements continually crop up in the disparate tales, 
regardless of their genre. There are the three glances in the mirror given by Karen in “The 
Death of Svend,” for instance, and the girl’s nightmarish vision of a troll and an elf in “The 
Little Old Lady” (discussed in the next chapter). Occasionally the fairy tale elements seem 
superimposed on a narrative and stand out awkwardly. This is the case in regard to 
Metternich’s shape-shifting in “The Mirror.” The blending of genres becomes subtle as 
Stead’s work progresses. The late novel, Cotters’ England (1966), for instance, might be read 
equally as a marvellous vampire and harpy story, or as a social-realist analysis of post-war 
working-class England: both interpretations are feasible. 
          A treatment of character which seems to exceed realist conventions, by blending in 
elements of the marvellous, is also present from the start in Stead’s writing. John Kinsella’s 
“conditions of encounter with character” (57) are complicated in Stead. In The Salzburg 
Tales, the three brothers in “The Marionettist” are portrayed as variations on one character. 
They appear to follow the same set pattern of behaviour. Verging on the robotic and the 
predetermined, a generic force inside the brothers deprives them of individual will. The  
construction of the three brothers as sharing a single character pushes them toward the 
category of automaton. As her fiction develops, Stead continued to create characters that seem 
less, or more than entirely human in a realist sense. Denise Brown writes, in regard to the 
characters Tom and Nellie in Cotters’ England, that “each slips easily into the outline made 
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by the absence of the other” (219-20). Tom and Nellie’s double character seems inhabited by 
a single, if two-sided, spirit. The uncanny effect of this kind of characterisation arises from a 
dissolution of discrete personalities, which brings into question received categories to do with 
character.  
          This presages the uncanny ambiguities of category which occur in Stead’s novella, 
“The Puzzleheaded Girl” (1967), where uncanny effects primarily stem from confusion over 
how to categorise the protagonist, Honor. As the story unfolds, Honor seems to become more 
like an animal, and sometimes more like a spirit, than a human character, or a human as 
conventionally depicted in a realist narrative. One result of Honor’s open-ended 
characterisation is that simultaneous interpretations of how the narrative is to be read are kept 
in play. Indecision associated with which reading conventions to deploy in relation to Honor’s 
characterisation grows entangled with uncertainties about to which category of narrative, or 
genre, “The Puzzleheaded Girl” belongs. “The Puzzleheaded Girl” seems initially to observe 
the conventional categories. Its beginning evokes the conventions of the realist genre. It is 
only as the narrative proceeds that categories of genre come under question, in ways that are 
not stressed, and are incremental. The text does not highlight any shift in, or challenge to, 
genre: and its uncanny effects depend upon this. Stead’s stories appear like realism, and only 
incrementally reveal themselves as rather unlike realism.2 
          As indicated, Honor is not the only character in Stead’s oeuvre to have this unsettling, 
destabilising effect. In Honor’s characterisation, however, the restrictions or “patterns” of 
genre, to use Kinsella’s term (57), are tested more than is customary in Stead’s work. A closer 
reading of this story reveals ways in which ambiguities in categorisation can produce uncanny 
effects. 
          “The Puzzleheaded Girl” begins with Honor applying for a job with a grain sales 
company in New York. One of the firm’s partners, Augustus Debrett, employs her, although 
she has never worked before, has no references, and seems naïve for an eighteen-year old (the 
age she gives, but she turns out to be fifteen). In employing Honor, Debrett appears to be 
acting on his keen social conscience. Honor works in the company for a year, learning 
quickly, yet remaining aloof and behaving oddly. She has few social skills and is high-minded 
                                                          
2 A text such as James Joyce’s Ulysses clearly challenges conventional categories, yet the 
effect is not uncanny, because the work constantly draws attention to the breaking of 
categories. Categories are more discretely undermined in Stead’s stories, and hesitation and 




in a number of ways, refusing, for instance, to do any job too closely associated with handling 
money. She reacts angrily to advances by male clients in the office, behaviour deemed quirky 
in Honor by the other characters – the setting is a male-dominated New York office in the 
early- to middle-decades of the twentieth century. Honor seems to detest being touched in 
general. Debrett invites her to his house, but she arrives on a day other than the one he 
suggests, and then ignores Debrett in his own home and speaks only to his wife, Beatrice. 
After a year, Honor abruptly leaves the grain company. Honor’s father turns up at Debrett’s 
office claiming Honor’s unpaid wages for himself. Honor’s brother, Walter, visits soon after 
in search of his sister, who, it transpires, has vanished. Walter, a successful artist, confides in 
Debrett the severe economic and emotional hardships of their upbringing, and reveals that 
Honor was born into a poor migrant background as Rosina Tommaseo (32-35). Honor 
unexpectedly turns up at a farm in the Midwest, having memorised the address of one of 
Debrett’s farmer clients, a man who was once kind to her in passing. The farmer is absent, but 
his wife, Celinda, pities and shelters Honor (35-37). The novella then tells of events that take 
place over about two years, listing seven occasions when Honor encounters either Debrett, or 
Debrett’s now former business partners, Tom Zero and Saul Scott. Honor meets her old 
bosses (Debrett, Zero, and Scott) as though by chance. She is usually begging for money, and 
each time she reappears, she has another story of neglect and abuse to tell. It seems she is 
increasingly hurt by and unable to make sense of the world, increasingly convinced this world 
is hell. She still does not have a home, and remains alienated from her family. By this stage of 
the narrative, Honor is felt by Debrett and his wife, Beatrice, to be haunting them (37-50). 
          The reader is then brusquely informed that Debrett has now divorced Beatrice, and is 
living in Europe with his new wife, Mari. During these years Debrett keeps seeing Honor, or 
women who strongly remind him of her, women who are usually impoverished and half-
crazed. Debrett is unsettled by these sightings – or are they visitations imagined on his part, 
given the coincidences and unlikely circumstances of some of the encounters? This is unclear 
by this point in the story (50-52). In the novella’s concluding section, Debrett and Mari return 
to New York, where again he meets Honor by chance. Honor is now in her thirties, yet seems 
much older. Soon after this encounter, Debrett meets Jay, Honor’s childhood friend and, now, 
her husband. Jay intimates that Honor has always loved Debrett. He also tells Debrett that 
Honor has married a second man, bigamously. The story ends with Debrett and Mari 
reflecting on the news of Honor’s death, homeless in a doorway (52-60).  
          “The Puzzleheaded Girl” circles repeatedly around its centre, Honor, yet the tale is 
never told from her point of view. Honor rarely speaks. A protagonist who is rarely heard 
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speaking is uncommon for Stead. Honor’s portrait emerges from the fragmentary and often 
hostile perspectives of those around her, perspectives which sometimes overlap, yet do not 
necessarily agree. Some characters see her as mad, some as a cunning parasite, others a 
pitiable wastrel. Beatrice sees her as a ghost, or a temptress luring Debrett, and Debrett 
alternatively sees her as a virgin, a whore, and a holy fool. Stead presents an ambiguous 
central character through an absence. This suggests that Honor might be read as an allegory of 
Woman, a kind of Everywoman who is present only as an absence. Matching form with 
theme, the obscure Honor is absent even from her own story. 
          Critics have differed on how to interpret Honor’s character. Honor has been read as an 
allegorical figure, and as a case study of a psychological type; both of these interpretations 
receive encouragement at different points in the narrative. Honor’s name invites an allegorical 
reading, as do most of the other names in the narrative. The author invited an allegorical 
reading of the novella when interviewed (Lidoff 213-15). The character Mari also offers an 
allegorical interpretation of Honor as “the ragged wayward heart of woman that doesn’t want 
to be caught and hasn’t been caught” (60).  An allegorical reading is further suggested when 
Debrett wonders if Honor can “inhabit and divest herself of other women’s forms” (52), a 
power which would make Honor an Everywoman. An indication that Honor is somehow 
plural occurs early in the narrative, in this passage from the third page: “[s]trongest of all were 
her gray eyes. They looked . . . as if someone else were there, not this timid girl; someone 
indifferent, wise, uncaught” (13). 
          Judith Kegan Gardiner, however, argues against an allegorical interpretation of Honor 
in her article, “Caught but Not Caught.” Gardiner reads Honor as a case study of a type of 
hysteric, who embodies a resistance to patriarchy (31-32). The character Beatrice also 
identifies Honor as a psychological type. Beatrice views Honor as a sexually repressed kind of 
woman (46-47).  
          Yet neither the psychological nor the allegorical interpretations of Honor’s 
characterisation can account for her being such a unique character. It is her uniqueness that 
makes her memorable to the reader, and disconcerting to the other characters in the story. For 
example, Jay, Honor’s childhood friend, sees Honor as a one-off, a self-created individual. He 
articulates a third interpretation of her character when he says of Honor: “[t]here are people 
with great gifts who want to create, but are not self-centered enough. The glory of creation is 
in them. They end by creating themselves; and they are miraculous creatures. People fall in 
love with them, because they’ve made something new” (57).  
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          These three readings of Honor as unique, a type, and an allegorical figure, need not be 
exclusive. They might be thought of in terms of scientific nomenclature, which views the 
individual within a species within a genus, so that an individual is classed in ever widening 
categories of increasing generality.3 As with this system, the narrative pursues these three 
different ways of reading Honor without any one method of categorisation dominating, 
hindering, or negating the others. Yet Honor never fits conclusively into any of these 
categories. She either floats in the gaps between, existing between conventional categories, or 
she inhabits several categories at once.  
          These questions of category become questions of genre. “The Puzzleheaded Girl” 
begins like a work of social realism: Honor applies for a job in the office of the businessman 
Debrett. In what ensues, however, Honor gradually reveals qualities that go beyond the 
construction of character associated with realism. As mentioned, two ways this is done are by 
stressing in Honor qualities which are conventionally attributed to a spirit, and, at other times, 
qualities given to animals. This suggests a fourth way of reading Honor’s character, as a 
character not conventionally human. I argue that it is this flexible treatment of character that 
most undermines identifying the genre of “The Puzzleheaded Girl.”  
          Honor’s characterisation as a spirit or an animal is elusive yet persistent. Her animal 
qualities are implicit, and sometimes negative, constituting some kind of lack in her person. 
These attributes include her aversion to being touched; her continual wandering; her 
disassociation from the verbal; a preternatural sense of knowing where people are; and a 
peculiarly accurate, innate sense of time. The portrayal of Honor’s eyes as “indifferent, wise, 
uncaught” is more like those of a wild animal than a human (13). This portrayal also focuses 
on perhaps her most animal attribute, her indifference to the conventions of the society in 
which she lives. Honor shows either a disconcerting lack of knowledge about, or a disdain for, 
                                                          
3 Anita Segerberg in “Getting Started” alludes to the Marxist critic Ralph Fox expressing a 
similar view on character. “A critical study, The Novel and the People,” writes Segerberg, 
“which Stead liked, written by her friend Ralph Fox, talks about the ‘dual history’ of man. 
Stead probably held similar views: ‘[E]ach man has, as it were, a dual history, since he is at 
the same time a type, a man with a social history, and an individual, a man with a personal 
history’” (137). Excerpts from Fox’s book were first published in New Masses in 1937 
(Williams 127): Stead was closely associated with New Masses. Stead’s 1938 review of a 
novel by André Malraux might be indebted to Fox’s thinking on the novel: “Malraux has 
achieved that perfect synthesis and simulacrum of life of which the novel alone is capable, an 




how humans relate to one another. All her life she refuses to participate conventionally in the 
sexual and financial economies in which most people learn to be regulated.  
          Giving a character animal attributes is a feature of Stead’s writing: “Stead liked to 
examine human behaviour as existing in a continuum with animal activity,” notes Robin 
Dizard (103). Giving a character spirit attributes, however, is a practice that Stead turns to less 
frequently. A somewhat similar treatment of character is evident in the farmer’s mentally 
disturbed daughter, Hilda, in “The Rightangled Creek” (discussed in chapter seven below). 
Physically, Hilda is in an asylum, but her spirit remains at Dilley’s Creek, her former home. It 
is Tom and Nellie in Cotters’ England, however, whom Honor most resembles. Nellie Cotter 
“is associated with liminal states,” writes Susan Sheridan, “between female and male . . . 
animal and human . . . human and supernatural. . . . She is a creature of metamorphosis” 
(118). Tom Cotter is also a changeling, with unfixed physical, temporal, and social qualities.4 
In “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” Honor’s changeling characterisation is evident in her frequent 
changes of appearance, name, and residence. The characterisation is extended toward the 
more overtly spirit-like by Honor’s wish for complete independence from material concerns, 
and her apparent aversion to the flesh. Qualities associated with a spirit could well be 
associated with Honor: ethereal, floating, fleeting, protean. She seems free of any fixed 
material form, and it is suggested that she inhabits other women’s identities. 
          Honor’s spirit quality is made explicit in the narrative by the character Beatrice, 
Debrett’s first wife, who says that she feels haunted by Honor: “‘she’ll be back, we’re 
haunted’” (41). A friend of Debrett’s, Duncan, sees Honor going into a graveyard at night and 
thinks of “the ghosts of the city of Prague; ghouls.” When Duncan tells Debrett this, the men 
first become uneasy, then Duncan laughs it off, saying, “‘ghouls don’t take money; proved 
she was human’” (49). The incident is later explained: Honor has been sleeping rough in the 
graveyard. Debrett recognises Honor’s otherworldliness as something potentially good. For 
him, she is special, and able to remind him of a higher self: “I feel she partakes of a sacred 
character” (45). He speculates on her supernatural powers, wondering if she can “shuttle 
between youth and age, inhabit and divest herself of other women’s forms” (52). 
                                                          
4 On the construction of character in Cotters’ England, Terry Sturm writes, “the definition of 
personality on which the novel is built is radically different from the conceptions of character 
in traditional bourgeois or socialist realism” (102). This would apply as well to Honor in “The 
Puzzleheaded Girl,” which was probably written at much the same time as Cotters’ England, 
or not long after. The two works exhibit some similar narrative techniques, and a comparable 




           Honor also seems ghostly due to her absence from her own story. She cannot be pinned 
down by owning a voice. Her speech is usually limited to short, obtuse responses to direct 
questions. In addition, Stead’s very focus on the material factors that would be expected to 
oppress Honor – her apparent refusal to be beholden to any need for food, sex, shelter, family, 
employment, or money (as far as she can avoid it) – suggests the non-material. By continually 
denying these basic needs, Honor draws attention to something else, something other. Her 
focus is clearly elsewhere. There must be something other than the material, her way of being 
in the world insinuates, and she aligns herself with this otherness.  
          Honor, then, is a character who exceeds the conventionally human, or, at least, she has 
qualities that reach beyond the customary boundaries of a realist presentation of character. 
Many people would regard the animal and the spirit as component parts of the human: in 
realist fiction, however, the spirit and the animal are usually invisible – the spirit by 
definition, the animal, or animalistic, due to socialisation. In Honor, both gradually become 
more than usually apparent. What is normally hidden in the human is made visible. The 
highlighting of Honor’s animal and spirit qualities means she defies easy classification. This 
is one reason that Honor is identified as uncanny by the characters in the novella, and by the 
reader. Not only do the other characters, along with the reader, struggle to place her, but she 
either struggles or refuses to place herself. She never has a home, settled employment, or a 
family, and seems to avoid these things. She seems permanently in the “margins,” in “the 
inarticulate area,” to use Douglas’s terms (99). 
          Honor’s character extends, then, or stretches, the accustomed reach of character a 
reader expects in a realist narrative. This stretching of the limits of a narrative convention, 
rather than overtly breaking them, is a flexible approach that allows for unusual aspects of 
characterisation to be introduced unobtrusively. The reader is pushed incrementally to the 
outermost limits of the reading conventions which they have adopted for the narrative. They 
begin to enter territory that is increasingly unfamiliar, yet which started from a familiar-
enough place. This process is not uncommon in Stead narratives.  
 
 
Another example of the stretching of the conventional limits of character in “The 
Puzzleheaded Girl” is that Honor is given an apparent telepathic ability.5 This attribute seems 
                                                          
5 The theme of telepathy runs through Stead’s writing. It is first evident in several of the 
stories in The Salzburg Tales (“The Marionettist,” “The Mirror,” “The Gold Bride”), through 
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both animal and ghostly. Telepathy is a contested human capability. In Freud’s terms, beliefs 
to do with telepathy are only partly surmounted, and can return at some coincidence. 
Telepathy is introduced gradually and unobtrusively into “The Puzzleheaded Girl.” At first it 
is explicable as coincidence. Debrett often meets Honor seemingly by chance, while walking 
in the street. Other characters also happen to meet Honor this way. It turns out that everyone 
meets Honor this way. Does she observe people’s movements, and wait for them? Stead then 
introduces a more explicit element of telepathy, or second sight, to Honor’s character, which 
is harder to explain rationally. The first example is when she turns up, uninvited, at Debrett’s 
apartment late one night, and says she had been expecting his wife, Beatrice, to be there. 
Debrett explains that Beatrice is staying with her mother in the country, and is not expected 
back for some time. However, Beatrice arrives back unannounced the next evening. At work 
the next day, Debrett tells Honor: “you were remarkably close to the truth. [Beatrice] came 
home last night unexpectedly” (26). Honor, it seems, is still fine-tuning her uncanny 
surveillance skills. These skills are honed by the time she flees to the Midwest farm of one of 
Debrett’s farmer clients. She stays with the farmer’s wife in the farmer’s absence: “Honor 
stayed till autumn. The husband returned home once. The day before he returned, Honor went 
away; she returned after he left, without saying where she had been, or how she knew he had 
gone.” Honor knows the farmer is returning, despite his wife not knowing. Stead continues, 
“[t]he second time, he was coming home for a longer stay. This time she went and did not 
return” (37).6 
          Telepathic ability is one way that Honor’s character departs from realist conventions. 
Claudette Sartiliot, in an article critiquing Jacques Derrida’s writing on telepathy, states that 
“telepathy breaches the discreteness and unity of the subject” (215). In “The Puzzleheaded 
Girl,” however, it is given as an extension of a pattern of behaviour established in Honor’s 
character from the onset of the narrative, a start firmly grounded in a realist account of the 
goings-on in a typical office. From the beginning, Honor is shown to have an unconventional 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to The Man Who Loved Children (telepathic messages would be a feature of Sam Pollit’s 
future world), and then Cotters’ England, in which Nellie and Tom Cotter appear to share 
thoughts. 
 
6 Honor is repeatedly shown knowing things about married male acquaintances that their 
wives or partners do not know, as though she is assuming a “feminine” knowledge where it is 





sense of the boundaries between people. She does not acknowledge boundaries in others, 
although she insists more strongly than usual on boundaries in her own case. For instance, she 
enters people’s apartments without their knowing, and she asks to stay overnight when no 
invitation has been offered. Honor “cannot make . . . divisions between private and public” 
(Brydon 116). Honor’s crossing of conventional boundaries is a first step in paving the way 
for the suggestion of telepathy. Also smoothing the way for the introduction of the marvellous 
into the realistic is that a possible rational explanation, however slender, is always given for 
Honor’s seemingly occult ability. Honor makes a habit of reading the telephone book, for 
example, and is shown to possess an extraordinary memory for names and addresses. This, 
perhaps, is how she gleans information concerning people’s whereabouts.  
          Telepathy gradually comes into focus in the middle of the novella. It is a significant 
feature of Honor’s farm visit. The theme is then reinforced when Honor tracks down Debrett, 
years later, when he is living in Europe. In this episode, Honor shows up at the office of 
Debrett’s business friend, Duncan, in London, and asks for a loan. She insists to Duncan that 
Debrett will act as guarantor, and then gives him Debrett’s telephone number on the 
Continent. When Duncan calls, Debrett says, “[h]ow in the world did you know I was here, 
Duncan? Even my wife has not got my address yet” (48). This almost inexplicable episode 
seems to progress naturally from the preceding narrative. Telepathy, then, does not breach the 
“discreteness and unity” of Honor’s character, although her peculiar psychic invasiveness 
breaches the discreteness of others. 
          Telepathy finally moves to the forefront of the narrative when it becomes the subject of 
the last, climactic scene between Debrett and Honor. On this occasion, he finds her waiting 
for him in a coffee shop in New York. A woman approaches Debrett, “who looked fifty, in 
clothes dirty and unbuttoned, gray-haired, face creased.” This is Honor, who says: 
“I have been waiting for you here. I knew you would come.” 
   He drew back. “I had no intention of coming here; you couldn’t have 
known.” He looked at her with dislike. 
   “I know, Augustus Debrett; I have ways of knowing.” 
   “You just wait, don’t you and then say things like that?” 
   “That’s not it. It’s you. I know where you will be.” 
   She was about thirty-one, not older; but she smiled like an aged prostitute, 
cunningly and coarsely using the remains of once potent charm to get some 
last hesitant customer. She handed him a piece of paper. “Read it.” On it 
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was written, “I feel that Mr Augustus Debrett will be at 57th Street this 
afternoon.” 
   “I suppose you saw me come in and wrote it,” he said, handing back the 
paper. 
   “No! Don’t you know I always know where you are?” 
   “I don’t believe in things like that, Honor. I suppose you know a lot of 
people and you wait till you see them.”  (54-55) 
This passage shows how the narrative advances the idea of telepathy while not endorsing it. 
Debrett doubts it; Honor insists on it. This is an example of how “The Puzzleheaded Girl” 
demonstrates a to-ing and fro-ing between offering rational explanations, and then 
withholding them. Stead’s narrative keeps the reader suspended between the realistic and the 
marvellous, since the narrative is able to accommodate the expectations of both, without 
letting one cancel out the other. By holding in suspense the balance between the realistic and 
the marvellous, “The Puzzleheaded Girl” remains suspended between categories. This allows 
Honor’s story to be read not only as a realist investigation into how a particular woman is 
oppressed by particular societal circumstances (the case study), but also as the tale of an 
allegorical figure.7 The narrative employs the generality of the allegoric and the particularity 
of the realistic simultaneously, and in such a way that they do not impinge on each other. At 
the beginning of “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” Honor presents as a realistic character, but by the 
narrative’s end, an alternative allegorical construction of her character is plausible. 
Occasionally, Honor is presented in the narrative in an allegorical mode while she is 
interacting with other characters, all of whom are unchangingly realistic. This leads to strange 
exchanges such as the one above, where Debrett finds Honor waiting for him in a coffee shop. 
Two differing models of character construction exist and are deployed simultaneously in the 
one scene. In a sense, the narrative succeeds in being two things, within two genres, at once. 
          Giving a character an attribute that seems to be marvellous, yet just might be credited, 
allows for the stretching of the “discreteness and unity of the subject” in regard to Honor. This 
is especially so in the highly condensed, sparingly narrated section of the novella which 
                                                          
7 By allegory I understand a conception of allegory that goes back to the ancient world, cited 
by Tzvetan Todorov: “Quintilian,” states Todorov, “writes: ‘A continuous metaphor develops 
into allegory.’ In other words, an isolated metaphor indicates only a figurative manner of 
speaking; but if the metaphor is sustained, it reveals an intention to speak of something else 




covers the twelve years that Debrett is out of the United States and travelling about Europe. 
Toward the end of this section, Debrett is depicted living with his new wife, Mari, first in 
Paris, then in London. In a series of incidents, Honor’s identity slides into different women 
the couple meet, as though Honor has become an essence capable of inhabiting other feminine 
forms. The story intimates that Honor is a shape-shifter, although it never commits to this. In 
Paris, Debrett thinks he sees Honor in the street and points her out to Mari. Some doubt is cast 
on the woman’s identity, however, when he says that it is “[a]stonishing how she keeps her 
youth and girlish beauty” (51). Observing the woman Debrett thinks is Honor, Mari sees a 
woman who reminds her of the woman for whom her ex-husband left her. R. G. Geering 
points out that Mari herself resembles Honor, with her grey eyes and “loose brown hair” 
(Christina Stead: A Critical 164). A few years later, while renting a room in London, Debrett 
and Mari notice a “stout, dark, stormy woman tenant who went in and out at odd hours, 
morosely; and at the end left quietly, owing four weeks’ rent.” Debrett says, “she reminded 
me of someone you don’t know; Honor Lawrence.” To this, Mari replies, “I noticed her too, 
and she reminded me of your wife Beatrice” (51-52). Five years later, the couple is visited by 
Mari’s cousin, Alice: “I hope,” said Debrett, “that you won’t invite that girl Alice to stay with 
us. When I saw her coming up the stairs, I felt the hairs rise along my spine. She is so exactly 
like Honor Lawrence; it is the same girl. If she ever got in here, she’d never leave. I don’t 
want her here; let her go. Never invite her” (52). These encounters imply that there is 
something of Honor in many women, or every woman, and that there is something haunting, 
insistent, and fearful about Honor. 
          These episodes might also suggest that Debrett sees women as types rather than 
individuals. Debrett is shown to be not alone in this. Earlier in the novella, characters project 
different stereotypes of women onto Honor: she is virgin, temptress, hysteric, whore. By this 
late stage in the story, the process is reversed, with Honor being projected back onto various 
women. Honor becomes a myth of her own, the origin of a myth, not only in Debrett’s mind, 
but also in Beatrice and Mari’s. The reader, as with Debrett and Mari, is never sure if Honor 
really is the woman in Paris, or how it is that cousin Alice comes to so closely resemble 
Honor. Honor seems to remind Debrett, and the more mature women in the novella, of some 
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point of common origin in themselves. This point of origin, however, is distant, and difficult 
for them to place or to articulate.8 
          That other characters in the story are able to hold so many interpretations of Honor 
suggests just how mutable she is. Each of the focalising characters – mainly Debrett and 
Beatrice, but also Mari, Celinda, Jay, Tom, and Saul – sees a different Honor. In her 
mutability, Honor is associated with the protean and the formless. When Honor first appears 
in the narrative, she is a raw, unshaped, feminine potency, with limited experience even for a 
fifteen-year-old. Each person she meets proceeds to project a different idea of what a young 
woman should be onto Honor’s apparently blank slate. Stead, in detailing this process, goes to 
the source of how the characters portrayed in the novella perceive and construct women. As 
protean femininity, Honor is moulded into whatever shapes people make of women. For 
Debrett’s first wife, Beatrice, Honor is a fate, a huntress, unavoidable, implacable, and always 
returning. For the farmer’s wife, Celinda, she is the eternal victim. For Debrett’s second wife, 
Mari, she is the eternal outsider. As indicated, these efforts by others to “understand” Honor 
reflect different constructions of Honor, or women, or Woman. Sometimes it is an 
unconscious construction (as with the male clients in the office who assume they can take 
sexual advantage of Honor); sometimes it is semi-conscious (as with Beatrice, whose attitude 
to Honor is initially confused but slowly crystallises); and sometimes it is clearly articulated 
(as with Jay). Honor’s characterisation is unstable because she is depicted in the process of 
being created by other characters in the novella. What she is depends upon whose viewpoint 
is given, and the viewpoints often change and develop.    
          The process of the construction of Honor is particularly highlighted in Debrett’s 
vacillating attitude toward her. At first he sees her as virgin, and, at their last meeting, as 
whore. His overarching, and eventually prevailing attitude, however, is that she is a holy fool, 
someone who embodies higher truths. Debrett’s attitude is made explicit in a scene in which 
Beatrice warns him about falling for the girl. Beatrice says, “[e]very time she comes into our 
                                                          
8 These instances in the narrative suggest that the story is as much to do with perceptions of 
Honor as it is to do with Honor herself. Brydon writes that the novella is “less about Honor 
herself than about the efforts of others to understand her” (117), while Ian Reid notes, “the 
further we move through the story the more we see that this strange woman, innocent yet 
parasitic, self-possessed yet fidgety, oblivious yet alert, adaptive yet a misfit, is emblematic of 
many other people” (57). This is an indication that in this work, as in other Stead stories, the 
centre of the narrative (that is, its central character, or concern, or focus) is hard to pinpoint: it 




lives, you don’t sleep. Watch out, Gus [Debrett]. I can see you in a mess.” To this, Debrett 
replies: 
“Over the poor suppliant? Don’t be silly. To her I’m a kindly uncle. . . . 
She’s not interested in men. But I am worried. Don’t laugh at me, I feel she 
partakes of a sacred character, those the gods love or hate: it’s the same. If 
the suppliant demands and you don’t give, you’re accursed. That’s an old 
idea. . . . At least in the old countries there is this idea that the sick and 
maimed are sent for your especial care.”  (45) 
Beatrice recognises Honor’s power. Debrett recognises that she is simultaneously potent and 
fragile. An aspect of “fantastic art,” according to Rosemary Jackson, is that it draws “explicit 
attention to the process of representation” (84). Among other things, “The Puzzleheaded Girl” 
details such a process.  
          Other aspects of Jackson’s arguments about fantasy literature are relevant at this point. 
By fantasy, Jackson means works such as Kafka’s The Metamorphosis. She gives this 
definition of fantasy: “[f]antasy . . . has to do with inverting elements of this world, re-
combining its constitutive features in new relations to produce something strange, unfamiliar 
and apparently ‘new’, absolutely ‘other’ and different” (8). Thus received, or conventional, 
ideas of form come under question in Jackson’s definition of fantasy. Perhaps “The 
Puzzleheaded Girl” can be read as a similar kind of fantasy narrative, reaching towards the 
possibilities of producing forms which are “strange” and “unfamiliar,” “new” and “different,” 
if in ways less overt than Kafka’s work. This approximates the sentiment expressed by 
Honor’s husband, Jay, in regard to Honor’s singularity. Following Jackson, Honor might be 
seen as “re-combining [this world’s] constitutive features in new relations,” where the more 
conventional aspects of her character are combined with animal characteristics and the spirit 
attributes projected onto her. The combination of the conventionally human, the animal, and 
the supernatural, produces in Honor something new, other, and different. She exhibits an 
essential trait of the typical fantasy character as theorised by Jackson: “the many partial, dual, 
multiple and dismembered selves scattered throughout literary fantasies violate the most 
cherished of all human unities: the unity of ‘character’” (82). To qualify this, Honor is 
presented as a cohesive, coherent unity, but not in conventional terms. Rather, she is assigned 
different selves by different characters, and with her shape-shifting and telepathy, passes into 
other people’s selves. As much as is possible for a character in a realist fiction, she embodies 
“non-form,” in Douglas’s terms (99). 
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          As Jackson suggests, this treatment of character might constitute a different genre to 
realism, although I would hesitate to label it fantasy, as this word is already so contested. 
Jackson’s book speculates on the subversiveness of this kind of representation of character, 
the body being a contested site of social control. In creating a character that undermines the 
boundaries of the body, Stead also depicts a socially disruptive character. Judith Butler 
extends an argument made by Douglas in Purity and Danger to theorise that the body is a site 
“to establish specific codes of cultural coherence”: “the boundaries of the body [are] the limits 
of the socially hegemonic” (131). Honor transgresses these limits. This throws into relief not 
only Honor’s character, but the culture that rejects her. As Butler theorises, the regulation of 
the body reflects societal regulation. In particular, the boundaries of the body need definition 
in order to be controlled, and “[t]he construction of stable bodily contours relies upon fixed 
sites of corporeal permeability and impermeability” (132). Honor threatens this 
“impermeability” in possessing the attributes of telepathy, shape shifting, and doubling (I 
explore Honor as Debrett’s double in the next chapter). In addition, her heightened spirit and 
animal attributes draw attention to the unperceivable and unregulated in the human. This 
makes her alarming to other characters, and condemns her as an outsider to the society 
depicted in the story. In “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” Honor’s body might be read as a site of an 
analysis of relations between capitalist and patriarchal American society and the individual. 
 
 
I have argued for the uncanniness of that which occupies several categories simultaneously, 
which renders the thing formless. The formless can also be that which falls between 
categories, that which is in transition. One way to understand Honor’s physicality as not 
“stable,” for instance, is to view her as a character always in transition. In Purity and Danger, 
Douglas explores how people, when undergoing periods of transformation or crisis, 
sometimes enter formless states between categories. To protect them during these times, and 
to protect others from them, they become taboo: “[d]anger lies in transitional states, simply 
because transition is neither one state nor the next, it is undefinable. The person who must 
pass from one to another is himself in danger and emanates danger to others” (97). She adds: 
“[t]o have been in the margins is to have been in contact with danger, to have been at a source 
of power. It is consistent with the ideas about form and formlessness to treat initiands coming 
out of seclusion as if they were themselves charged with power” (98). In Stead’s novella, 
Honor is “charged” with a power analogous to that analysed by Douglas. She seems always in 
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the margins of an in-between and formless state, in a perpetual state of transition, and this is 
where her indefinable power lies. 
          Stead often presents characters in states of transition, or at the point of transition. I end 
this chapter with a discussion of some of these instances, in order to clarify under what 
circumstances the uncanny is elicited by the marginal and the transitional. One of Stead’s 
stories collected in Ocean of Story, “A Night in the Indian Ocean,” focuses on a potentially 
transitional moment in the life of a young woman, Stella, who is on a boat in the middle of the 
Indian Ocean, sailing from Australia to England. It is night. Stella is about to enter the next 
stage in her life. She is in transition, physically and psychically. To help pay for the passage, 
she is looking after an alcoholic heiress, Barbara, who spends her life inebriated on ships, 
between ports. Barbara attempts to initiate the younger woman into the ways of the world. 
According to Barbara, this means learning how to catch a rich man and hold him. Stella’s 
initiation into Barbara’s knowledge of the world happens in the middle of the ocean, in the 
middle of the night, at a time in Stella’s life when she is on the threshold of new knowledge. 
Fiona Morrison, in her article, “The Elided Middle,” notes similarities between Stella’s 
situation and that of initiates in some societies, to whom a space outside society is allocated, 
as theorised by Arnold van Gennep in his early twentieth-century work, Rites of Passage (a 
work Douglas draws upon). Morrison argues further: 
“A Night in the Indian Ocean” represents the expatriating traverse between 
one nation space and another, and this space of ‘in-between-ness’ is a 
particularly interesting moment of expatriation. The sea voyage, as the 
interstitial passage between nation spaces, is continuous and discontinuous, 
and contests the separation between the inside and outside. The confusion of 
the interstice is the confusion about whether these boundaries or limits 
operate as inside or outside, or both, a confusion that indicates a disruption 
to the circumscribing space between subject and object.  (162-63)  
This state of transition is not felt as uncanny, however, since “the ship operates as a 
microcosm of the social and economic. . . . the interaction of gender and class means that the 
woman ‘at sea’ is not in fact ‘nowhere’” (163). One of the points of this story, then, is that 
Stella has yet to find a transitional space, a way to metamorphose: Barbara offers nothing 
new. 
          “In Doulcemer,” a story in The Salzburg Tales, also shows how determinants such as 
class, gender, and capital remain operational for those in flight from their societies. Told by 
the Medical Doctor, “In Doulcemer” depicts an artists’ colony in an old, run-down village in 
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provincial France. The village of Doulcemer is overrun by a bohemian community of 
metropolitan Americans and Europeans getting “back to nature” (140). This is a place full of 
characters in transition, including the artists who come and go, and longer-term residents who 
are going up or down socially. The aloof local aristocrats are sinking due to lack of money, 
while the obsequious and ambitious art dealer, Nina Nyiregyhaza, sells local real estate at 
inflated prices, and waits for the occupants to go broke, before reselling the same property. 
The story begins with two depictions of groups of people in transition: a peasant marriage 
ceremony entering the village (138), and an artist and his family, reduced to utter poverty, 
leaving the village on a horse and cart (140). The story also ends with an explicit image of 
transition, a tight-rope walker attempting to climb between two nearby peaks, for the 
amusement of the wedding party. His fall and death provides an image of the potential perils 
of transition. The dangers to those in transition include having their vulnerability exploited. 
This is evident in the portrait of the opportunistic Nina, who is more alive than most to the 
unexpected business opportunities presented by states of flux (she is a forerunner of Robbie 
Grant in A Little Tea, a Little Chat, who sells goods to both sides during the Second World 
War). As one member of the colony, Sophie, puts it, “no moment [is] too fleeting for Nina to 
sell something in it!” (144). “In Doulcemer” ends with Sophie and her husband, Charles, 
reflecting on the nature of transition while watching the tight-rope walker’s last moments: 
“Each one of us is like that,” said Charles, “balancing on as thin a cord 
between precipice and precipice.” 
   “It seems to me more like Doulcemer,” said Sophie, “suspended in the air 
precariously between its peaks. Scatter-brained colony doing a polka in thin 
air.” 
   At this moment the tight-rope performer put an end to all this bad poetry 
by plunging headfirst into the chasm and coming to rest, calm as could be, 
on the rocks at the bottom. 
    “He is very, very still,” said Charles thoughtfully: “he does not even 
know he fell.”  (155) 
The stillness, the lack of consciousness, of the dead man suggests that the moment of 
transition is fleeting: not fixed, or visible, or able to be located. 
          In this story, the characters float, lost in an alien environment that is itself in transition. 
The characters are out of time and place. Nevertheless, “In Doulcemer,” in a similar fashion 
to “A Night in the Indian Ocean,” affirms that people, defined by class, capital, gender and 
other factors of identity, take their past with them wherever they go. It is hard to change. 
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          There is one instance in The Salzburg Tales, however, where a space opens up in which 
the usual determinants of identity vanish, if only momentarily, and a protagonist enters a 
charged and transformative state, with uncanny effect. This story, “Day of Wrath,” locates a 
transitional moment and place. “Day of Wrath” is a three-page story told by the Schoolboy. In 
this work, Stead depicts another boat crossing, a ferry crossing of Sydney Harbour. During the 
boat crossing, several instances of transformation are presented.  
          Important aspects of this key story in The Salzburg Tales are emphasised by its being 
placed after a story titled “The Death of the Bee,” which is an account by the personage of the 
Naturalist of the death of a single bee, as witnessed by him as a young man. For the last two 
pages of this five-page story, the reader is focused on the moment of transition as the bee 
moves from life to death. Its dying struggles are related in lingering detail, right down to the 
last wriggling of the insect’s legs. The Schoolboy tells “Day of Wrath” in immediate, even 
irritable, response to the Naturalist’s tale. His narrative is protean in form, defying 
classification in any genre. It contains elements of parable, allegory, myth, satire, and 
reportage. The Schoolboy’s story is of a woman who leaves her prominent and well-off 
husband for a poor man, taking her two children with her. She is divorced, and the children 
disowned by the father. The woman is shunned by the local community of “Avallon,” the 
village by Sydney Harbour where she lives. When a ferry sinks in the harbour,9 drowning 
“more than fifty souls,” Viola, the daughter of the ostracised woman, is one of the many 
children drowned. The village can only forgive the adulterous and divorced woman after this 
“sacrifice”: “the women began to lament on [Viola’s] mother’s account, to say she was well 
punished and one could even pity her. The beast was appeased, as in ancient days, by the 
sacrifice of a virgin” (467).  
          A second, very different, story of transformation is embedded in this tale. This is the 
story of the Schoolboy’s response to the sinking of the ferry. While crossing Sydney Harbour 
only half an hour after the ferry’s sinking, something odd happens to the Schoolboy. He 
prepares his listeners by setting the scene: “[o]ne Wednesday afternoon, the four o-clock ferry 
. . . was struck amidships by an ocean liner and sank immediately. . . . Thirty children were 
drowned, and all those who died were from our village of Avallon. I went down to catch the 
four-thirty ferry and saw the stretchers with bodies brought in already by the rescuers” (465). 
                                                          
9 The story is based on the sinking of the ferry Greycliffe in Sydney Harbour in 1927. This 
occurred shortly before Stead left Australia as a young woman. Brigid Rooney gives an 
account of the sinking, and its subsequent representation in literature, in “Time’s Abyss.” 
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As with the Danish Woman in “The Death of Svend,” death has passed close to the 
Schoolboy, who continues: 
All the way home, with my books on the seat, I watched the lustrous tide 
flow in, bearing planks, seats, lifebuoys and splintered wood up into the 
bays and rivers. Eddies of soot and oil floated past. In a few minutes we 
reached the spot where the ferry lay with her passengers, and I felt paralysed 
with a strange and almost voluptuous cramp, and my spirit being wound out 
of me like a djinn out of a pot.  (465-66) 
For a moment, as the ferry with its living passengers floats over the sunken ferry with its 
drowned passengers, the boy seems to die too, as though he has merged with the dead below. 
A closer reading of the last sentence, however, suggests that his “spirit being wound out” is 
more the unleashing of a potency that has always existed in the boy – the “djinn” in his “pot.” 
The Schoolboy then tells: 
We went dead slow, with our flag at half-mast, and there was a silence on 
the boat. I thought of those people sitting below, almost living, with a glow 
on their cheeks still through the green gloom of the deep-water channel: 
they seemed a company that had gone apart for some conclave. I believed 
my two young sisters were there, waiting for me with open eyes, and wanted 
to dive in, but I could not move.  (466) 
Here the gap between the living and the dead narrows. The dead still “glow” and sit “with 
open eyes,” while the living are silent and go “dead slow.” For a moment, the difference 
seems to lie only in that the dead are “sitting below.” The Schoolboy is drawn as close as 
possible to the transitional moment between life and death. The state between life and death  
has already been portrayed in the preceding tale, “The Death of the Bee.” The Schoolboy’s 
proximity unleashes a power in him, and transforms him. The allusion through the djinn to 
Arabian Nights suggests that the Schoolboy transforms into a storyteller.10 As discussed in the 
third chapter, Walter Benjamin links the power of death to the generation of story, and this 
transference is suggested in Stead’s story at the moment the ferry of the living passes over the 
ferry of the dead. The moment the ferries cross is the source of story. 
                                                          
10 Given his Australian origin, his transformation into a storyteller, and his story’s origin in the 







The Taboo in Christina Stead’s Shorter Fiction   
                                              
In the previous chapter I mentioned Mary Douglas’s linking of the formless and the hard-to-
categorise with what can be considered taboo. If the taboo is associated with that which 
cannot be categorised, then it might also be associated with the uncanny. The taboo might be 
considered a subset of that which elicits uncanny effects. Before discussing taboo in relation 
to Christina Stead’s novella, “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” and her earlier story in The Salzburg 
Tales, “The Little Old Lady,” it is helpful to explore both the idea of taboo and its links to 
formlessness and the uncanny, and how these relate more generally to Stead’s work. 
          Christina Stead’s fictions usually have at their core the exploration of a taboo, although 
her work has not been much discussed in relation to this. Stead characters are often depicted 
as infringing taboos. These infringements, I argue, can produce uncanny effects, and in 
breaking taboos, the characters become taboo themselves. They are treated as dangerous and 
are sometimes marginalised by other characters. I want also to suggest the possibility that the 
taboo might spread, according to the laws of taboo contagion, from the character to the 
narrative, and beyond to the reader. 
          Stead portrays characters that break taboos from her first-published fiction onward; 
these include the Jenkins family in “The Triskelion,” and James in “The Marionettist.” Two 
storyteller figures discussed in the third chapter, Peter in “I Live in You” and Lafe in “My 
Friend, Lafe Tilly,” also break taboo by telling of issues such as death. All these characters 
seem uncanny outsiders. Honor in “The Puzzleheaded Girl” is another character who can be 
identified as breaking taboos, becoming an uncanny outsider in the process. She breaks taboos 
relating to sex, money, and social interactions. Honor, the Jenkins family, and to a lesser 
extent James, become taboo and uncanny by their actions. The storytellers Peter and Lafe, 
however, seem to become taboo merely by telling of the taboo: their uncanniness derives from 
their taboo-infringing storytelling.  
          Links between taboo, the uncanny, and literature are explored in two relatively recent 
books, Transgression and Taboo: Critical Essays (2005), edited by Vartan Messier and 
Nandita Batra, and Taboo and Transgression in British Literature from the Renaissance to the 
Present (2010), edited by Stefan Horlacher, Stefan Glomb, and Lars Heiler. In a chapter in 
Taboo and Transgression, Stella Butter and Matthias Eitelmann make connections between 
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the uncanny and taboo. Butter and Eitelmann link the breaking of taboos to do with sexuality 
and death in Gothic novels to the uncanny return of the repressed. They cite Jack Morgan, 
who writes that “Gothic texts ‘expose taboo aspects of the fleshly reality we inhabit’” (135). 
Butter and Eitelmann continue: “[i]t is in the wake of the return of this repressed ‘fleshly 
reality’ with its attendant abject qualities that the organic is rendered uncanny. . . . The 
interrelation of the uncanny with taboo was highlighted by Freud when he elaborated its 
Janus-faced quality: on the one hand, taboos demarcate both the realm of the holy and sacred; 
on the other hand, taboos signal danger, impurity and the uncanny” (136). My exploration of 
the uncanny in relation to taboo and literature is more indebted to Ernst Jentsch’s formulation 
of the uncanny as the experience of an ambiguity in relation to categories, than to Freud’s 
theory of the uncanny return of the repressed.  
          At least six concepts are inherent in the term taboo: power; danger, ambivalence, 
prohibition, contagion, and sacredness. Equally important are the opposites of the last four of 
these terms: temptation, transgression, purification, and profanity, and a reverse aspect of 
power and danger – vulnerability. Part of the difficulty of defining “taboo” is that, as with the 
word “heimlich,” the term contains two sets of meanings that are contrary to one another. 
Franz Steiner, writing in the twentieth century, gives the following definition of taboo in his 
authoritative and influential Taboo:1 
Social relations are describable in terms of danger; through contagion there 
is social participation in danger. And we find expressed in the same term . . . 
of taboo, two quite separate social functions: (1) the classification and 
identification of transgressions (which is associated with, though it can be 
studied apart from, processes of social learning), and (2) the institutional 
localization of danger, both by the specification of the dangerous and by the 
protection of society from endangered, and hence dangerous, persons.  (147) 
                                                          
1 It is difficult precisely to date Steiner’s writings, which were mostly unpublished at the time 
of his death in 1952. The definition of taboo given by Stefan Horlacher in his introduction to 
Taboo and Transgression, taken from the Oxford English Dictionary Online, and intended as 
a benchmark reference for the term’s use in Taboo and Transgression, more or less rephrases 
Steiner’s ideas: taboo is “[t]he putting of a person or thing under prohibition or interdict, 
perpetual or temporary; the fact or condition of being so placed; the prohibition or interdict 
itself. Also, the institution or practice by which such prohibitions are recognized and 




For Steiner, taboo involves identifying, and then quarantining, things dangerous to “social 
relations.” To be “marked thoroughly” is the etymology Steiner prefers for the word “taboo,” 
deriving from the Polynesian words signifying the custom of staking out a taboo place (32-
33). To mark can mean to signal and draw attention to a thing, yet it can also mean making 
that thing off-limits, and these two meanings can be simultaneous. The mark is a signal that 
this is where a person is not to go. Even in our thoughts this seems to be so with taboo, as 
thoughts edge around taboo subjects. It is usually only in literature and the arts that taboo is 
explored, at least in the public arena. The taboo is hidden, so that it might be considered a 
form of social hiding. If these hidden and difficult to place things are brought into the light, 
they may be perceived as uncanny. 
          Links between taboo and the uncanny emerge in Freud’s Totem and Taboo, published 
six years before his essay “The ‘Uncanny,’” but possibly drafted at much the same time. 
Freud notes how the term “taboo” contains apparently contradictory ideas, the same 
observation that he makes of “heimlich.” In giving a list of meanings for “taboo,” Freud 
includes “uncanny”: “[t]he meaning of taboo, as we see it, converges in two contrary 
directions. To us it means, on the one hand, ‘sacred’, ‘consecrated’, and on the other, 
‘uncanny’, ‘dangerous’, ‘forbidden’, ‘unclean’” (71). Also, writing on Wilhelm Wundt’s 
study of Australian Aboriginals, Freud notes that the Aboriginals have a class of the taboo in 
which “everything that is uncanny . . . becomes subject to taboo” (77). Freud does not pursue 
these links between taboo and the uncanny in his essay, “The ‘Uncanny.’” This is perhaps 
surprising, given that he had already made connections between the two, and that Friedrich 
Schelling’s definition of the uncanny, so important to the essay, contains an injunction – that 
the uncanny is that which should or ought to remain hidden but has come to light – which 
suggests a link to the taboo.            
          A closer reading of Honor’s characterisation in “The Puzzleheaded Girl” clarifies some 
of the connections I have begun to make between the uncanny and the taboo:  in turn, these 
connections help in further interpreting the story. Honor is most clearly, if loosely, associated 
with the taboo in being marked as an outsider who exists beyond prescribed social relations. 
Honor is associated with the outsider figure of the wanderer, a type which preoccupied Stead 
from the beginning of her writing. In “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” a late work, Stead gives her 
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most comprehensive portrait of a wraith and wanderer.2 Honor seems reluctant, or is unable, 
to be fixed in form or place.  
          Honor is unusual among Stead’s protagonists in that she just might be something 
wonderful and angelic. This potentially sacred quality marks her as an outsider. She closely 
resembles Julia Kristeva’s “foreigner,” as described in the collage-like portrait of the 
foreigner given in Strangers to Ourselves: “[a]lways elsewhere, the foreigner belongs 
nowhere”; “living neither before nor now but beyond, they [the foreigner] are bent with a 
passion that, although tenacious, will remain forever unsatisfied” (10); “[f]ree of ties with his 
own people, the foreigner feels ‘completely free.’ Nevertheless, the consummate name of 
such a freedom is solitude” (12); “the foreigner longs for affiliation, the better to experience, 
through a refusal, its untouchability” (12); “[the foreigner’s] speech, fascinating as it might be 
on account of its very strangeness, will be of no consequence, will have no effect, will cause 
no improvement in the image or reputation of those you are conversing with” (20-21); “to be 
deprived of parents – is that where freedom starts? Certainly foreigners become intoxicated 
with that independence, and undoubtedly their very exile is at first no more than a challenge 
to parental overbearance” (21). This is what Honor is like, more or less orphaned, dismissed 
and unlistened to, seeking yet not seeking alliances with other women, proudly solitary, 
always wandering. She is outside speech, friendship, social status, and the family. 
          Yet for Kristeva, the foreigner is also an aspect of ourselves, and this is what Debrett, 
the other main character in Stead’s novella, recognises in Honor. For him, Honor represents 
not something to ignore or lament, but a higher self. As Kristeva writes of the foreigner: 
“[s]trangely, the foreigner lives within us: he is the hidden face of our identity” (1); “the 
foreigner’s friends, aside from bleeding hearts who feel obliged to do good, could only be 
those who feel foreign to themselves” (23). Debrett may be a bleeding heart, but he is also 
sometimes aware of something foreign in himself, something Honor represents.  
          As mentioned in the previous chapter, Debrett’s attitude to Honor vacillates. His 
conceptions of her correspond to three potentially taboo figures: an angel, a virgin, and a 
whore. In each of these figurations, she is untouchable to him, for different reasons. Steiner’s 
assertion that “taboo means both prohibition and sacredness” (34) would apply to Debrett’s 
                                                          
2 Anita Segerberg in her article “Getting Started” discusses several early manuscripts of Stead 
with the title “The Wraith and the Wanderer,” which are collected in Stead’s papers at the 
National Library, Canberra. Segerberg reproduces from the papers an interesting quasi-




seemingly contrary, yet more or less simultaneous, conceptions of Honor. A combination of 
these two characteristics, polarised in Western culture, meet in Honor. She is “‘sacred” and 
“above the ordinary,” yet also “dangerous,” “unclean,” and “uncanny” – Freud’s terms for the 
taboo. Notions of purity and pollution, intrinsic to taboo, are inextricably bound up in co-
existing aspects of Honor. Debrett’s business partners, Zero and Scott, regard Honor as a 
parasite who always asks for money, yet she will then travel to another continent, years later, 
to repay the debt. While she hates being touched, she marries bigamously and appears to work 
as a prostitute. Honor refuses to handle money, yet asks for loans. Debrett sees her as a holy 
fool, yet most of the other characters shun her. Both purity and pollution are integral to 
Honor’s character. She insistently avoids categorisation, and this leads to her being both 
uncanny and taboo.  
          There are further points of correspondence between Honor’s character and the taboo. 
She is both dangerous and vulnerable. When she first appears in the narrative, it is as a 
protean potency so that her power and her vulnerability are equally on display. She is 
powerful in being independent, resourceful, physically attractive, and as a being yet to take a 
fixed shape. Honor’s power lies most in this last attribute. She is unsocialised and unformed, 
and she cannot be categorised or placed as she is still in the process of being created. This 
formlessness is dangerous since it is unknown, of which the character Beatrice is aware. 
Honor’s protean quality, however, also contributes to her vulnerability. As someone who 
cannot be placed, she is always an isolated outsider.  
          At this point I want to extend this argument, to explore how the uncanny reading effect 
emanating from evoking the taboo in a story might spread beyond a character in a narrative, to 
the narrative itself. This kind of contagion may account for aspects of the strangeness and 
unsettling effect so frequently attributed to Stead’s work.  
          Characters in “The Puzzleheaded Girl” react to Honor as though she is uncanny: the 
reader of the novella reacts to the text as though it is uncanny. It becomes an uncanny story. 
The reader is then left with a feeling of having been touched by, or of having been in the 
proximity of, something taboo, or prohibited.  
          The intensity of this effect is heightened by Stead’s apparent fearlessness in suggesting 
the taboo, which is evident from her first publications. While explicit violations of taboos are 
rarely presented in her writing, the suggestions or traces of the transgression of the taboo 
almost always underpin her work. In The Salzburg Tales, for example, taboo subjects are 
repeatedly confronted, although Stead rarely writes of these subjects as confrontations but 
rather as aspects of everyday interactions, as taboo is. “The Triskelion” tells of transgressions 
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of taboos to do with incest, paedophilia, rape, suicide, and murder. “The Death of Svend” also 
deals with taboos with regard to suicide, as Svend gives himself over to death. “Gaspard” 
deals with adultery and the breaking of class barriers, and “The Marionettist” shows James’s 
disregard of taboos when he deserts his role of father, husband, and breadwinner for his 
family, and in his incestuous return to his mother. Stead’s narratives persistently approach, or 
touch on, the taboo by addressing or suggesting transgressions of taboos.  
          It is commonly held that a taboo thing is not to be touched or approached. Those who 
get too close to the taboo object also become taboo. The argument that an uncanny, taboo 
character spreads uncanniness to the narrative as a whole can be extended: if a story is 
charged with the power of the taboo, this can then be passed to the reader. Of the contagious 
quality of taboo, Freud writes, in Totem and Taboo: “the basis of taboo is a prohibited action, 
for performing which a strong inclination exists in the unconscious” (86), and the taboo object 
“has the power of reminding a man of his own prohibited wishes and the apparently more 
important one of inducing him to transgress the prohibition of obedience to those wishes” 
(88). One of the results of narrative depicting the breaking of a taboo, or the temptation to do 
so, is that it cannot help but remind people of “prohibited wishes.” From Plato onward, 
literature is suspect on the basis that it might incite transgressive behaviour. Stead’s own Letty 
Fox: Her Luck was banned for decades in Australia on the grounds that it would provoke 
immoral sexual behaviour.3 Letty Fox: Her Luck was proscribed by “the institutional 
localization of danger,” to apply Steiner’s phrase (147).  
          Catherine Padmore writes of the uncanny experience of being a reader experiencing 
something resembling taboo contagion. The anecdote is in relation to her reading of Christos 
Tsiolkas’s Dead Europe, a narrative which depicts the breaking of multiple taboos. Padmore 
explores potential complicity between the reader and the text which some readers testify to 
feeling, whereby the transgressive racism of Tsiolkas’s protagonist rubs off on the reader. 
Padmore writes of “the book being ‘grimy,’” and eliciting collusion in the reader by being 
uncannily haunting: 
because of this complicity [Dead Europe] produces an almost visceral 
reaction. After talking to a number of people about [Dead Europe] I noticed 
that their bodies reacted with a shudder. Anecdotally, I heard that one 
                                                          





colleague passed the book to another, because she didn’t want her hands to 
touch it again or to have it “festering” in her flat. [Humphrey] McQueen, in 
his Book Talk review [of Dead Europe], recounts an experience where he 
found Hitler’s signature in the copy of Mein Kampf he had retrieved from 
the library. He wanted to show the signature to two friends, but “No one 
would come close enough to touch the autographed copy. I sensed that they 
feared that the hand that had signed the paper could reach out from the 
flyleaf and contaminate them.” This visceral reaction suggests readers feel 
that something from this book can move into the reader’s body and lodge 
there long after the book has been put down, creating disturbing after-effects 
and changing or perhaps compromising the reader.  (61) 
These are instances of taboo contagion. Another example is given by Susan R. Bowers in her 
reading of Tess Gallagher’s poems, in which she notes that they suggest infringements of 
taboos to do with death and sex. One poem, Bowers writes, “does not actually violate the 
incest taboo, but skirts around it. However . . . the lines feel dangerous” (10). Here is another 
instance of the danger of taboo moving from the text to the reader.  
          Taboo contagion might explain some of the reluctance to hear a story that Walter 
Benjamin notes in “The Storyteller.” The listener fears hearing something that is not supposed 
to be heard. The listener, having heard what they are not supposed to hear, or had not wanted 
to hear, fears that they will be polluted by this knowledge. They might have to change how 
they think, or even how they act. People might look at them differently for having heard what 
they have been told. They have been compromised by being shown something that, by general 
consent, should be kept apart, or hidden. Such reluctance is expressed by the Old Man in The 
Salzburg Tales. “‘Let me hear,’” he says, “‘something respectable and natural tomorrow. . . . 
An old man can’t afford to go about with these cynical, salacious remarks in his ears. . . . that 
upsets my ideas’” (174). A number of Stead critics insinuate something similar when they 
respond to Stead’s fictions as though something in the works is transgressive. Diana Brydon, 
in a passage quoted at greater length in my first chapter, responds to “The Triskelion” as 
though repelled by something polluting: “the teller and audience of ‘The Triskelion’ . . . 
utterly miss the point of the story – the corrupt ways in which the law and the business world 
conspire together to protect the oppressor,” adding, “Stead’s refusal to comment in these 
instances [of blaming the victim] . . . must be taken as at least a kind of endorsement” (46). 
Kate Lilley makes a similar assessment in her discussion of Stead’s novel, Miss Herbert (The 
Suburban Wife): “Stead’s narrative exemplifies her own morbid and compulsive feminine 
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curiosity: and despite Eleanor’s [the protagonist’s] function as scapegoat, some of the 
opprobrium attaching to her must rebound on her author” (7). Of the novel, Lilley writes, 
“Stead’s novel has itself been viewed as a curiosity or oddity in her oeuvre, and as readers we 
may well feel like Bronwyn in Miss Herbert: ‘I’m eating it and suddenly as I put my tongue 
around it, I feel an absolute horror’” (12). 
          Perhaps also explicable in terms of taboo is the ambivalent kudos afforded authors, who 
are both lionised and somehow suspect. The power of the storyteller to charm, bewitch, and 
entrance, to be a Scheherazade, gives them a certain aura. Yet what makes storytellers 
fascinating also makes them potentially repellent, contaminated figures. The portraits of 
storytellers found in Stead’s writing, such as Peter and Lafe, are of such characters: they are 
somehow beyond the pale, as though they know things that should not be known, and are 
tactless in repeating what really should not be said, but which, nevertheless, is interesting to 
hear. In those portraits the fascination and repulsion with which the central characters are 
regarded is palpable in the narratives. This is the fascination and repulsion felt toward those 
who break taboos. The narratives exert analogous effects on the reader. 
          These points have a bearing on Stead’s story, “The Little Old Lady,” in The Salzburg 
Tales. As with “The Triskelion,” this story explores the incest taboo, although the treatment of 
the theme is more sidelong in “The Little Old Lady.” An Oedipus narrative, “The Little Old 
Lady” investigates the dynamics of a basic social structure, that of mother, son, and daughter-
in-law, a structure regulated by the incest taboo. In this five-page story, told by the Musical 
Critic, a young man is at the opera with his mother and his lover. During the performance the 
mother, the little old lady of the title, chatters away to her son and his lover, in the process 
providing an entirely different narrative of love to the romantic one being staged. Romantic 
love is not real, says the old lady, rather, mother love is real. The little old lady is a template 
for the incessant talkers who dominate Stead’s large novels, and the narrative consists mostly 
of her monologue. She insists that she knows her son best, and that her son loves her best: 
“‘[w]e were so happy. . . . A son is always happy with his mother: he never has anyone to 
love him as she loves him. A mother’s whole life is her son.’” As if this is not enough for the 
young woman to endure, the old lady mysteriously adds, “‘twice we were together.’” She 
repeatedly states that romantic love is only an illusion, no more real than the opera they are 
watching: “‘yes, it is all romansch [the little old lady speaks with a German accent], but that is 
to get the young folks. They believe in it – they are little fools, eh?’” (370). The mother 
fondly recalls, at some length, how her son once loved another woman, a woman “‘with such 
a shweet voice, with such a shweet face’” (372). The son and his new lover are not invited to 
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respond. That something ancient, persuasive, and insidious – something regressive – is 
showing itself is hinted at in the descriptions of the old lady, who is likened to an animal, and 
wears a “little fur coat like a squirrel” (374). The regressive is also indicated metonymically 
when the young woman, or “girl,” glances along the balcony, and sees: 
through the dim light . . . a strange troll sitting on the velvet and gold apron 
of a loge, his aged green mask turned and fixed upon her. The troll very 
slowly turned his eyes to the seat in front of him, and there sat a fair girl 
with a long swan neck, an oval head and the face of an old elf; she wore a 
cream tulle dress, and in it, and in her long, thin, yellow hair, were brilliants. 
She turned luminous green eyes upon the girl: she laughed up with drawn 
mouth and rat teeth at the troll. Her jewelled bodice in the dark resembled 
ribs between which fireflies danced. Presently the troll disappeared, and 
nothing was there but a green opera cloak hanging over the front of the loge.  
(369-70) 
In this passage, given near the beginning of the story, the girl glimpses death and ugliness in 
beauty and romance. This is crystallised in a transformation, as in a fairy tale. The little old 
lady proceeds to introduce death, ugliness, and futility into her son’s relationship with the girl. 
The reader is left thinking that this girl will never supplant her potential mother-in-law in her 
lover’s heart.  
          A proscribed force surfaces in “The Little Old Lady”: the incestuous feelings between 
mother and son. The taboo that prevents the feelings being acted on is evoked. The garrulous 
old lady evoking the taboo, and going to its origins in proclaiming her love for her son, and 
his love for her, is unsettling. The girl and the young man are shown to be uneasy, the young 
man trying to quieten his mother (373). The taboo, however, is never named. It is simply felt 
as being there. The taboo does not work in the girl’s favour. Rather, evoking it underscores 
the strength of attachment between mother and son. The old lady is unscrupulous in 
reminding the young couple of this bond. To the extent that they empathise with the young 
woman, the reader feels despoiled by the old lady.  
          This recalls the larger point about narrative being felt as taboo through contagion. “The 
Little Old Lady” not only implies a transgression, but transgresses by telling it. This 
exceeding of protocol is alluded to by the tale’s narrator, the Musical Critic. In the preamble 
to “The Little Old Lady,” the Musical Critic tells his waiting audience: “I am an inveterate 
and shameless eavesdropper, I listen at the doors of rooms, I pussyfoot along the corridors, I 
read private letters and stare at people in their emotion. . . . I am a connoisseur of the things 
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people say in the dark” (368). His listeners, and readers, become a little of the same. The 
Musical Critic is not unlike Lafe in “My Friend, Lafe Tilly,” and Peter in “I Live in You,” two 
storytellers shown to be infected by the nature of their stories, which raise taboo subject 
matter in addressing death and illicit sexual attraction. These storytelling characters say what 
should not be said. As with Peter and Lafe, the Musical Critic, through his storytelling, 
becomes the agent for spreading the contagion of taboo. 
 
 
Kate Macomber Stern’s book on Stead skirts some of these issues of taboo. She reads Stead’s 
work through theories of decorum. According to her, Stead’s novels are “so flagrantly 
indecorous – they shock our sense of what is proper.” This is the source of the power of 
Stead’s writing. Stern adds, however, that Stead’s works “affirm values which have always 
been cherished – they are profoundly proper” (6). An example of how Stern reads Stead is her 
analysis of the scene in The Man Who Loved Children, in which Louisa writes a play in a 
made-up language that depicts a fatal struggle between father and daughter: in her anger, 
Louisa breaks decorum by showing the depth of feeling between father and daughter, yet 
reaffirms something “profoundly proper” in doing so, as her play is a protest against her 
father’s emotional invasiveness, and involves a call that he maintain appropriate boundaries.  
          The notion of literary decorum, whether taken in the sense of proper style, or in the 
deeper sense of depicting appropriate moral models, does not seem to account sufficiently for 
the psychological, intellectual, and emotional ferocity of Stead’s work. Stead’s narratives 
seem determined to present what is, rather than what should be. Stead’s characters often 
remain accountable to no one and nothing: likeable and good characters are not necessarily 
repaid for their virtues. Notions of decorum remain tied to manners, appearances, and 
instruction, in regard to which Stead’s works display limited interest. However, ideas of 
decorum are not far removed from Steiner’s definition of taboo, when he writes that taboo is 
“the classification and identification of transgressions (which is associated with, though it can 
be studied apart from, processes of social learning)” (147). Decorum might be regarded as a  
regulating arm of taboo, the process of social learning that internalises the taboo. The 
breaking of decorum can, as with the breaking of the taboo, point to the powers of 
formlessness, or chaos, which threaten the orderly and the categorical.  
          One issue that lies on the borderline between decorum and taboo, and which is 
frequently explored in Stead’s fiction, is the dangerous unsociability of loving too 
passionately, whether it be love of another person romantically or sensually, love of the self, 
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or love of an idea (as in a quest, for example). Stead’s work abounds with characters that 
either indulge, or flee from, the chaos caused by loving too greatly. One who loves too much 
is Lilia in The Little Hotel, who is most indecorous in caring for other people – at least, 
according to her snobbish lover, Robert. Many of the characters in the stories in The Salzburg 
Tales love too excessively. Passionate love is shown to be antithetical to playing a decorous 
part in contemporary Western life. The adulterous wife in “Day of Wrath” follows her heart 
and leaves her rich husband for a poor lover, to the outrage of the local community, and is 
ostracised. The two talented artists in “To the Mountain” eschew the world and the city to 
focus on their love of each other: they end up being in love with death, and will their own 
deaths. “The Gold Bride” tells of the passion of two cousins for a woman named Zelis, a 
passion so strong that the cousins withdraw from the world and lock themselves up with a 
statue of Zelis after her death. And loving too much destroys Chloé in “A Colin, a Chloé.” In 
this story, Chloé sacrifices herself to the self-centred Colin.  
          Loving excessively is dangerous, since it has the potential to dissolve boundaries. This 
is articulated in Miss Herbert, when the protagonist, Eleanor, begins to fall in love with her 
daughter’s fiancé. Faced with this passion, Eleanor fears being “pulled away off the earth, out 
of life.” The narrative continues:  
This is love and he knows it [thinks Eleanor]; it would be too strong for me, 
my life would be carried away into a whirlpool, round and round and down, 
in the center, lost and gone; I wouldn’t want to get out of it, I would lose 
myself; I’d be swept away; I don’t want that. I couldn’t live, then all would 
mean nothing. I can’t live like that; what of the past and future? There’d be 
no meaning to the world or time, but this hour and the future hours with him 
would break into everything, flooding everything, everything would be 
washed away.  (304) 
Decorum is about things being in their proper place, and love threatens that. Eleanor, who 
personifies decorum, never acts on her love. 
          Stead often presents those characters who love too passionately (Eleanor is their 
antithesis) in terms of a double character. The double cannot exist in this world, in these 
times, and to pursue such an all-encompassing intimacy is to break a taboo. The double, 
emblem of passionate union or reunion, unleashes a force that threatens institutions, such as 
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marriage, and must be regulated. So much passion directed at another individual is dangerous, 
and it is taboo.4 
          The ancient, unsociable motif of the double informs the intense non-relationship 
between Debrett and Honor in “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” where the taboo on the double holds, 
and Debrett is never able to act on his love of Honor. Yet the evocation of the taboo, by the 
intensity and persistence of feeling between the pair, is sufficient to evoke an uncanny edge – 
it is more threatening than a frisson – in their relationship. Debrett is seemingly an opposite of 
Honor. He is relatively sociable and successful: educated, older, a man, a father. Stead 
ultimately cuts across these points of difference, however, by slowly and implicitly revealing 
a portrait of Debrett as Honor’s double. The novella is Stead’s last sustained exploration of 
the theme of the double, following closely, at least in dates of publication, the portrayal of the 
siblings, Nellie and Tom Cotter, in Cotters’ England. Debrett and Honor are never explicitly 
referred to as doubles (neither are Nellie and Tom). Rather, in spite of their clear differences, 
a growing list of similarities between the two is gradually revealed. These resemblances are 
assembled in different parts of the narrative and never highlighted. Stead is more likely, for 
reasons to do with contrast and irony, to draw attention to the differences between the two 
characters. Yet like Honor, Debrett is lonely. Both have messy family lives. The young Honor 
is fiercely virginal: Debrett seems rather chaste himself. They both indulge in the peculiar 
habit of reading telephone books for the sake of it. Like Honor, Debrett is unsettled and a 
wanderer, pacing the streets of New York late at night, travelling from country to country in 
the latter part of the story, often changing jobs. He is high-minded, too: despite being a 
businessman, the reader is told that he has not much interest in money, and abandons the 
business that he founded with Zero and Scott once it becomes too dubious. Like Honor, 
Debrett has an unsettling habit of telling the truth: “‘[y]ou have to pick your company for Gus 
Debrett,’” says Zero’s wife, “‘[h]e doesn’t care what he says’” (18). Honor’s apparent gift of 
telepathy is given a parallel in Debrett’s sympathy and sensitivity. Debrett is influenced by 
Honor, inspired, for instance, to go overseas after hearing of her failed attempt to travel to 
Italy. Debrett also, in his oddly naïve insistence on Honor’s good character, and his 
willingness always to help her, is a kind of holy fool himself. He is a better socialised version 
of Honor. 
                                                          




          The most persuasive, and most elusive, aspect of the closeness of their relationship, 
however, is Debrett’s sense of Honor as being a part of himself. Stead conveys this 
impression from things left unsaid, lingering memories, troubled conversations: “‘[w]hat has 
she to do with me?’” Debrett asks in exasperation at one point, when talking with Beatrice 
about Honor. “‘I don’t know,’” is all the usually prescient and articulate Beatrice has to say 
(39). Occasionally, Debrett glimpses his affinity with Honor, yet he never quite trusts his 
intuition, and never shows any inclination to act upon their intimacy, other than to buy her 
food and give her money. He is always fobbing Honor off. About half way through the story, 
the reader is told that Debrett had a sister, who died young of “tenement life” (35). This is not 
developed in the narrative, yet presumably Honor reminds Debrett of his lost sister. If only in 
a hint, the motif of the lost and special sibling, present in “The Death of Svend,” “Gaspard,” 
and “A Harmless Affair” in Ocean of Story, is repeated. 
          Some of Freud’s speculations on the theme of the double and the uncanny seem 
relevant to the relationship between Debrett and Honor. According to Freud, “in the idea of a 
double . . . are also all the unfulfilled but possible futures to which we still like to cling in 
phantasy, all the strivings of the ego which adverse external circumstances have crushed, and 
all our suppressed acts of volition which nourish in us the illusion of free will” (“The 
‘Uncanny’” 358). If applied to Honor and Debrett, this interpretation of the double would add 
pathos to a relationship unconsummated in every way. It would also help explain Honor’s 
haunting effect on Debrett, and the sense of opportunity wasted between them, which leaves 
him so desolate at the story’s end. Freud also maintains that the double is ultimately “the 
uncanny harbinger of death” (357). Beatrice seems to recognise this in Honor, shivering at the 
mention of her, as though knowing that the young woman embodies the inevitable.   
          Near the story’s end, Debrett meets Jay, Honor’s old friend. Jay is initially cool toward 
Debrett before confiding his Honor story. They were childhood friends; he had always loved 
her; she had taken him for granted, until abruptly she proposed he marry her. But once 
married, the relationship was not consummated, and Honor left Jay to marry bigamously. The 
double quality of Honor’s actions toward Jay typifies her character. For Jay, she is sacred and 
prohibited. When Jay strongly implies that Honor has always been in love with Debrett, 
Debrett is convincingly shocked, for while the reader feels Debrett must have known this, the 
narrative has made it clear that he resists admitting or acting on any intimacy with Honor. The 
revelation realigns the relationship between Debrett and Honor in the last few pages of the 
novella. The reader, along with Debrett, gains a further glimpse of a more intimate 
relationship between the two main characters.  
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          The novella concludes with Mari, Debrett’s second wife, trying to deny the possibility 
of an intimacy which has persistently survived all obstacles. Learning of Honor’s death, Mari 
insists Honor never loved Debrett: “‘[s]he never loved anyone,’ said Mari. Debrett thought of 
this. He did not believe it, but walking up and down under the trees in someone’s garden, he 
bent his head a little, saw nothing, wiped his eyes with his hands” (60). Mari’s strange 
insistence upon denigrating Honor reinforces the danger posed by the outsider, even in death. 
In regard to Honor, Debrett has observed – has honoured – the taboo: it preserves his 





 “The Captain’s House,” the Blind Field, and the Uncanny 
 
Elizabeth Wright says of “The ‘Uncanny’” that “Freud’s essay as a (w)hole is held up as a 
prime example of the return of the repressed, because what is left out . . . returns to haunt the 
essay” (143). What Wright refers to as “left out” of the work is Freud’s theory of the death 
drive, which nevertheless permeates the essay.1 An uncanny reading effect can result when 
something is left out of a narrative. In readings of a number of Christina Stead short stories, I 
argue that her fiction elides a great deal, but that traces of what is elided remain in a narrative 
in ways that are uncanny. An absence is sensed as a presence: something is felt to be absent 
by design. Michael Wilding touches on this reading effect in his analysis of Stead’s novellas, 
stating that the “manner” of the novellas “leads to a remarkable concision, an elliptical 
compression . . . the elisions and ellipses retaining a powerful energy that imprints these 
stories on the memory” (“Christina Stead’s The Puzzleheaded” 147). Importantly for my 
argument, what is elided is glimpsed in part, but not to the extent that it can be placed or 
categorised.  
          Terminology and concepts to do with the uncanniness of the elided have been 
developed in the visual arts. One concept is the theory of the blind field, a theory developed to 
critique photography, cinema, sculpture, and painting.2 I think it has possibilities for analysing 
literature. 
          In the article, “In the Blind Field” (1998), Margaret Iversen argues that some objects of 
art produce uncanny effects in a viewer when they induce the return of repressed material to 
the viewer’s consciousness. In Iversen’s conception, the repressed material suggests the return 
of the normally hidden death drive (417), a drive conceived by Freud as an urge to quiescence 
                                                          
1 Freud never wrote at length about the link between the uncanny and the death drive, due to 
his arrangement of most of his thinking on each into different works. He raises the theory of 
the death drive in “The ‘Uncanny’” in 1919, only to put on hold any fuller investigation until 
the publication in 1920 of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, a work not explicitly concerned 
with the uncanny. A sense is gleaned, however, in reading “The ‘Uncanny,’” that the death 
drive is the essay’s excised eye. 
 
2 The original concept informing Roland Barthes’s use of the term in Camera Lucida derives 
from observations made by the film theorist André Bazin on the centrifugal nature of the 
cinema screen (166).  
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in all living matter. Iversen teases out this conception of the returning death drive in an 
analysis of Edward Hopper’s paintings. She argues that Hopper’s paintings work powerfully 
on the viewer through an “uncanny surfacing of the death drive,” a “figuration of the death 
drive” (417). The returning death drive creates a “blind field,” a trail of association that incites 
the viewer to create a narrative, suggested by elements in the painting, but which extends 
beyond the painting’s frame. “Hopper always included a blind field in his paintings” (422), 
Iversen writes, and, “in my view the spatial and temporal blind fields of [Hopper’s] painting 
incite a speculation and reverie which is free-associative” (424). It is by “speculation” and 
“reverie” that the viewer moves beyond the painting’s frame, in order to interpret the painting. 
Iversen cites Hopper himself as giving an account of what she means by a blind field: 
“Hopper . . . said of [his painting] Manhattan Bridge Loop . . . that its long, uninterrupted 
horizontal lines were intended ‘to make us conscious of the spaces and elements beyond the 
limits of the scene itself’” (422). These elements “beyond the limits of the scene itself,” 
according to Iversen, evoke the return of the death drive, and constitute a blind field. A blind 
field, then, is a kind of elision: a presence sensed through an absence. It is what is suggested 
by a work, but which lies beyond its border, or beyond what is shown. 
               Something akin to a blind field can be recognised in narratives which “make us 
conscious of  . . . elements beyond the limits of the scene itself.” Before pursuing this point in 
relation to Stead’s stories, I will explore in more detail how a blind field might be created. In 
painting, writes Iversen, the blind field is triggered by techniques also associated with cinema 
and photography. One such technique is cropping: 
The effect of cropping objects in the foreground with the frame is essentially 
a photographic device. Film theorists have developed the idea to 
accommodate their medium. André Bazin notes how the edges mask the 
surrounds and show only a portion of reality: “What the screen shows us 
seems to be part of something prolonged indefinitely into the universe.” It 
leaves even what is centred open and incomplete.  (422) 
The blind field is that which is outside the frame, that which has been cropped. This technique 
is found in Hopper’s paintings, in which what is left out, yet intimated by cropping, returns to 
haunt the viewer. The excised material expands through speculation and reverie, creating a 
blind field. For the purposes of her argument, Iversen limits this returning repressed material 
to the death drive, yet not all repressed material, in Freud’s thinking, is explicitly to do with it. 
I would argue that what is evoked and returns could include any repressed material, or any 
elided material, for that matter. I would suggest, too, that the returning material is unsettling 
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not because it has been repressed or has to do with death, but because it cannot be categorised. 
It is, by definition, outside the frame. 
          Iversen cites other theorists to explain how the blind field is not an effect restricted to 
cinema:  
Meyer Schapiro comments perceptively on this phenomenon in painting 
where foreground objects are apparently arbitrarily cropped: “Such  
cropping . . . brings out the partial, the fragmentary and contingent in the 
image. . . . The picture seems to be arbitrarily isolated from a larger whole 
and brought abruptly into the observer’s field of vision. The cropped picture 
exists as if for a momentary glance.”  (422)3 
A literary equivalent to cropping, which creates a blind field, would be to create a narrative 
where crucial elements are intimated, yet never brought into the centre of the story. What is 
“centred” would be left “open and incomplete.” Such a technique might produce in the story a 
blind field in ways analogous to the use of cropping in the visual arts. Stead, I suggest, 
particularly in her later work, increasingly uses the literary equivalent of cropping. In her later 
fiction, much happens “off-screen” – usually what is most important. This is notable in 
Stead’s novel Cotters’ England (1966). In the novel, the incest in the Cotter family, Nellie’s 
lesbianism, and the malign influence of the Jago bohemian circle on the development of 
Nellie and Tom are excised from the narrative. These things are suggested in as sidelong a 
way as possible, never stated or approached directly. References to them are started, then 
curtailed or cut off: they are cropped. Similarly, in the novella “The Puzzleheaded Girl” 
(1967), Honor’s preternatural qualities are hinted at, yet never made the centre of the 
narrative. It is up to the reader to fill in this aspect of Honor’s character by speculation. The 
effect can be correlated to that of a blind field. 
          This narrative technique, and the uncanny effects which flow from it, is also found in 
Stead’s story, “The Captain’s House,” collected in Ocean of Story. “The Captain’s House” 
was probably written in the early 1950s (Rowley 372-73). The story depicts the household of 
a retired French cavalry captain, a few years after the Second World War. It is set in France, 
                                                          
3 Elsewhere in Iversen’s article she suggests other techniques, in addition to cropping, which 
can create a blind field in a painting: “Hopper’s paintings are like stills from a film: these 
suggest a ‘suspended narrative.’” She also explores how Hopper’s “camera angles” create a 





near Versailles. The narrative consists of low-key episodes portraying the daily life of the 
captain’s household. The captain is grieving his rich wife’s death. Being hard-up, he is forced 
to lodge two tenants, Aldo and Laura, from whose viewpoint the narrative unfolds. The 
captain is anxious that nobody knows he is renting rooms, so that he will not have to pay 
tenant tax. Aldo and Laura become confined by his secrecy. When Aldo falls on the stairs, the 
captain will not let him ring a doctor, so adamant is he that his undeclared renting should 
remain secret. By this stage Aldo and Laura feel hostage, and soon give notice.  
           The surface of this narrative is serenely banal, and this reflects the carefully maintained 
surface of the captain’s household. A scattering of odd details, however, slowly coalesces in 
the reader’s mind, leaving a sense that everything is not as it first seems in the captain’s 
house. The details that stand out in Stead’s narrative are like dots which are slowly joined to 
sketch in what has been omitted. Historical context is largely excised in “The Captain’s 
House”: the characters act in a foreground tightly restricted to the present. Nevertheless, about 
mid-way through the story, some untold aspects of the captain’s house and its history begin 
emerging from the polished surfaces of the narrative present. As these details are revealed, the 
narrative starts to unfold in a much larger context. It becomes almost certain that the captain 
collaborated with the occupying Germans a few years earlier, although this is never stated 
directly. Instead, the inference is gathered from passing references to German officers having 
used the house, while the captain lived downstairs. One of the references alludes to the theft 
by the Germans of the carpets which once covered the stairs. As a result the steps are waxed 
and slippery, and this is the reason that Aldo has fallen on them. Having realised that the 
captain is a kind of collaborator, the reader might wonder if this is the reason that the house 
feels so isolated, with few visitors, an isolation ironically highlighted on the one occasion 
visitors do appear. Are the captain and his house being shunned? The house is surrounded by 
traces of the possibly complicit past: a building across the way that was once a palace; holes 
by the road where soldiers once fought; and inside, the slippery stairs.4 
          These details contribute to the captain’s house feeling oddly besieged. The past 
impinges on the present. The accretion of such details incites speculation in the reader that a 
large portion of this story remains untold. The captain represses his collaboration, just as 
wider French society represses its former collusion with the occupying Germans. The reader 
                                                          
4 The overall impression of the physicality of the captain’s house and its oddly haunting effect 
is not dissimilar to depictions of buildings in Hopper’s paintings: isolated, and somehow 




is made to feel the inevitable return of these repressed things. This is a process correlating to 
Iversen’s concept of how a blind field is created. The excised historical context of the story, 
beyond the narrative frame, is gradually brought into focus, not in the narrative, but in the 
reader. All remains ambiguous, however: Aldo and Laura, along with the reader, cannot 
clearly place the captain and the nature of his house. 
          Also produced in “The Captain’s House” is a sense that the captain, and his kind, are 
haunted by what is to come. Something is looming, somehow both imminent, yet already 
immanent. One way Stead achieves this is by keeping the action and the language of the story 
poised in a liminal present. Present tense is used throughout: an insistence on the present, at 
the level of language, suggests the repression of the past, yet also a temporariness that cannot 
last. A sense is given that a tipping point has been reached, that change cannot be avoided, 
that the future already has a toe-hold in the present. Thus the reader only ever sees the captain 
in a kind of snapshot, “prolonged indefinitely,” to borrow Bazin’s phrase, in an eternal 
present, but one inevitably headed toward destruction. One of the last images in the story 
highlights the precariousness of the present: the captain is pictured dining with his 
housekeeper in a room isolated by the surrounding night, as though the night is set to engulf 
them (286).  
          Other passing references near the end of the narrative, including mention of the ongoing 
mass strikes in nearby Paris, indicate both looming strife and the strangely untroubled 
complacency of the captain and his kind in the face of this strife: “Anne-Rose [the captain’s 
daughter] is restless. During the transport strike, she found an excuse to go to Paris. . . . There 
she stayed with friends in the fashionable Sixteenth Arrondissement, doing office work as a 
volunteer against the strikers; and now she has gone again, to stay there till she marries in the 
fashionable church in which her mother was married” (286). Here, maintaining a certain 
lifestyle, getting married, prolonging traditions – and helping to violently break up strikes – 
are all blithely rolled into one. All serve the ideology of the captain’s house. The language is 
ironically, childishly sing-song. 
          The formation of a blind field in “The Captain’s House” is not only due to the structure 
of the narrative. In this story, Stead uses striking imagery to produce a trail of association. In 
one scene, Laura, one of the captain’s tenants, looks out of her second-storey window into the 
rooms of the old palace opposite: 
Through the windows of the palace in every room, in the drawing-rooms, 
the dining-rooms, the bedrooms, in the hayloft and the attics of the stables, 
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where once the men slept, there can now be seen beautiful raincoats, in 
every paintbox colour. 
   They come out of cases, they are stretched on long tables, they hang in the 
hayloft on racks, they are packed into separate cardboard boxes with tissue 
paper, downstairs; and on Monday they will go away again in trucks.  
   All the fruit-trees, the nut-trees, the flowers of the palace have come out in 
leaf and bud. The girls, women and men have gone home. The wind in the 
forest is coming from the east, it turns over the heads of the trees. The forest 
is beginning to roar.  (280) 
The “paintbox” raincoats, seemingly so out of place, leap from the narrative. This image is 
followed by the images of change, culminating with the simple and ominous sentence, “[t]he 
forest is beginning to roar.” The whole is related in inexorable, processional language, a 
march, with the rhythm and the simple logic of the inevitable. The palace raincoats intimate 
the story of the captain’s house: the workers are already in the palace just across the way, 
making raincoats en masse. The proletariat has already arrived at Versailles, the heart of old 
France, and the palaces are already factories (the wind, after all, is coming from the east). The 
captain and his kind are fated to disappear. The last two sentences in the passage above hint at 
the overturn of the everyday order that, for the moment, falsely preserves the captain.  
          By creating the equivalent of a blind field in “The Captain’s House,” Stead finds a way 
to analyse and dramatise forces at work in French society in the years following the Second 
World War, with only passing reference to the war, no mention of the Cold War, and only a 
sidelong glance at the intense conflict between the left and right of politics which was deeply 
dividing France at the time. The effect is one of extreme economy. Another effect, of a 
different order, is that the captain and his like, living in their short-sighted present, are not 
only felt to be doomed, but to have collaborated, perhaps unwittingly, in that doom. What is 
elided would seem to include a force resembling the death drive: yet the reader cannot be 




I suggest above that a blind field can be created not only by the structure of a narrative, but by 
imagery. To explore this argument further, I draw on Roland Barthes’s theory of the punctum, 
given in his last work, Camera Lucida. Barthes’s punctum is a striking, startling detail which 
cannot be reconciled with the surrounding context in a photograph. It is a detail which cannot 
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be placed, and which creates a trail of association in the viewer’s mind, that is, a blind field. 
Iversen draws on Barthes and refers to him, but she does not use the term blind field as he 
does. She extends Barthes’s conception of the blind field by interpolating into it aspects of 
Freud’s death drive. Barthes, for his part, appears to be at pains to avoid Freudian concepts or 
associations. For him, the blind field is an implied beyond, outside the frame or border of a 
work of art. This much is in common with Iversen. However, the implied beyond, or trail of 
association, that comprises Barthes’s blind field, is set off by a strange, startling, irreducible 
aspect of a photograph, characteristically a detail. This is the punctum. The idea of a detail 
creating a blind field is not taken up by Iversen.  
          In Camera Lucida, Barthes instigates his enquiry into photography by puzzling over 
why some photographs affect him more than others. He identifies his attraction to particular 
images as deriving “from the co-presence of two discontinuous elements, heterogeneous. . . . a 
kind of duality” (23). In a passage outlining the thesis of Camera Lucida, Barthes analyses 
these two elements: 
The first . . . has the extension of a field, which I perceive quite familiarly as 
a consequence of my knowledge, my culture. . . . Thousands of photographs 
consist of this field. . . . What I feel about these photographs derives from an 
average affect, almost from a certain training. I did not know a French word 
which might account for this kind of human interest, but I believe this word 
exists in Latin: it is studium, which doesn’t mean, at least not immediately, 
“study,” but application to a thing, taste for someone, a kind of general, 
enthusiastic commitment . . . but without special acuity.  (25-26) 
A photograph’s studium only interests Barthes in a limited, polite way: “The studium is of the 
order of liking, not of loving; it mobilizes a half desire” (27). It is what defies the studium, 
however, a contrasting second element, which intrigues Barthes: 
the second element will break (or punctuate) the studium. This time it is not 
I who seek it out (as I invest the field of the studium with my sovereign 
consciousness), it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it 
like an arrow, and pierces me. A Latin word exists to designate this wound, 
this prick. . . . This second element which will disturb the studium I shall 
therefore call punctum. . . . A photograph’s punctum . . . pricks me (but also 
bruises me, is poignant to me).  (27)  
These passages indicate that part of the power of the punctum is that it cannot be reconciled 
with the cultural references brought to the work. It resists being explained away or 
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rationalised. It is incorporated yet somehow alien, nagging, and impossible to place. These 
characteristics make it potentially uncanny. Other important features of the punctum are that it 
is often a detail (43), it is usually apparently accidental (47), and it eludes language: “what I 
can name cannot really prick me” (51).  
          Barthes expands his notion of the punctum by linking it to the blind field, a concept he 
takes from film studies. As mentioned, a punctum, according to Barthes, has the power to 
create a blind field. Barthes likens the creation of a blind field by a punctum to the process of 
metonymy: “[h]owever lightning-like it may be, the punctum has, more or less potentially, a 
power of expansion. This power is often metonymic” (45). While metonymy works through 
association, it is not necessarily dependent on physical similarity or analogy. It works also 
through connections between memories, moods, and non-cerebral ways of knowing. Barthes 
gives an example of how a punctum triggers the outward, metonymic trail of association that 
creates a blind field: 
Now, confronting millions of photographs, including those which have a 
good studium, I sense no blind field: everything which happens within the 
frame dies absolutely once this frame is passed beyond. . . . Yet once there 
is a punctum, a blind field is created . . . on account of her necklace, the 
black woman in her Sunday best [pictured in a photograph reproduced in 
Camera Lucida] has had, for me, a whole life external to her portrait.  (57, 
emphasis added) 
A photograph which contains a punctum, explains Barthes, “takes the spectator outside its 
frame, and it is there that I animate this photograph and this animates me. The punctum, then 
is a kind of subtle beyond” (59). In the last sentence here, Barthes rather confusingly conflates 
the punctum with the blind field, identifying the punctum, rather than the blind field, as a 
“subtle beyond.” I would like to keep the two separate, and stress that the punctum is the 
startling detail, while the blind field is the metonymic trail of association triggered by the 
punctum. 
          In Camera Lucida, Barthes implicitly resists a psychoanalytic interpretation of the blind 
field, as he also does of his meditation upon photography as a whole.5 Yet as Freud excises 
the death drive from “The ‘Uncanny,’” it seems that Barthes excises Freud’s essay from 
                                                          
5 Barthes is evidently aware of how close the evocation of loss and desire he analyses in 
certain photographs takes him to Freud’s developmental theories, and perhaps even closer to 
Melanie Klein’s, Otto Rank’s, and the early Jacques Lacan’s theories of the importance of the 
mother in the formation of the self. Camera Lucida, after all, can be interpreted, at least in 
part, as an exploration of the desire to return to the lost mother. 
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Camera Lucida. At one point, however, he directly references the essay, while he attempts to 
distance his theory of the blind field from psychoanalysis. This occurs in the context of 
writing about a longing provoked in Barthes by certain landscape photographs: “Freud says of 
the maternal body that ‘there is no other place of which one can say with so much certainty 
that one has already been there.’ Such then would be the essence of the landscape (chosen by 
desire): Heimlich, awakening in me the Mother (and never the disturbing Mother)” (40). Here, 
it seems that the Unheimlich is disavowed (“never the disturbing Mother”), and the word, 
either in German or in its English translation, “uncanny,” never appears in Camera Lucida. 
Neither is Freud’s essay named, despite Barthes’s citation being taken from “The ‘Uncanny.’” 
Heimlich, however, merges in meaning with Unheimlich, and the concerns with ghostly 
returns and doublings that permeate Camera Lucida make the book an exploration, at least in 
part, of the uncanny.  
          I recognise the creation of something similar to a blind field in many narratives, and I 
have already explored this in my discussion of “The Captain’s House.” I have also suggested 
that a blind field might be instigated in a narrative by a startling image, such as the raincoats 
in that story. Such a startling image could correspond with Barthes’s idea of a punctum: a 
particularly striking image would be a written punctum. The effect of such imagery in Stead’s 
writing correlates with Barthes’s analysis of the effect of a punctum in a photograph. To 
borrow Barthes’s terms, it startles or pierces the reader, creating a trail of association in the 
reader’s mind. It has a “power of expansion.” As with Barthes’s punctum, this imagery is 
often a detail seemingly insignificant to the whole, and it occurs as though incidentally, never 
being the explicit or extended focus of the narrative. It resists easy categorisation. To 
paraphrase Barthes, this imagery pricks, bruises, is somehow poignant to the reader.  
          Before looking at examples of this kind of imagery in Stead’s writing, it is relevant to 
note that Stead critics have often remarked on her facility with imagery. “In the last resort, 
Christina Stead is an imagist,” writes Barnard Eldershaw, referring in part to The Salzburg 
Tales (26). Barnard Eldershaw says of the stories in the book – an observation that would hold 
for much of Stead’s early work – that “the words have an imaginative bloom on them. They 
are a little far-fetched, a little strange, so that they prick the imagination” (24). Here we have 
the strangeness, the “prick” to the imagination that also characterises Barthes’s punctum. H. 
M. Green writes of Stead that “[t]he most notable and characteristic constituent of Stead’s 
style is its images . . . no Australian prose writer has been so rich in images as Christina 
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Stead” (1076).6 Joan Lidoff states that Stead has a “capacity for specificity,” which includes 
an ability to produce singular, startling imagery (105). Randall Jarrell notes Stead’s 
“concentration of experience into a strange and accurate, resonant image” (27). Jarrell points 
to something time-defying about the imagery used by Stead. According to him, time is 
collapsed into the imagery, which is “resonant,” or lingering.  
          An example in Stead’s writing of punctum-like imagery occurs in the tale of the 
deformed person in The Salzburg Tales. This tale is an untitled fragment narrated by the 
Centenarist, and tells of the Centenarist’s grandmother’s experiences while working as a 
servant girl “in a castle by the gloomy lakes of Babiagora between Hungary and Poland” 
(486), no doubt a very frightening place to work. As mentioned, it turns out that someone is 
locked in a hidden room of this castle. One night, the servant girl hears “an outcry in the 
corridors”: 
Running upstairs with two other young servants, she saw in the corridor, 
unlighted except for the moon, a hideous creature, about four feet tall, with 
large phosphorescent eyes, a high nose and a bony forehead, in a thin drawn 
face. It was clothed in a woollen suit of some sort. It seemed to have no legs 
or arms; its hands hung from its shoulders and its feet were fixed to its 
buttocks. The creature was gesticulating with its hands, speaking a jargon 
unintelligible to the servants, and occasionally sighing heavily, while around 
it the baroness and an old manservant were fussing, trying to persuade it to 
go along the corridor.  (487-88) 
In a passage listing unsettling details, it is the woollen suit in particular that makes the plight 
of this “creature” poignant, and pricks the reader. So out of place, yet oddly appropriate, the 
woollen suit tells the reader so much about this hidden person, about his or her care, neglect, 
and the circumscribed world he or she has to live in. The detail is quickly passed over, and not 
fully focussed: it is “a woollen suit of some sort.” The detail is not too fixed but remains open 
and suggestive. A blind field is created, as a whole series of associations opens up in the 
reader, including childhood memories of textures, smells, and helplessness. Institutional 
                                                          
6 Green also suggests: “[e]ach image arises naturally in its place and adds something to what 
is being conveyed, which indeed could not be fully conveyed without it, but Stead’s images 
do not shine out from their contexts as they might otherwise, because it also shines with a 
light that is only less focused and condensed than they are” (1076). I think, though, that the 




“care” and its little depressing horrors are evoked. Through the punctum of the woollen suit, 
this character takes on “a whole life external to [his or her] portrait,” to borrow Barthes’s 
words again. 
          Similarly striking images occur throughout Stead’s writing, images which lodge in the 
reader’s mind, and continue to grow while the rest of a narrative might fade. These images are 
felt as slightly other to the story, even as they proceed from it. Further examples include the 
already cited sea-elephant crawl of the Danish woman after being hit by a car in “The Death 
of Svend,” and the image of the lovers as a spider in “A Russian Heart” (305). In “The 
Triskelion” there is the portrait of Mr Jenkins: “[h]is two small eyes were reddish and 
ichorous, as if they were two little wounds looking on an interior ulcer” (226). Another 
striking image is that of the wavering, upright corpse of the drowned girl, Viola, snagged on 
the sunken ferry in Sydney Harbour in “Day of Wrath”:  
At the end of the week Viola was found on one end of the wreck, standing 
upright, uninjured, her right foot simply entangled in a rope. . . . everyone 
that night had before his eye the image of Viola standing in the green gloom 
for a week, upright, looking for the rescuers, astonished that they did not 
come for her, perhaps with a lively word on her lips at their slowness, and 
then, prisoned by her poor weak foot, decaying, but with her arms still 
floating up; a watermaiden tangled in a lily-root, and not able to reach the 
surface.  (466-67) 
This passage, like the one depicting the deformed person, presents a list of details, each 
disquieting to a degree. After some time, one detail in particular emerges as the main source 
of the passage’s uncanniness: it is that Viola is “upright,” for the dead are meant to lie down. 
Each of the examples above lingers with the reader, and enlarges the effect of its narrative by 
gathering associations.   
          It is also noteworthy that the images each depict something between states. Viola seems 
caught between death and life; the Danish Woman and the lovers under the bush are part 
animal, part human; the deformed person is part monster, part victim and innocent; and Mr 
Jenkins’s eyes blur the line between interior and exterior. 
          In the same general category as these images might be included phrases such as “[m]y 
heart seemed a drop of jet” in “The Death of Svend” (135). The startling effect of this phrase, 
however, seems not so much due to the imagery, as the turn of phrase – “the magic phrase,” to 
use Stead’s words (Seven 302). Strictly, this would constitute a different class of punctum, to 
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do more with sound than image. Stead’s use of the word “magic” indicates the transformative 
power of certain phrases. 
           “The Marionettist,” the opening story of The Salzburg Tales, also contains a punctum 
which creates a blind field. As already mentioned in the second and third chapters above, the 
protagonist in this story, James, abruptly leaves his wife and children and spends fifteen years 
philandering. Then he returns to his family and expects them to look after him. At this point a 
memorable passage occurs in which James, sitting at the dinner table on the night of his 
unheralded return, begins telling his wife and grown-up daughters what he has been doing for 
the past fifteen years: 
“Yes, I had a decent job doing [sculptures of] Dantes and Tuscan girls in 
alabaster, but the pay is not high. . . . So I became a real ne’er-do-weel, 
drank with the other men, went to the cheap theatre, ran after a girl or two – 
there was one in the street just now, who is she? with the face of a 
medallion, a large bosom and small heels sticking out of thonged sandals: 
she waggled her tail at me in a red striped calico, pretty girl – hm. . . . At 
last I got tired and thought I’d come home and let you keep me!”  (65) 
The red striped calico leaps out at the reader, particularly when read in the full context of the 
narrative. The calico is a punctum. It creates a blind field, as James’s mention of it suggests a 
great deal about him, what he has been up to, and why he is now broke. It is a window to an 
untold part of the story. For a moment, James is suspended between being the rake he has 
been, and the responsible husband and father he is seeking to become again. When his wife 
and now-adult daughters fail to embrace him, James returns to live with his elderly mother. 
          The literary punctum, then, could be defined as a detail, usually an image, but 
potentially a turn of phrase, which generates a blind field consisting of the return of elided 
material which defies categorisation. Christina Stead shows a facility for creating such 
imagery from her first-published writings. The uncanny effects deriving from a blind field 
created by the structure of the narrative, whereby what is elided is suggested and becomes 
haunting, is a technique most evident in Stead’s late writing. Both techniques involve an 





“The Rightangled Creek,” Nature, and the Uncanny 
 
 When Mary Douglas writes in Purity and Danger that “[s]o many ideas about power are 
based on an idea of society as a series of forms contrasted with surrounding non-form,” and 
that “[t]here is a power in the forms and other power in the inarticulate area . . . beyond the 
external boundaries” (99), she could well be giving a synopsis of “The Rightangled Creek.”  
Christina Stead’s novella explores the non-form that surrounds societal forms, and dramatises 
the power of this “inarticulate area.” Stead identifies this non-form, and its power, with 
nature. 
          “The Rightangled Creek,” which appeared in 1967 in the collection The Puzzleheaded 
Girl, is a story with an exclusively rural setting. The protagonists, however, are urban 
characters. The responses of these urban characters to their rural surroundings are dramatised 
in a place named Dilley’s Creek, in Delaware. What transpires in “The Rightangled Creek” is 
that nature is given an inchoate agency that the contemporary, Western characters cannot 
accommodate. This agency is associated with a protean quality, or formlessness, which 
threatens and then dissolves the various categories by which the protagonists structure their 
world. For instance, boundaries falter between the categories of human and animal, human 
and nature, physical and psychical, and inner and outer. The dissolution of these categories 
precipitates the return, in the characters, of their various fears and desires. The sweeping away 
of category suggests the power of formlessness. Nature, the ultimate subject of the narrative, 
is depicted as the source of this formlessness. 
          In order to analyse the portrait of nature given in “The Rightangled Creek,” this chapter 
draws upon the various arguments I have made in this thesis in regard to the uncanny. In 
Freud’s terms, the characters “regress” with the return of the surmounted and the repressed; 
this regression is attended by dissolution of categories. And a great deal is suggested in the 
narrative, in the resonant imagery, and in what is experienced as uncannily present yet elided. 
           One definition of nature is that it is the observable natural physical world: nature 
consists of light, water, climate, fauna, flora, and so on. I start with this narrow definition 
since the novella proceeds from such a conception of nature. As the narrative develops, 
however, the materialist definition of nature is challenged, and nature begins to encompass 
something broader and more regressive. It comes to comprise features such as these, 
identified by Val Plumwood as typical of a traditional Western view of nature: “the emotions, 
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the body, the passions, animality, the primitive or uncivilised, the non-human world, matter, 
physicality and sense experience, as well as the sphere of irrationality, of faith and of 
madness” (19-20). A regression is thus traced in the narrative’s characters, from the 
Enlightenment stance of nature as existing “in its own right” (Thomas 90), to a more overtly 
anthropocentric view, dominant in pre-Enlightenment thinking, yet still implicit and ready to 
blossom again in much contemporary thinking.  
          “The Rightangled Creek” is unusual in Stead’s oeuvre in foregrounding the natural 
world and its effects on contemporary urban people. Such an exploration usually takes place 
as part of a larger Stead narrative. In each of her novels, for instance, an extended episode 
occurs in the countryside or a provincial town outside the main metropolitan setting. Contrary 
to the linking of the uncanny to the metropolis in some recent books including Petra 
Eckhard’s Chronotopes of the Uncanny, in Stead’s stories uncanny effects are just as likely, 
or more likely, to emerge in rural or provincial settings as they are in the city. Set entirely in 
rural Delaware, but always with the city of New York as a distant backdrop, “The 
Rightangled Creek” is not unlike an excerpt, comprising the customary rural or provincial 
episode, from a Stead novel. The best-known example is Teresa Hawkins’s visit to the 
fictional “Harper’s Ferry” in the farming areas north of Sydney in For Love Alone; it is also 
the case, however, that rural or provincial episodes in Letty Fox: Her Luck, A Little Tea, a 
Little Chat, The People with the Dogs, and Cotters’ England, notably feature uncanny 
incidents and atmosphere. In “The Rightangled Creek,” what would normally be worked into 
a larger Stead narrative becomes the narrative.  
          In Stead’s works, the city is the site of cultural constructs to do with modernity, with 
materialist, rational, and scientific ways of thinking. These constructs come into question in 
the face of nature. In “The Rightangled Creek,” as in the interludes in Stead novels where the 
action moves out of the metropolis, what is classified as the animal and the natural, and 
partitioned off from the human, begins to reassert itself in the human. What is then 
experienced is the return of something old and once-familiar in the urban characters. What 
was once-familiar, however, is now threatening, strange, and disorienting, and is felt as 
uncanny. 
           Stead’s treatment of the natural world in the novella foreshadows developments in 
recent thinking by environmental philosophers on the relationship between the human and 
nature. For example, Stead’s story explores a de-centring of the human; links between the 
domination of nature and the oppression of women, the Indigenous, and economic oppression; 
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the questioning of dualities to do with the classification of the human and nature, and the 
human and animal; and agency and consciousness in forms other than the human.  
           With regard to the duality between the human and the animal, Elizabeth Grosz 
designates the “place of the animal” as that which “is before, beyond and after the human, the 
uncontainable condition of the human, the origin of and trajectory immanent within the 
human.” Grosz suggests further that, “[t]he animal is that from which the human precariously 
emerges; and the animal is that inhuman destination to which the human always tends. The 
animal surrounds the human at both ends: it is the origin and the end of humanity, the destiny 
to which the human always tends” (3). In “The Rightangled Creek,” Stead’s treatment of the 
relation between the human and the animal, and by extension the natural world in general, is 
similar to that posited by Grosz, whereby nature, and animal nature, is all-enveloping of the 
human. Grosz states:  
We have dealt with the intangible and evasive line that divides the animal 
from the human since Ancient Greece, by creating an oppositional structure 
that denies to the animal what it grants to the human as a power or ability 
. . . . Man must be understood as fundamentally different from the animal, 
an animal perhaps, but one with at least one added category – a rational 
animal, an upright animal, an embarrassed animal – that lifts it out of the 
categories it shares with all other living beings and marks man’s 
separateness, his distance, his movement beyond the animal.  (3-4) 
Grosz questions the categories of human and animal, and, by implication, the human and the 
natural world. This suggests how experiences of nature might be felt as uncanny, given I have 
argued that the uncanny is the experience of that which cannot be categorised. In this chapter, 
I explore how “The Rightangled Creek” depicts just such an unsettling of the categories of 
human, nature, and animal.  
          A context for the way in which Stead writes about nature is provided in some of the 
fiction preceding “The Rightangled Creek.”1 Imagery linking the human and the animal is 
frequent in The Salzburg Tales. In this book, likening the human to the animal, often by 
                                                          
1 There is not space here to consider Stead’s complex treatment of nature in her first novel, 
Seven Poor Men of Sydney (1934). For an analysis of this, see Maria Teresa Bindella’s 
“Searchlights,” and Manfred Mackenzie’s “Seven Poor Men.” See also Wendy Woodward’s 
“Concealed” for a discussion of the ambivalent treatment of the feminine in relation to nature 




imagery, intimates a form of regression, a recrudescence of some usually superseded mode of 
behaviour in the actions of contemporary characters. In “The Triskelion” the entire Jenkins 
family is depicted as animal-like. Mrs Jenkins, for instance, “had a number of tics . . . like 
little animals” (214-15). Animal imagery occurs in “The Little Old Lady,” in which the 
character of the old lady is likened to a rodent, who constantly scratches herself, darts 
inquisitive looks, and wears “a little fur coat like a squirrel” (374). An agency associated with 
the animal is frequently emphasised in these portrayals, as is the inevitable coming to light of 
this agency. This recalls Grosz’s analysis of the animal as “the origin of and trajectory 
immanent within the human” (3). 
          Animal-like depictions of characters in The Salzburg Tales often hint at an abundance 
of energy in nature that threatens to spill over and contaminate. This over-abundance suggests 
nature’s potentially anarchic quality, a threatening formlessness. The unsettling formlessness 
of the natural world is articulated by Kate’s mother in “The Triskelion,” who reacts to a cry 
heard at night in the bush near the ocean: “‘[i]t seemed different from a curlew’s cry, horrid as 
that is. . . . How I hate those birds. And how I hate this everlasting gush and hiss of the sea, 
and those swishing trees. . . . I hate nature: it is full of cries and tears like a female 
madhouse’” (226). Here nature is terrifying, out of control, disorienting, and associated with 
what is both damaged and female. Examples such as this suggest that in The Salzburg Tales 
the natural world is charged with unruly erotic and destructive forces. The manifestation of 
these forces is sometimes felt as unsettling not only by the reader, but also (the reader is 
occasionally told) by the characters in the narratives, as in the passage above.  
          The relation of urban Western characters to nature is explored at greater length and 
depth in “The Rightangled Creek,” and all the points raised above are expanded. In the 
novella, nature is associated with the formless, the potentially threatening, the flooding of the 
past into the present, and a force that possesses agency and is seemingly inevitable. The 
novella’s characters are disturbed by their encounter with nature, which involves for each the 
return to consciousness of an old fear, imaged in the external world, but already present inside 
them. For the characters, staying at Dilley’s Creek is an encounter with “the emotions, the 
body, the passions, animality, the primitive or uncivilized,” as Plumwood characterises one 
traditional Western view of nature (19). 
          Dilley’s Creek comprises two acres of land in rural Delaware, an area too small to farm. 
It is bounded by a creek, and has on it a two-storey house with a deep cellar. The place is 
rented out by two couples in succession, each couple’s tenancy of Dilley’s Creek forming one 
half of the novella. The first couple is Laban and Ruth Davies. Laban, a writer and alcoholic, 
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uses the house for work and as a retreat from his circle of friends, all heavy drinkers. Ruth 
struggles to make ends meet on the few acres, unsuccessfully trying to grow a vegetable 
garden. She is resigned to living in isolation, if only to keep Laban from his alcoholic friends. 
These friends eventually turn up from the city on a spree, intent on claiming their old drinking 
buddy. Laban hides and the group is fooled into thinking that he is not home, but their 
reappearance undermines his determination not to drink. He soon disappears to the city on a 
bender. Penniless, Ruth is forced to move out of Dilley’s Creek, which abruptly ends the first 
half of the novella. Laban and Ruth play no further part in the story. The first part of the 
novella is narrated from the point of view of a visiting friend, Sam. When Sam learns that the 
house has become vacant, he and his wife, Clare, decide to rent it the following summer. Sam 
initiates this decision after thinking back on his stay at Dilley’s Creek with Laban and Ruth: 
“I must remember how pretty it is; it’s really enchanted; it smiles: it’s a dream cottage. Clare 
would love it” (130). The second half of the novella tells of Sam and Clare’s stay at the house. 
The narrative is thus divided into two distinct halves. 
          Sam and Clare, an urban couple, soon discover that the little acreage and its creek teem 
with wildlife. The second half of the novella is told from Clare’s point of view, sometimes 
equated or contrasted with Sam’s view. Stead depicts the natural setting in increasing detail, 
coinciding with Clare and Sam’s growing awareness of the natural world about them. This 
process continues until both the natural world and Clare and Sam’s consciousness assume a 
hyper-reality. The couple’s state of mind is thus shown as altering to try to accommodate their 
confrontation, or commingling, with nature. This passage is an example, taken from the mid-
point in this process: 
“I never lived in so much nature; I never knew I could,” said Sam, laughing, 
tenderly, helplessly. . . . 
   “I read in the Lambertville Gazette [said Clare] that this and the wood on 
the cliff . . . is a refuge for birds and all wild things, everything driven from 
the farms.” 
   The owl hooted. “That’s a dreadful sound.” 
   “Yes.” To comfort him, she remarked, “Where the mice and little birds 
and insects are, there are owls; and mice and little birds where corn and 
insects are.” 
   “Oh,” said Sam Parsons, “I have gotten used to them. Not so long ago I 
would have taken the first train back to New York.”  (146) 
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This passage shows Clare and Sam’s way of looking at the world beginning to shift at 
Dilley’s Creek: this process continues until it shades into an animistic way of perceiving the 
place. Other urban characters in the narrative undergo a similar change, and the return of an 
older way of looking at nature is one means by which uncanny effects accumulate. The 
process correlates with Freud’s observation of how uncanny effects are generated by 
evocations of earlier mental states, or the return of “animistic mental activity within us” (“The 
‘Uncanny’” 363). For example, Sam and Clare are forced to admit that Dilley’s Creek is 
haunted. At first they are loth to grant this. They use euphemisms to communicate to each 
other the comings and goings of a spirit, such as noting that “mice” are going up and down the 
stairs (135, 146, 155). Theirs is not a friendly spirit. At one point, Clare feels it is pushing her 
down the stairs (145). However much Clare and Sam are rationally inclined to deny it, they 
eventually have to acknowledge the force inside the house that is trying to drive them away, 
although they do not know what the force is. The novella is subtitled “A Sort of Ghost Story.” 
          The identity of the haunting spirit grows clearer as the house’s history emerges. A 
neighbouring farmer divulges a curious story about the absent owners of Dilley’s Creek. Their 
daughter, Hilda, came to think she was Pocahontas.2 Hilda dressed as she imagined the Native 
American princess dressed, and acted out the role of the haughty noble. Embracing her role 
further to assume Native American resentment, she attacked her mother with an axe (138-43). 
Clare and Sam learn that Hilda is still alive, consigned to an asylum, and surmise it is Hilda’s 
self-as-Pocahontas who is haunting the house (145). The disturbed woman’s presence is felt 
further as Clare remembers finding a Pocahontas costume in a trunk in a locked room (136-
37). She has also found knives and axes secreted in obscure places about the house (132-33). 
The spirit (can it be a ghost, given Hilda is still alive?) becomes an increasingly insidious and 
persistent presence. 
          In a simultaneous movement, the natural world about the house also becomes an 
insistent and haunting presence, so that the two sources of haunting are intimated as aspects of 
one force: nature, and a returning memory of the Native American, are linked. Nature presses 
increasingly on both the physical house and the consciousness of its tenants. The house fills 
with animal noises and smells. Birds and insects are thick in the trees and grass. A singing 
                                                          
2 Pocahontas, a Native American woman and apparently a chief’s daughter, is credited with 
saving the struggling British settlement at Jonestown. She is said to have acted as an 
intermediary between the settlers and her people. She married one of the colonists and 




spider, living in a corner of the veranda, sings louder and louder (146, 155). The spider is 
given the same name as the spirit – Poky, for Pocahontas – again emphasising a relationship 
between nature and the spirit. A couple visiting Sam and Clare from the city, Bill and Joyce 
Jermyn, soon flee, frightened by the spirit, and overwhelmed by the fecundity of the place. 
Joyce is terrified that she will fall pregnant if she stays any longer (156). A later visit by two 
brothers, the Imbers, ends tragically, when one of them dies after defiantly rolling in poison 
ivy, despite Clare’s warnings. Even the plants at Dilley’s Creek, it seems, are supercharged 
with a vital, essential energy (159). Before these visits, the creek floods, filling the basement 
of the house: in the flood, nature takes possession of the house (149-52). The last unfortunate 
event occurs when Clare breaks her arm (160). Upon this, Sam and Clare finally accede to 
“the great ousting power” (145) of the place, a power partly deriving from the spirit, and 
partly from nature, which they have sensed growing ever since their arrival. They leave. As 
with the first couple, Laban and Ruth, and Hilda’s family before them, Clare and Sam have 
failed to make Dilley’s Creek home. For Clare and Sam and their like, this is “an environment 
gone wrong, uncontrollable, and in which man perhaps, is the unnatural element,” as Rebecca 
Coates theorises the relationship between contemporary Western culture and nature (n. pag.). 
          Another way uncanny effects in “The Rightangled Creek” are developed is when Stead 
presents a series of doublings, most largely figured in the two parts of the story (Laban and 
Ruth’s occupation, then Sam and Clare’s). A series of couples moves through the house, and 
the house is doubly haunted, by the spirit of the possessed Hilda, and by nature. The house 
itself is also doubled. It is “the double house on two acres” (128), with “two porches, two 
pitched roofs and, at the back two tall stone chimneys” (104). The reader learns that having 
two houses in one, one stone and one wood, is architecturally typical of the region: “[t]his is a 
typical way of building ’round here. . . . A farmer builds himself a frame house and when the 
son grows up, he builds on a stone one for the young couple” (106). It seems the stone house 
is built around and over the original wooden structure: 
In the wooden house there was only one room downstairs, the big farm 
kitchen with its two doors, two porches, a long range of windows warm with 
the sun and warm with the big wood-and-coal stove with its double oven, 
standing in the center. . . . There was also a closet; but this turned out to 
contain a staircase leading to the second-story rooms in the wooden house.  
(106) 
This design results in parts of the house remaining hidden. There is a known house, and an 
unknown house. The unknown parts are slowly brought to light as the story unfolds. Other 
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rooms are locked. It is not until some way into the second half of the story, for example, that 
Clare gains access to the locked room where she finds Hilda’s dress-up box containing the 
Pocahontas outfit. The house has an oddly two-sided character too, “completely open but 
inaccessible, neighbors on every hill but invisible” (131). This repeated double quality never 
overreaches a realistic portrayal of place, yet it is strange, since it is repeated in so many 
different forms. The reader cannot help but think that some other meaning than the literal 
must be attached to these doublings. As J. Hillis Miller writes of repeated “emblems” in 
Wuthering Heights, the repetition of something unremarkable in itself alerts the reader to the 
repeated thing having some significance greater than is first apparent. “The details,” Miller 
writes, referring to these recurring emblems, “the reader is led to believe, are the repetition of 
a hidden explanatory source” (42-43).  
          The emphasis on repeatedly depicting nature also has the effect of gathering a 
significance that starts to overflow the literal. The two acres at Dilley’s Creek are rendered in 
even greater detail than the house. The naturalistic opening passages of the story accumulate 
details and build a picture of the place. These passages almost always mention the creek, or 
some watery quality of the place, as on the opening page: “[t]he road rises steeply from 
Lambertville on the Delaware, into hill country. . . . The track drops between Newbold’s 
home-patch. . . . down to a narrow creek. This tiny creek first appears as a meander in a wet 
place, and then as a wallow” (103). Stead returns repeatedly to depicting the aspect of the 
land, its fauna and flora, the light, and the surrounding water:  
Low set in the green below the pouring ivy and lightblow of tiger lilies, 
ahead through thick leaves, was the cottage, with a set of shining windows. 
All the other farmhouses bare on the hilltop were blistered and weathered 
bone-white or raw; this one was fresh in buff and red. Ringed with high 
fields, waters, trees and overgrown ridges, with its lines flowing toward the 
brook, low set and like a pumpkin flower, the cottage was spellbinding.  
(104) 
          Other than the numerous allusions to water, this passage also introduces the stifling 
profuseness of the natural world at Dilley’s Creek, which is developed in the second part of 
the novella: “[t]he warm spring air was thick damp and breeding” (132); “[n]ature thickened 
around them” (135); “[t]he house must have been full of field mice. Each night a skunk and 
its family passed under their window. The woman [Clare] was awakened each night by the 
pungent smell and the knowledge that animals were moving around” (134). This fecundity is 
associated with night, the animal world, water, the feminine, and filling, ripening, quickening, 
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and thickening. Such passages emphasise that Dilley’s Creek possesses a powerful 
reproductive energy, that it is a source of life. The source, however, brimming in its watery 
medium, is potentially dangerous and threatens to overrun the house. Eventually, the house 
does flood.  
          Dorothy Jones, in her reading of “The Rightangled Creek,” links the environmentally 
damaged natural world around Dilley’s Creek to the oppression of women characters such as 
Ruth and Hilda (257-61), and in this way aligns women with nature in the novella. This 
argument holds to an extent, since the women characters are certainly more open to the 
surrounding environment, and try to embrace the place, to live with it. Yet this does not bring 
them closer to nature. As Wendy Woodward writes, “Stead quite explicitly undermines the 
dominant analogy of female to nature in a number of her narratives” (87), and this is the case 
with “The Rightangled Creek.” Ultimately, nature at Dilley’s Creek apparently resents and 
drives away any human presence, regardless of sex. As are the men, the women are repelled: 
Ruth cannot grow vegetables there; Hilda goes mad; and Clare is hounded until she breaks her 
arm and is driven away. For Stead’s narrative purposes, the corralling of nature into one small 
spot at Dilley’s Creek only concentrates something approaching malevolence in nature toward 
the human. The apparent malice in nature, expressed in the haunting of Dilley’s Creek, is 
given as stubbornly unchanging: there are no unambiguous moments of reconciliation 
between nature and the human. This is not a ghost story of the type defined by Ken Gelder 
and Jane Jacobs, who write that the Australian ghost story genre characteristically utilises an 
uncanny “structure in which sameness and difference solicit each other, spilling over each 
other’s boundaries only to return again to their respective places, moving back and forth in an 
unpredictable, even unruly manner – a structure in which sameness and difference embrace 
and refuse each other simultaneously” (42). The embrace in Stead’s story is never returned. 
          As a remnant and a refuge, Dilley’s Creek is a distilled essence of the original area. The 
reason for this, early discovered by Clare, is that wildlife is crammed into a small area as a 
result of the surrounding habitat destruction (146). However, there is a psychic element in the 
nature of the place as well, and the abundance, and the associated danger, increase as Clare 
and Sam’s consciousness expands to comprehend it. Abundance is most associated with the 
creek, depicted at the story’s start as “lively with eels, fish and watersnake” (103). As a 
remnant, Dilley’s Creek is something of the past existing in the present. This past quality of 
the place combines with its superabundance to give an effect of something from the past 
flooding into the present. This is a source of uncanny effects in the novella, as the distinction 
between categories of time – past and present – dissolves. 
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          The early and detailed descriptions of both house and land mean that a duality is 
established between nature and the house, yet only so that the duality can be disrupted. No 
sooner is the duality established than its flimsiness is demonstrated. As soon as Sam and Clare 
move in to Dilley’s Creek, it is apparent that vegetation and animal life constantly intrude 
upon the house and its margins: 
The days passed; nature thickened around them. “The grass and the weeds 
need a-cuttin’,” said [their farmer neighbour] Mr Thornton, on a fine 
summer morning. . . . “Oh, leave them: we’re not making a garden; we like 
things wild,” said Sam. The weeds, white, yellow, purple, wild flowers and 
plants were so high that Sam could walk into them and be hidden. Here the 
birds clung and hunted. Plenty of small things ran about the ground in the 
shade. . . . There were large and small burrows opening around the Dilley 
house, right at the porch and further out. There were skunks; a weasel like a 
big swift worm dived and doubled into his hold by the stops. . . . The creek 
was full of life.  (134) 
The remnant of a division between the outside and the inside only stresses the precariousness 
and contentiousness of the line between nature and the house, inner and outer. The narrative 
maps these realms dissolving into one another as the house becomes “invaded and possessed 
by wild life” (137). Concurrently, and more radically, the narrative moves toward breaking 
down the boundary between the psychic and the material worlds. This happens incrementally 
in the course of the novella. Dilley’s Creek goes from being a metaphor for the mind, to 
becoming a mind, brimming with ideas, intentions, drives, and states of consciousness. The 
setting is even able to manifest thoughts. The other side of this increasing permeability 
between inner and outer is that the interiors of the characters are exposed (I explore these last 
two points further below). Stead brings this complex portrait of place to bear on her characters 
so that setting and character become interchangeable. 
          “The Rightangled Creek” foregrounds setting to an extent unusual for Stead. Characters 
come and go, dismissed with a kind of brutal indifference, echoing the indifference or malice 
of the place, while the same slight plot – eviction – is repeatedly enacted. Meanwhile the 
spirit in the house and the surrounding acres remain in the same fixed, antagonistic attitude to 
people and human events, remorselessly gathering an overbearing presence the longer anyone 
stays, until spirit and nature combine in a flood of hostility, and no human, at least no urban 
human formed by the forces of modern capitalism, can stand the place any longer. Nature’s 





Associated with the profusion of nature at Dilley’s Creek is a magical quality. Dilley’s Creek 
is repeatedly referred to as “spellbinding,” or terms synonymous. “‘It’s spellbound,’” Sam 
says to Clare: “‘You mean we are?’ ‘No, it is.’ ‘Spellbound’” (132). The depictions of 
Dilley’s Creek also repeatedly suggest disturbances of everyday reality, disturbances 
associated with distortions of time, space, causality, number, and scale. These distortions are 
controlled in the narrative in the varying responses to the place by different characters. What 
is initially enchanting, for some, becomes frightening for all. Clare, in her close observation 
of Dilley’s Creek, professes a love of nature, and so appears less perturbed. She feeds the 
animals and lies naked in the sun, “thinking of fertility, surrounded by all the life and love of 
the beast and plant world, part of the earth life. ‘Why is the devil called the Lord of Flies? If 
he is, then we must be close to his hole’” (144). Sam, however, a “big city boy,” slow to learn 
the names of the plants and attend to what is around him, becomes rattled. At one point he 
remarks that the place is “as rich in birds and animals as a Brueghel painting,” as though he is 
attempting to reduce nature to what he has read as a familiar, contained, cultural experience: 
Clare laughed. “A Brueghel painting! Well, not only the sleep of reason, but 
nature breeds horrors; and this is where you feel the multitudes, the creeping 
and running, the anthills and wasp nests, the earth breeding at every pore, 
there’s a sort of horror in fertility and rioting insanity in the hot season. I 
love it.” 
   “Yes, it is the place for you: you will be close to nature.” 
   “But you don’t like nature?” 
   “Why do you say that? I’ve learned to look at things and recognize a few. 
I’m not the bookish man I was.”  (131-32) 
For Sam, identifying, or “recognizing,” the creatures and plants is important, so that he can 
name and place them, and make them less disturbing. Clare claims she revels in nature’s 
chaos and “rioting insanity.” 
          In the passage above, Clare refers not to Brueghel, but to Goya’s famous etching of a 
slumped, perhaps sleeping man, with bats flying over his head. She does this by alluding to 
“the sleep of reason,” which is the title of Goya’s etching. Los Caprichos, the series of 
etchings to which this image belongs, repeatedly depicts disruptions of established relations of 
light and space. The sources of light in “The Sleep of Reason,” for example, are in an 
impossible relation to the shadows thrown. The image known as “The Sleep of Reason” is 
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also unsettling because it intimates a rendering of the sleeper’s inner world. Stead’s portrayal 
of Dilley’s Creek works in similar ways. The internal forces in nature, usually hidden, are laid 
bare, but in confusing relation to one another. This passage depicts such an assault on the 
senses:  
There were many insects about now and in the silence their multifarious life 
could be heard: wasps scraping wood off the rough wooden seat on the 
porch, some insects singing perhaps in their nests, bees humming, the 
immense horseflies droning, the interminable whipping chatter of the house-
wrens and other tiny sounds about the house, half invaded and possessed by 
wild life; they poured out of the sun copiously on the earth, richest in this 
manidle dell.  (137) 
This is typical of the distorting effects of “The Rightangled Creek,” effects evoked with 
increasing intensity in the last half of the novella. The distortions depend upon such devices 
as an insistence on disembodied sound, a free and plastic treatment of time, and changes of 
scale. These are often employed in combination. The archaic-sounding “manidle” seems to 
intimate something of the past in the present, and express a creative forging of the two, while 
the words, “they poured out of the sun copiously on the earth,” for example, evoke 
disorienting confusions of light, space, and number (similar to those Goya creates in Los 
Caprichos and elsewhere).  
          Disorienting too is the concentration on small things which are barely visible, and, 
accordingly, rarely noticed. The identifying of small things in the surrounding world helps to 
create a sense, which pervades “The Rightangled Creek,” that the characters are approaching, 
or are in the presence of, a source or origin. The zeroing in on the microscopic reflects an 
insistent approach to a point of origin. It as though Dilley’s Creek has been put under a 
microscope, and the elements of the place are suddenly made large and visible. In depicting 
very small things, Stead also uses terms that equally indicate largeness, such as 
“interminable,” “copiously,” and “multifarious.”  Flies are “immense.” The very small, and 
the very large, meet. One result is an impression that quantifiable number and time are 
effaced. Another result is that qualities that would normally be polarised or considered 
opposite become united at Dilley’s Creek: discrimination, measurement, categorisation, break 
down. Maria Teresa Bindella notes similar techniques in Stead’s novel, Seven Poor Men of 
Sydney. Analysing Stead’s depiction of searchlights on Sydney Harbour, Bindella writes, 
“distances are abolished and physical space is summed up into a whole where the detailed and 
measurable is made to coexist with the indistinct and immeasurable” (98). 
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          A focus on the very small is one way the narrative brings to light what is usually 
hidden, or unobserved. Things are also unobserved because they are deemed insignificant, or, 
later in the novella, unobservable because of their psychic nature. Clare is interested in these 
things, in “unrecognized part[s] of nature, like the faintest sound of a spider scuttling under 
leaves, or a cat’s footfalls. Few hear them; they were there” (133). As with the double aspect 
of the house, there is visible nature, and invisible nature. The unseen aspects of nature are 
nevertheless felt to be present.  
         In these ways, “The Rightangled Creek” presents nature as uncanny: disorienting, 
unsettling, invading the house, in a state where categories cannot hold. Also notable is that 




Stead consistently likens the land around Dilley’s Creek to the watery element. Clare often 
sees it as though underwater: 
Two small windows set at floor-level . . . looked down upon the green, the 
weed patch, in which birds flashed; and the clear shallow saucers of the 
brook surrounded by orange and white flowers could be seen; all swimming 
in the hollow full to the top with sun and the invisible but thick and moving 
damp. If you are an underwater swimmer and have visited rock-cities, 
floated over weedy and sandy bottoms which the fish know, looked down, 
like a fish, that is the liquid sort of scene you see.  (136) 
Clare views the scene from the point of view of a diver, or even a fish (the blurring of the 
distinction between viewpoints is typical of the novella). Stead foreshadows this passage a 
few pages earlier, when evoking animals active in the night about the house: “[i]t was a lake, 
a deep pool of animals, a deep pool filled to the top with air and in it animals, not fish” (134). 
The creek, and the watery element, has taken over this part of land: the two elements merge. 
Stead also often links the presence of water, or a watery effect, with enchantment: “ringed 
with high fields, waters . . . its lines flowing toward the brook, low set and like a pumpkin 
flower, the cottage was spellbinding” (104). The place is under the power, or spell, of water.  
          Are there associations between water and the uncanny? Instances exist in Stead’s work 
in which water is closely associated with the surfacing of something inevitable from the past – 




There was a family there [by Sydney Harbour] named Baguenault . . . but 
disaster fell on it, and its inner life, unexpressed, incoherent, unplanned, like 
most lives, then became visible as a close and tangled web to the neighbours 
and to itself, to whom it had for so long remained unknown. Who can tell 
what minor passions running in the undergrowth of poor lives will burst out 
when a storm breaks on the unknown watershed? There is water in barren 
hills and when rain comes they spurt like fountains, where the water lies on 
impermeable rocks.  (2-3) 
          Freud’s analysis of the uncanny begins from a not dissimilar reference to water. At the 
start of his essay, “The ‘Uncanny,’” Freud cites the etymology of the word heimlich, listing 
several pages of dictionary meanings, and, as I mention in the introduction, noting how the 
word’s meaning can sometimes merge with its antonym, unheimlich. He italicises two 
passages of particular interest to him. The first italicised passage, which becomes the starting 
point of his essay’s argument, is this example of a usage of the word by an author named 
Gutzkow:  
“The Zecks [a family] are all ‘heimlich’. ” . . . “‘Heimlich’? . . . What do 
you understand by ‘heimlich’?” “Well. . . . they are like a buried spring or a 
dried-up pond. One cannot walk over it without always having the feeling 
that water might come up there again.” “Oh, we call it ‘unheimlich’; you 
call it ‘heimlich’. Well, what makes you think that there is something secret 
and untrustworthy about the family?”  (343-44) 
In this instance, it seems to be water’s power of returning and coming into view that 
associates it with the uncanny.  
          This is not the only reason, however, that water might lend itself to eliciting the 
uncanny. Water is part of nature, and “The Rightangled Creek” repeatedly returns to this most 
basic condition of life. Perhaps it is the indifference of water to human life, even though 
essential to it, which is unsettling for humans. The visiting Joyce seems to sense the 
simultaneously threatening and life-giving aspect of water when she exclaims, after coming 
back to the house from the creek, “[t]here are snakes in the water; watersnakes. Oh, I know I 
shall get pregnant here; the place is alive” (156). It is also disquieting that in flood, water can 
return over the land and cover it, and Stead’s narrative emphasises that being at Dilley’s 
Creek is like being underwater, as though everything is drowned. Then there is the constantly 
changing and moving quality of water, as though water is a being in itself. In “The 
Rightangled Creek,” water is invested, too, with sentience and deliberate action: in the flood it 
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acts in concert with the other natural forces to help drive out the unwanted tenants. It is due to 
water that Clare and Sam are eventually forced to leave, when Clare slips and breaks her arm 
in a puddle of water. Also, water and the unfriendly spirit are connected when Clare listens to 
the spirit moving through the house at night: 
The living sleeping night was all around, close, formless, rich and 
suffocating as a mother’s breast. On the black breast of night she fell asleep, 
too. The footsteps passed her again; she did not hear them . . . they slept. 
The faceless haunter of the stone house moved slightly through the open 
attic door and down the closed stairs; with the strength of water behind 
glass, without shape and ready to pour through, it mixed with the moonlight 
at the locked glass door, mixing as blood with water, smoking, turning.  
(146) 
In the passage the reader seems stuck, along with Clare, at a still forming source of life, 
“suffocating” in a maternal place, attached to a “breast,” where all is “formless,” “faceless,” 
and “without shape.” The formless water, or spirit, is on the cusp of gaining a new form. The 
formlessness displays a protean potential (“with the strength of water behind glass”) on the 
point of coming into being (“mixing as blood with water, smoking, turning”). This is the 
potential of the still unborn, formless yet alive, gathering, in process, caught between two 
states. Ian Reid articulates the quality of Dilley’s Creek as “inchoate impulses that emanate 
from the fertile and fluid natural surroundings” (55).  
          The constant references to the wateriness of Dilley’s Creek, along with its fecundity 
and inchoate quality, suggest the place is a womb, and Clare is in the womb. Qualities of 
purity and impurity are associated with the womb, and for some it is an uncanny place. 
          Adding to the startling quality of the passage is that the movement of the spirit through 
the house happens while Clare is asleep, yet it is read through her consciousness, as though 
the reader is inside her sleep.  
          The uncanny quality of water, then, is attributable not only to the surfacing of 
something normally hidden, but to confusions of category around water. These ambiguities 
are suggested in the “smoking, turning,” formless aspect of water. Water is “[p]rinciple of 
what is formless and potential,” writes Mircea Eliade, “water symbolizes the primal substance 
from which all forms come and to which they will return either by their own regression or in a 
cataclysm. . . . immersion means a dissolution of forms, a reintegration into the formlessness 





At Dilley’s Creek, not only nature, but fancy, multiplies and runs amok, paralleling nature’s 
“riotous insanity.” This is reminiscent of a taboo’s contagious nature. This fancifulness, or 
propensity to illusion, affects to some degree every tenant or visitor at Dilley’s Creek. It 
involves the return of something from the past. Hilda, the disturbed daughter of the owners of 
Dilley’s Creek, is a victim of a dangerous proliferation of fancy. Sam and Clare are told that 
Hilda first began acting erratically after seeing a circus act portraying Pocahontas. After the 
routine, Hilda adopted the persona of the circus Pocahontas, living out a colonial fantasy of a  
Native American person: “[Hilda] began to say she was Pocahontas, and she was a-goin’ to 
marry Captain John Smith [leader of the English colony]. She forgot she was [already] 
married sometimes. She forgot about the baby. So they bought her a doll and she seemed to 
think sometimes it was a baby. . . . she thought she was this Indian princess” (140). Then there 
is Laban’s wife, Ruth, who early on is ashamed to admit to Sam that she imagines that a 
“hairy man” lives in the attic of the house. “‘Don’t leave me, Sam,’” she says, “‘[t]here’s 
something peculiar about this place. Do you know I have an obsession that there’s someone in 
the attic, a huge hairy man. . . . It’s foolish of me to have such fancies; I’m not the type of 
woman’” (128). Sam and Clare are also each affected in turn by fancy. Sam is strangely 
perturbed by surrounding bird calls, while Clare feels herself being pushed off the stairs by 
Hilda’s spirit. She says to Sam: 
   “She tries to get rid of everyone: it is still her place.” 
      “Don’t say those things.” 
      “Why?” 
      “It’s dangerous.”  (153) 
           This proliferation of fancy seems to be associated with buried anxieties coming to the 
surface. In particular, the anxiety of the settler toward the Native American culture insists on 
expressing itself, as Hilda’s story shows. This is not the only repressed fear that returns, 
however. Dilley’s Creek is a place where the mechanism of repression begins to fail, and 
everyone, it seems, has a particular fear or desire, or fearful desire, exposed. Different 
repressions emerge from different characters. For Laban, the love of alcohol returns to reclaim 
him, in a dream featuring “a nest of fluorescent snakes where Ruth had put her stockings” 
(121). For Ruth, it is the “hairy man” in the attic, some sort of repressed sexual fear or wish, 
or something even older – a recrudescence of a race-memory, or perhaps the return of a 
Native American belief to do with the land. Clare too seems overly aware of the hairiness of 
the visiting Bill Jermyn, as Reid points out in his article (54), and even the nearby hill is 
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“hairy” (153). And, as mentioned, Sam, generally imperturbable and reasonable, is 
persistently disturbed by the cry of birds, particularly the mourning doves. When he goes for 
evening walks, “he would soon be in, certainly; for the mourning dove had begun his grieving 
and sobbing, a desolate sound in this sunken place. . . . To Sam the mourning dove was 
horrible” (133). The call of the mourning doves evokes painful associations for Sam, which 
he is unable or unwilling to articulate.  
          Toward the end of the story, repressed anxieties come to the surface with increasing 
ease and frequency. This corresponds with the depiction of Dilley’s Creek as having a 
consciousness. The distinction between the consciousness of the characters and that of the 
place becomes permeable. Human fears become externalised and manifest in the exterior 
world. They swim out from an inside that no longer holds against an outside. This is most 
clearly illustrated in a late cameo involving the minor character, Joyce. While visiting Dilley’s 
Creek, Joyce expresses sexual discontent with her husband, Bill: “‘[w]hat I ought to be 
looking for is a wolf. There are no wolves here. There’s nothing for me.’” The next afternoon, 
“a gray long-haired animal leapt the creek, and howling, whining in fear, rushed to the porch 
and crawled under it.” After witnessing this, Bill says, “‘I wouldn’t spend another night here: 
by the morning you may be invaded by bears and moose. This is just a piece of the great 
northern world that has got loose.’” The next day the couple departs in fright, Joyce saying of 
the wolf, “‘it’s a specter’” (156-57). The wolf is an animal associated with transformation and 
a potential rapaciousness in nature. At Dilley’s Creek, it freakishly reappears, as though 
through a hole in time. There were no wolves left in Delaware at this time.3 This continual 
irruption of the repressed, and the return of an older world, renders Dilley’s Creek 
uninhabitable.          
          Stead portrays Dilley’s Creek as a place that is characterised in part by the return of the 
repressed and, in the evocation of the supernatural and the animistic, the surmounted. These 
things are associated with formlessness: various categories can no longer hold. Characters are 
confronted with their origins, both in the broadest possible sense as being derived from 
nature, and in a narrower sense, in being confronted with the origins of contemporary 
American society by an irruption of the colonial past in the Hilda-Pocahontas story. The 
return of fears in almost all the characters in the novella suggest that there is no easy “return 
                                                          
3 Barry Lopez details the almost pathological hunting of wolves by settlers in the forty-eight 
mainland states, until by 1945 wolves remained only in Alaska, apart from a tiny remnant 
population in northern Minnesota and on an island on the Great Lakes (173-74). 
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to nature” for Clare and Sam and their kind, as what may have been once familiar in nature is 
now strange, and fears live in this strangeness.  
          These fears are linked to unresolved economic and social injustices. Plumwood writes, 
“[b]ecause ‘nature’ has been a very broad and shifting category and has encompassed many 
different sorts of colonization, an adequate account of the domination of nature must draw 
widely on accounts of other forms of oppression” (1). Many forms of these “different sorts of 
colonization” do not escape Stead’s analysis. In the novella’s treatment of the Pocahontas 
story, in which the conquering of the Indigene is entwined with the domination of nature, 
colonisation is linked to the destruction of nature, destruction of the Native American culture, 
and issues of race. And, in the story’s economic analysis, a connection is made between the 
exploitation of nature and economic exploitation under capitalism. Wilding notes how the 
plans to convert Dilley’s Creek to an artists’ colony are carried out by the Imber brothers with 
insensitivity to the environment. “The Imbers,” writes Wilding, “trample in with a lack of 
reverence before nature, the ecological environment, cutting new water courses. . . . we have 
moved to the arrival of the brash materialists, insensitive to others; the insensitive ‘semi-
socialists’” (“Christina Stead’s The Puzzleheaded” 165). Yet nature fights back: the elder 
Imber brother dies after rolling in poison ivy, having ignored as mere superstition Clare’s 
warning against doing this (158-59). At Dilley’s Creek, the natural world is not only 
indifferent to the human, it is actively hostile to it. None of the projects planned for the place 
– an artists’ colony, a writers’ retreat – ever come to fruition, and the acres cannot be farmed. 
As Reid notes, “[t]he consistent pattern then, traced in this novella, is one in which the 
ordering of culture (the house, but also domestic arrangements and literary enterprises . . .) are 
partly subverted by . . . impulses that emanate from the . . .  natural surroundings” (55). 
 
 
I mention above that nature at Dilley’s Creek is associated with a point of origin, a source. 
Dilley’s Creek also stimulates the imaginations of whoever stays there. Can nature and 
imagination, or creativity more generally, be linked in “The Rightangled Creek”? Might the 
novella be read as a meditation on the origins of creativity? Laban is portrayed as working 
furiously at his writing near the beginning of the story, and both couples who visit Sam and 
Clare are inspired to see the place as a retreat for artists. In a natural sense, Dilley’s Creek is a 
place creative to the point of riotousness, it is dangerously creative. The potentially 
imaginative creativity of the place is also clearly dangerous, as an excess of imagination leads 
to the delusions that inflict Hilda, Ruth, and Joyce. The sources of creativity in the story – 
168 
 
whether prompting negative or positive creativity, fancy or imagination – include a sense of 
mystery and wonder, cultural myths, changes of perspective, and the coming to light of 
repressed drives. Primarily, however, it is nature itself that inspires creativity. 
          A meditation on creativity would correspond with the blossoming of Stead’s own full 
creative powers because, although it was not published until 1967, “The Rightangled Creek” 
was apparently drafted in 1937 and 1938 (Rowley 244). The dense style of the work, similar 
to the “American” novels that soon followed, tallies with this date. During her stay in 
America, Stead had completed four long novels and drafted another. These include her most 
commercially successful and critically acclaimed works (The Man Who Loved Children and 
For Love Alone), and, according to some critics, her most verbose and least successful work 
(A Little Tea, a Little Chat). The natural profusion which the novella depicts presages Stead’s 
own most prolific years, and it furnishes a notable instance of what Fiona Morrison identifies 
as “Stead’s interest in capturing a kind of vital materiality” (“Modernist” 7). 
          With the focus on the natural world in “The Rightangled Creek,” Stead returns, in 
several senses, to the roots of her storytelling. As noted in chapter three above, Stead’s father 
was a naturalist, and her late autobiographical essays, collected in Ocean of Story, highlight 
the importance of her father and nature to her storytelling. The essay “Ocean of Story,” for 
instance, associates the origin of story in general with the natural world (4-5). Stead identified 
with the figure of the naturalist, as in, for example, a 1980 interview with Rodney Wetherell, 
in which she made this often cited declaration: “I was brought up by a naturalist and I am a 
naturalist” (441). “The Rightangled Creek,” then, with its themes of nature and creativity, 
addresses issues close to home for Stead.  
          Reading the novella as a meditation on the source of creativity might suggest why 
Dilley’s Creek is portrayed as a taboo place. The source of anything perceived as essential to 
life attracts taboos. Springs, as the source of water, and therefore life, are often taboo places. 
Taboos demarcate these vulnerable, yet also potentially dangerous, points of origin. In “The 
Rightangled Creek,” is Stead demarcating the source of her creativity? If so, then the source is 





I first read a book by Christina Stead twenty-five years ago, and can still feel the shock of that 
work’s power. My reaction to The Man Who Loved Children begged the question: what made 
the writing memorable? I read other works by Stead, and each produced intellectual challenge 
and emotional involvement. This thesis is an analysis of an aspect of how this is achieved in 
Stead’s work. I started from two observations: the works were experienced in reading as 
strange, and they were difficult to categorise.  
          In the introduction to this thesis, I link the qualities of strangeness and 
indeterminateness to the uncanny. The thesis then argued for and articulated connections 
between the difficult-to-categorise and the uncanny in relation to a number of shorter and 
longer Stead stories. In a discussion of “The Triskelion,” I first found that uncanny effects 
have no one source in the narrative, but several sources. I investigated how some of these 
corresponded, but only in part, to Freud’s different classes of the uncanny. These classes 
include the return of the repressed and the surmounted. In chapter two I extended this to a 
discussion of the appearance of the death drive in a number of other Stead stories in The 
Salzburg Tales. In these discussions, I argued for the importance of ambiguity of category in 
producing uncanny effects. For example, in the case of the death drive, it is not so much the 
appearance of the drive itself that is uncanny in Stead’s stories, but the difficulty in 
categorising its manifestations in the literary representation. 
          Chapter three developed this thesis by investigating how story can be a medium for 
what is difficult to categorise. I analysed how several storytelling characters in Stead’s writing 
tell of the hard-to-place and the forbidden. The stories told by these characters are uncanny, I 
maintained, because they focus on what is difficult to categorise. I extended the point to show 
how in telling uncanny stories, the storytellers themselves sometimes become uncanny.  
          The next chapter linked what is difficult to categorise, and thus uncanny, to the 
formless. I did this by drawing on the writings of Mary Douglas, who theorises the formless 
as the unclassifiable or hard-to-place. I argued that Stead depicts characters, such as Honor in 
the novella “The Puzzleheaded Girl,” as unclassifiable, and thus formless. Following 
Douglas’s argument about the nature of the formless, I then argued in chapter five that the 
formless, or that which cannot be categorised, has links with the taboo. This led to a 
discussion of taboo and uncanny effects in Stead’s stories, and in literature more generally.  
           The sixth chapter drew on theory concerning the blind field in the visual arts, in order 
to analyse uncanny effects which result from certain kinds of elision and imagery in Stead’s 
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works. I adapted two conceptions of the blind field: the first suggests that what is elided from 
a work can return in the subject, and the second suggests that a striking image or detail in a 
work can elicit a trail of association in the subject. I argued that in Stead’s writing, both this 
kind of elision and striking imagery can induce feelings of the uncanny, as they result in 
bringing to light the hard-to-place. 
          The seventh and last chapter brought together the preceding arguments on the uncanny 
to discuss the various uncanny effects in the Stead novella, “The Rightangled Creek”: 
categories come under question in this work, allowing for the return of the repressed and the 
surmounted. Dilley’s Creek, the setting of the novella, is felt as uncanny and taboo, and a 
place of protean power. 
 
 
Further work that might be done, arising from my thesis research, will now be briefly 
discussed. The methodology I have used in this thesis, which draws on aspects of 
anthropological and psychoanalytic frameworks, and visual arts theory, can shed light on 
aspects of Stead novels. My arguments in regard to the death drive, for instance, could inform 
a study of repetition in these works. Repetition is a distinctive feature of Stead’s writing – 
“her repeated returns,” as Susan Sheridan puts it (Christina 17). The circling form of many of 
Stead’s novels, their apparent formlessness, and the recurring figure of the double might be 
analysed in terms of the uncanny as it is understood in this thesis.  
          A valuable analysis of Stead’s novels could be done through focusing on their rural or 
provincial interludes, sites that have unusual and disruptive qualities in each work. In my 
reading of the novella, “The Rightangled Creek,” I indicated that the uncanny is likely to 
surface in a Stead novel when the narrative moves to locations outside the metropolis. Brigid 
Rooney makes a similar observation in regard to Cotters’ England. In her reading, 
Bridgehead, Stead’s fictional town in the north of England, is a scene of “regression,” a place 
where “half-articulated narratives . . . break to the surface,” including the knowledge of the 
incest in the Cotter family (“Strange” 250).  
          Methodologies that theorise colonisation, the post-colonial, and post-coloniality could 
be of use to analyse the provincial or rural uncanny. Fiona Morrison’s article, “Modernist,” 
touches on the potentially uncanny provincial aspect of two of Stead’s novels, and provides a 
comparative discussion of Katherine Mansfield’s story, “The Woman at the Store,” in terms 
of the provincial and the uncanny. Rooney, in “Time’s Abyss,” reads “Day of Wrath” for 
what the story can “reveal about the province” (104), and argues that, in the story, Sydney 
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Harbour is given an “uncanny status . . . [t]he watery abyss encircled by land is only 
apparently tamed and domesticated and belies the security of settlement” (106). Also 
potentially relevant to a reading for the uncanny in Stead’s works is the proposition, explored 
by Ken Gelder and Jane Jacobs in Uncanny Australia, that the relationship of contemporary 
settler culture to the landscape in Australia is uncanny: the land is simultaneously home yet 
not home, familiar yet unfamiliar. Stead sometimes included this dynamic in her writing, 
especially in her many portraits of wandering characters. It is as though she exported the 
experience of being a settler Australian, as characterised by Gelder and Jacobs, to wherever 
she lived and wrote. This could extend an analysis of Stead’s work as transnational writing.  
          My account in chapter three of the storytelling characters in Stead’s fiction pointed to a 
potential uncanniness deriving from the allusive quality of storytelling. I returned in chapter 
six to an exploration of allusion in Stead’s stories, in the discussion of the blind field which 
generates a variety of allusion through free-association. Allusion in Stead’s work could be 
discussed in terms of uncanny haunting, and might draw on Jacques Derrida’s notion of the 
supplement. Seemingly endless supplementarity is a distinct feature of many Stead narratives, 
both in relation to themselves and other narratives. A Stead narrative can give the impression 
that it might proceed indefinitely, powering itself by consuming and incorporating other 
discourses.  
          Related to this point is the facility with which Stead synthesises various influences in 
her narratives. R. G. Geering and Michael Ackland note Stead’s ability to absorb her 
antecedents’ works into her own, as does Ann Blake, who writes of Stead’s “subtle 
incorporation of the poetic resonance of folk tale” in The Man Who Loved Children and For 
Love Alone. In a testimony to Stead’s power of synthesis, Blake writes: “[i]n neither of these 
novels is there a crude sense of the narrative splitting to work on two levels; neither invites a 
reductive identifying of motifs” (“Christina Stead’s Ocean” 120). Stead’s ability to 
incorporate her influences contributes to her working in several different modes or genres 
simultaneously. It also means her debts to other authors can pass unnoticed, although Stead 
sometimes foregrounds allusion in order to suggest alternative readings for a narrative: “[t]he 
surface reality of Stead’s characters is frequently disturbed by undercurrents of allusions to 
fairytale, myth, legends or old dramas,” as Denise Brown puts it (206). This technique could 
be explored further in terms of an uncanny coming to light of the old in the new. Jonathan 
Arac, in an article examining the influence of Charles Dickens and Mark Twain on the 
character of Samuel Pollit, makes a start on analysing this kind of allusion in Stead. Arac 
identifies how the cultural influence of these two authors is “refunctioned” through the 
172 
 
character of Samuel Pollit – refunctioning being a kind of channelling, appropriation, and 
resetting of voices. Studies of this kind might profitably read Stead through writers such as 
Balzac, Stendhal, and Maupassant. The influence of the major dramatists can also be felt as 
curiously present and alive in Stead’s work. The deathly old lady in “The Death of Svend,” 
for example, uncannily resembles the Rat Wife, the harbinger of death, in Ibsen’s Little Eyolf.  
          An intriguing development in Stead’s fiction, when it is viewed in an arc from early to 
late work, is a shift in emphasis from the optical toward the aural. Many critics note that her 
early work is extremely visual, yet few note how unusually aural her late work is. Susan 
Carson is one who notes “an increasingly strident aural signature in [Stead’s] late works” 
(254). As Stead’s work progresses, descriptions and imagery are increasingly replaced by 
dialogue and monologue, so that there is a movement from the eye to the ear. This correlates 
with the steady disappearance of any authorial comment or guidance, as the reader is left 
increasingly with voices, and voices almost disconnected from a context (Nellie in Cotters’ 
England and Emily in I’m Dying Laughing are remembered as floating voices). There is 
something uncanny about the unattached voice. This ever-increasing focus on the voice might 
be discussed in terms of “the development of intensified stylistic devices” in Stead’s late work 
(Carson 253). 
          The mingling of the extremes of subjectivity and objectivity is another distinctive 
feature of Stead’s work, and this might be analysed in terms of the uncanny. Laurie Clancy 
writes of The Man Who Loved Children and For Love Alone: “[t]he novels are alike . . . in 
uniting two apparently disparate traits. On the one hand there is a sense of intense familiarity 
on the author’s part with the world of her novels. . . . Nevertheless . . . there is also a sense in 
which both could be described as extraordinarily impersonal. Stead seems to be totally outside 
the events she describes with such graphic realism, fullness and immediacy” (3-4). Writing on 
I’m Dying Laughing, Brigid Rooney notes “[t]he simultaneous exercise of sympathy and 
detachment” (“Crossing” 31). Maria Teresa Bindella is another critic who comments on the 
breaking down of boundaries in Stead’s work between categories predicated on the 
relationship between objective and subjective (104).  
          Although Stead’s writing has often been discussed in the light of feminist and Marxist 
theory, potentially fruitful lines of enquiry still exist in relation to methodologies that make 
central gender, femininities and masculinities, economics, class, and the uncanny as it is 
understood in this thesis. In relation to feminist theory, I have alluded to issues associated 
with the “feminine” to do with excess and the overflowing of conventional boundaries: while  
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a fuller exploration of the links between the feminine and the uncanny is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, more might be made of the transgressive or “monstrous” feminine, particularly as 
there is a substantial body of feminist critique on Freud’s essay, “The ‘Uncanny.’” In regard 
to the writings of Marx and Engels, Stead’s sometimes seemingly mechanistic characters – 
including Emily Wilkes, Sam and Henny Pollit, Robbie Grant, and Nellie Cotter, each of 
whom seems to talk unstoppably – owe something to Marx’s writings on the spectralisation of 
relations between people, their labour, and social structures. Bruce Holmes suggests this in 
regard to characters in House of All Nations: “[their] drift towards spiritual death, from an 
ideological point of view, can be seen as the logical outcome of an alienated society, 
according to Marx’s ‘analysis of reification’” (278).  
          An investigation of possible links between shorter fictional forms and the generation of 
uncanny effects, a topic beyond the focus of this thesis, may also reward further analysis. 
          In this thesis I have sometimes argued against current and received ideas about the 
uncanny, in particular the Freudian uncanny. For example, I suggested, at greatest length in 
the first chapter, that the uncanny in literature need not be limited to forms of realism, but that 
uncanny effects can be elicited in any literary genre, including the marvellous. In the case of 
the marvellous – for instance Kate’s narration in “The Triskelion” – although uncanny effects 
may not be able to be derived from the surmounted, they can still be derived from the 
repressed or the death drive even as theorised by Freud, and they can certainly derive from 
ambiguity of category. Then, in the second chapter, I suggested an uncoupling of uncanny 
effects from any exclusive link with modernity. These arguments invite a reading for the 
uncanny in writing other than the modern and the realistic. This methodology could be used to 
read works such as Ovid’s Metamorphoses or Apuleius’s The Golden Ass, examples of pre-
modern texts which include uncanny passages. These works are structured to make the most 
of the unsettling power of uncanny effects. 
           I have shown that an understanding of the uncanny as derived from ambiguity of 
categorisation illuminates the source and nature of uncanny effects in a number of examples 
of Stead’s shorter fiction. Works discussed in this thesis, including “The Marionettist,” “The 
Death of Svend,” “The Triskelion,” “I Live in You,” “The Captain’s House,” “The 
Rightangled Creek,” and “The Puzzleheaded Girl” are among Stead’s most accomplished and 
memorable, and I have demonstrated that their power is due, in no small part, to their 
uncanniness. It is my hope that the arguments developed in this thesis can be applied to 
analysing how and for what ends uncanny effects are produced in other of Stead’s works, or 
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